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I. INTRODUCTION
A bought a car from B, and it subsequently became evident that
the car had not belonged to the seller, or that there was a valid charge
upon it; A leased from B a commercial building in order to operate
an industrial enterprise, and then found that the applicable zoning laws
preclude such use of the property; A made a contract for the purchase
of two hundred tons of wheat, and the seller supplied her two hundred,
and thirty tons; B performed electrical work in A's house, and because
the work was carried out improperly, a fire broke out soon after,
resulting in personal and other injuries; B undertook to supply A with
a car of a certain make, and delivered a car of different manufacture.
Should the promisor ("B") bear liability in all of these cases?
Approaching this question requires a two step investigation. The
first step concerns the possibility and desirability of dealing with all
of these situations (and other similar situations) within the same ana-
lytical framework. Do all of these cases share a common denominator,
so that a single, unified set of rules could apply to all of them? Once
we answer that question affirmatively, the second question is whether,
and under what circumstances, should liability be imposed on the prom-
isor.
In one sense, the first question is one of form while the second is
one of substance. The first has to do with the choice between a system
of various specific rules, each of which applies to a narrowly defined
situation, and between a system of a few broad rules, based on a
unified conceptual framework. The second question deals with the jus-
tifications for imposing liability. Yet, as is also the case in many other
contexts, form and substance are interdependent. If we accept that all
the cases are similar, then the same substantive considerations must
apply to them, and they should all be governed by basically the same
rules. At the same time, one cannot treat all the cases as similar unless
the same justifications are indeed applicable to all of them.
The objective of this article is, therefore, twofold. First, we shall
try to show that from the point of view of contract law,' a sufficient
resemblance exists between the various situations previously discussed,
so as to make a unified treatment of them both attainable and worth-
while. We shall suggest that such a unified set of rules can be based
on a general concept: the conformity of the performance of the contract.
The main task will not be to indicate the similarities between the cases
1. Some studies focus on a typical factual situation and examine all the possible
rules applicable to it (contractual, tortious, regulatory, etc.). See, e.g., Bearman, Caveat
Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14.Vand. L. Rev. 541 (1961).
This study instead concentrates on one legal concept that may apply to a great variety
of scenarios. It views the various situations from a contractual perspective only.
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(which are quite patent); rather, it will be to delimit the applicability
of the suggested concept so that it will not be too broad or abstract,
and therefore practically meaningless. The second goal is to show that
the introduction of obligations based on the principle of conformity is
justified in light of various views about the role of contract law.
In order to demonstrate the real need for a general concept of
conformity, Part II of this study comprises a short survey of the main
features of conformity rules (i.e., the rules dealing with the quality,
quantity, and other aspects of the contract's object-the goods, the
leased property, etc.) in several legal systems. this comparative study
reveals that most systems (both Anglo-American and Civil Law) do not
recognize a general concept of conformity. There are a few exceptions,
such as Austrian law and Israeli law, in which the principle of con-
formity may be revealed with relative ease. In most other systems,
however, the principle is concealed behind a web of historically charged
doctrines and rules. However, since the rules established in almost all
legal systems reflect the reasons and justifications for recognizing the
concept of conformity, it seems desirable to "import" it into them as
well. In that sense, the proposed concept has both explanatory and
critical aims.
In Part III an attempt is made to describe the principle of con-
formity, from which specific rules can be derived for the conformity
of the object in different contracts. This part will discuss the concept's
scope of applicability, its legal structure, and the main issues with which
the rules derived from the basic principle must cope.
Finally, Part IV is dedicated to the "substantive" question of the
justifications for imposing conformity obligations on the promisor. The
question will be dealt with in light of various theories about the role
of contract law, and the role of contractual default rules in particular.
II. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
A. General
This is not an appropriate framework for a full description of the
conformity rules in a comparative and historical perspective. For our
purpose, it suffices to state some central characteristics of the conformity
rules in several legal systems. A general review of the conformity rules
in Civil Law systems (mainly the French and the German) will be given
first, and a short description of Anglo-American law will follow. Finally,
a brief account of the present issue in Austrian and Israeli laws will
be given, in order to demonstrate that the complex sets of rules found




B. Absence of Coherent Guidelines in Most Legal Systems
1. Civil Law Systems
a. Roman Law
To a large extent, Roman law still forms the basis of most of the
continental legal systems, especially regarding the conformity of property
in sales. In this field, Roman law evolved gradually in the direction
of extending the seller's liability. 2 This development coincided with
changes in the Roman economy, which grew from a primitive, agri-
cultural economy to a commercial power by the standards of the ancient
world. Already in the old Roman law, the seller bore responsibility for
fraud (dolus) or breach of express warranty. Fraud included non-dis-
closure of known defects in the object. Liability for express warranty
arose not only out of an actual promise, but also from any represen-
tation or even description of the object, provided they were not mere
puff. There are grounds to believe that even a tacit representation could
give rise to such liability.
Alongside these bases of liability, the aedilitian reliefs, originating
in the edicts of the aediles, gradually evolved. At the height of their
development, these reliefs applied to every severe defect that precluded
the possibility of using the property for its ordinary purpose, or which
significantly impaired its usefulness ("redhibitory" defects). The seller's
liability for these defects was not conditioned upon his knowledge of
the defect. The redhibitory remedies were two: an action for the re-
scission of the contract (actio redhibitoria), and an action for a reduction
of the price (actio quanti minoris). During the first six months after
delivery, the buyer had the option of either rescission or reduction.
For the second six months following delivery, the buyer was entitled
to reduction only. The advantage of the aedilitian remedies was that
the seller's liability was not contingent upon any actual undertaking or
fault. The disadvantages, in comparison to ordinary liability for an
express undertaking or fault, were the short periods of applicability,
the limitation to severe defects, and the restriction of relief to the
2. See generally Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey. 14 Tul. L.
Rev. 327, 347-360 (1940). 14 Tul. L. Rev. 529 (1940); Mackeurtan's Sale of Goods in
South Africa § 336, at 238-243 (B. O'Donovan 4th ed. 1972); A. Watson, The Law of
Obligations in the Later Roman Republic 86-91 (1965); Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim
Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L.J. 1133. 1156-58 (1931); A. Rogerson, Implied Warranty Against
Latent Defects in Roman and English Law, in Studies in the Roman Law of Sale,
Dedicated in memory of F. de Zulueta 112 (D. Daube ed. 1959); F. de Zulueta. The




protection of the restitution interest (with no right to reliance or ex-
pectancy damages). It should be noted that Roman rules of noncon-
formity referred only to hidden defects. Thus, the seller bore no
responsibility for defects of which the buyer was aware, or which were
so patent that the buyer should have been aware.
Whereas the information we have on the Roman law of sale is
quite comprehensive, our knowledge concerning the Roman law of leases
and contracts for services is more limited.3 According to one source,
dealing with a lease of a rural farm, if at the time of the delivery,
the leased object suffered from a defect of which even the lessor was
unaware, the remedy of the lessee was not to pay the rent.' Only if
the lessor knew about the defect and did not disclose it, was the lessee
entitled to damages as well. Though it is not clear whether this rule
applied to residential leases, the prevailing view is that the lessor was
indeed obligated to deliver a property which was fit for the contemplated
purpose.' However, even if Roman law imposed an ex lege responsibility
for the conformity of the property at the commencement of the lease
(in the absence of an actual undertaking or the lessor's knowledge of
the defect), it appears that a breach did not entitle the lessee to remedies
that would protect his expectation or reliance interests, but only his
restitution interest. As for the lessor's obligation regarding the condition
of the property during the lease period, the lessee was exempt from
paying the rent for the period in which his enjoyment of the property
was precluded due to a factor unrelated to him,. whether caused by
force majeure or by the lessor.6 Where the lessor affected the lessee's
use deliberately and unjustifiably, the lessee was also entitled to full
damages for his losses. Otherwise, the lessee was entitled to damages
only if the lessor had expressly or impliedly accepted responsibility for
the condition of the property. Despite the clear inequality between the
socio-economic status of lessors and lessees, the Roman law did not
prohibit the contracting out of these responsibilities by lessors.
With regard to contracts for services (locatio conductio, hire of
work), it seems that liability of the contractor was based on fault. Lack
of suitable skill, however, was also deemed to constitute fault.7
3. The development of any legal field is largely determined by the extent of litigation
within the field. Considering leases, and lessees' rights in dwelling leases in particular,
various factors have led to the result that there is almost no recourse to courts for the
realization of rights. See B. Frier, Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome 48 (1980).
4. Corpus Juris Civilis, D.19.2.19.1 (Ulpian/Serv., Lab.. Sabin.).
5. See B. Frier, supra note 3, at 153-54; M. Kaser, Roman Private Law 221 (3d
ed. 1980 trans. from Germ.); A. Watson, supra note 2, at 115.
6. A. Watson, supra note 2, at 116; M. Kaser, supra note 5, at 184; B. Frier, supra
note 3, at 150-53.




The salient feature of the conformity rules in German law is the
existence of a special set of rules regarding the seller's responsibility
for the quality of the object in sales contracts. These rules are different
from the ordinary rules applicable to other contractual obligations (such
as the obligation to deliver the object), both in terms of the scope of
the seller's liability and the remedies available to the buyer. As for the
conformity of the sale object in every other respect except its quality,
and as for the conformity of the object in any other transaction (in
all respects), the ordinary rules of contractual liability apply.
i. Sales Transactions
The warranty against defects in the sale object in German law
(Gewahrleistung fir Sachmangel) is very similar to the rules of redhi-
bitory defects in Roman law. This warranty relates to two kinds of
cases. The first includes any defect in the object of the sale that destroys
or significantly diminishes its value or fitness for ordinary use or for
the purpose provided in the contract. The other kind of case has to
do with the absence of any quality that the seller promised the object
would have (Section 459 of the BGB). The seller is not responsible for
defects of which the buyer was aware at the time of the formation of
the contract. With regard to defects of the first kind, the seller is also
exempt from responsibility if the buyer remained unaware of them due
to gross negligence, unless the seller had knowingly concealed them or
had undertaken that the object would be free of defects (Section 460
of the BGB).
The seller's liability is not conditioned upon her fault or even her
knowledge of the defect.' However, the law restricts the buyer's remedies
and augments the burdens imposed on her. Several provisions in the
BGB and in the Commercial Code (Handelgesetzbuch-HGB) impose
on the buyer burdens directed to prevent a delay in the realization of
her remedies. The period in which the buyer must realize her rights is
quite short (Section 477 of the BGB), and in commercial transactions
Kaser, supra note 5, at 224; S. Martin, The Roman Jurists and the Organization- of
Private Building in the Late Republic and Early Empire 38, 89-113 (1989).
8. See Daniels, The German Law of Sales: Some Rules and Some Comparisons, 6
Am. J. Comp. L. 470, 490 (1957); N. Horn, H. Kdtz & H. Leser, German Private and
Commercial Law: An Introduction 125 (1982). This is an exception to the basic approach
of German Law, according to which contractual liability requires fault. See Riegert, The
West German Civil Code, Its Origin and Its Contract Provisions, 45 Tul. L. Rev. 48,
75-78 (1970); N. Horn, H. K6tx & H. Leser, supra at 112-15; E. Cohn, Manual of
German Law, Vol. I, § 221. at 118-19 (2d ed. 1968-1971).
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there are also special burdens of examination and notice (Section 377
of the HGB).
According to Section 462 of the BGB, the buyer is entitled to
choose between reciprocal restitution of the sale object and the price
paid, that is, a rescission of the contract (Wandlung), and proportional
reduction of the price (Minderung). Under the law of warranty, the
buyer is entitled to damages (in lieu of rescission or reduction)
only if the seller has promised that the object possessed a certain quality,
or if the seller deliberately concealed a defect of which she knew at
the time of contracting (Section 463 of the BGB).9 The buyer is entitled
to demand a substitute for the defective property only if the object of
the sale is a fungible good (Section 480 of the BGB). In no other case
is the buyer entitled to enforcement, either by way of rectification of
the defect or by replacement of the property.' 0 The buyer's remedies
under the rules of warranty are considered lex specialis, and therefore
exclude recourse to any other cause of action, such as defects in the
formation of the contract, or the ordinary rules relating to the im-
possibility of performance (Unmglichkeit)." A buyer who is not sat-
isfied with these special remedies (which ordinarily protect only her
restitution and reliance interests) may try to rely on the judge-made
doctrine of positive breach." It is not easy to determine the borders
and inter-relationships between the rules of warranty and the rules
concerning liability for positive breach. Assuming the prerequisites for
positive breach have been met-including proof that the breach involved
fault-it seems that the proper remedy would coexist with the remedy
for the defect, though not with regard to the defect itself. In many
instances, the buyer can thus obtain damages for the harm that the
breach caused to her other interests, while the loss arising out of the
very existence of the defect is remedied under the rules of warranty.
As previously mentioned, in German law the rules applicable to
defects in the sale object are different from those that apply to other
9. See K. Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, Bd. i: Besonderer Tell, 64 (12 Aufl.
1981).
10. Unless the parties agree otherwise, as is usually done by referring to general
conditions applying to commercial contracts. See N. Horn, H. Kdtz & H. Leser, supra
note 8, at 127.
11. See E. Cohn, supra note 8, § 258, at 133; Daniels, supra note 8, at 494.
12. In German contract law there is no general, unified concept of breach. The
general concept Leistungsstdrungen (irregularities in performance) evolved only in the
1920's. The BOB is based on the theory that all incidents of breach may be classified
under one of two headings: delay of performance (Verzug) or impossibility (Unm6glichkeit).
Only after the enactment of the BGB, was the residuary category of positive breach
(positive Vertrogsverletzung) developed by the courts. This category includes all other cases
of breach. See generally N. Horn, H. K6tz & H. Leser, supra note 8, at 90-115; 2 K.
Zweigert & H. K6tz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 179-86 (2d ed. T. Weir transl.
1987); A. von Mehren & J. Gordley, The Civil Law System 1104-23 (2d ed. 1977).
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types of nonconformity of the sale object. This division requires difficult
decisions in various border-line cases, especially between the delivery
of a defective object (peius) and the delivery of a different one (aliud),
and between qualitative and quantitative nonconformity. The general
law of contract applies to the delivery of a different object and to
quantitative nonconformities. Thus, the buyer is entitled to the full
scope of remedies for breach, including enforcement and damages as
routine relief.
The two aforementioned distinctions raise many difficulties. Does
the delivery of a metal desk instead of wooden one constitute a qual-
itative defect, or a delivery of a different object? Is the excessive length
of timbers delivered a nonconformity of quality or of quantity? 3 The
German law has not yet succeeded in doing away with these delicate
distinctions, though it limits their effects. With regard to the burdens
of examination and notice imposed on the buyer in commercial trans-
actions, the HGB applies the special burdens also to the case of a
different object (aliud), provided that the delivered merchandise is not
so obviously different from that ordered that the seller must have
understood that the buyer's approval could not be forthcoming (Sections
377, 378 of the HGB). The difficulty in this rule is that it implements
a new distinction between different types of aliud property. The disparity
between the rules has further been reduced by the courts that have
determined that the shortened period of limitation under the warranty
rules applies to the case of aliud property as well.' 4 The rule provided
by Section 378 of the HGB and the case law regarding the period of
limitation also apply to quantitative nonconformity. Nevertheless, the
basic distinctions between defective and different property, and between
qualitative and quantitative nonconformity are still in force in German
law. Not only are these distinctions difficult to operate and their very
justification dubious, in certain situations they actually render the po-
sition of the seller who supplies a wholly different object preferable to
that of the seller who supplies a defective one."
Legal defects in the sale object (Rechtsman gel, Section 434) are
another kind of nonconformity not regulated by the warranty rules.
The buyer's primary remedy is to claim performance of the obligation,
to demand that the title be transferred to her or that any third party
right be removed. Additionally, she is entitled to all the ordinary
13. For an analysis of these fine distinctions in a comparative perspective, see E.
Rabel, Das Recht des Warenkaufs, Bd. 2, 124-28 (1967).
14. See id.
15. The rule by which the injured party must give the party in breach an additional
period to perform his or her obligation, as a pre-condition for obtaining the remedies of
rescission and damages (§ 326 of the BGB), does not apply to the case of defects in the
sale object. See E. Rabel, supra note 13, at 126.
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remedies available in the case of non-performance of a mutual contract
(Section 440), including damages and rescission (Sections 323 to 326).
To complete the patchwork of different rules applicable to non-
conformity of the sale object in German law, it should be added that
the special warranty rules apply only from the time of the passing of
risk. If the buyer discovers the defects before delivery to her, she may
reject the object. Though it is not clear, it appears that in such a case
the buyer may also require that a conforming object be delivered to
her.' 6 Also worth mentioning is Section 493 of the BGB, which applies
the special rules concerning the quality of the sale object to other
contracts for alienating or for giving a charge upon a thing for value.
ii. Leases
The rules of conformity in leases under German law are free of
the difficulties resulting from the existence of a separate set of rules
on quality defects, as is the case in the German law of sales. The
lessor's obligations of conformity are subject to special provisions, but
they are considered ordinary obligations. In sharp contradiction to sales,
legal and physical defects in leases are treated under the same rules.
However, here too the situation is not entirely simple. The conformity
obligations in leases are divided into two categories. The first category
includes obligations relating to the usefulness and maintenance of the
object. The second category regulates the issue of defects in the leased
object. The distinction between these two types of obligations is not
chronological; both apply with regard to the condition of the property
at the beginning of the lease as well as during its term. The distinction
is not very clear, and even its justification is questionable.
Section 536 of the BGB deals with the usefulness and maintenance
of the object. The lessor is bound to hand over the property in a
condition appropriate to the stipulated use, and she must keep it in
such condition during the period of the lease. Inter alia, the lessor is
required to refrain from disturbing the lessee's use, and may also be
subject to accessory obligations of doing (facere).'7 Although in principle
the lessor's obligation may be contractually waived, in residential leases
the lessee's remedy of rescission may not be excluded (Section 543 end).
As for defects, Sections 537-540 lay down the lessor's obligations re-
garding defects in the leased object, and Section 541 applies these
provisions mutatis mutandis to defects of title. The definition of a
defect in leases is basically the same as in sales, yet the lessee's remedies,
unlike those of the buyer, ordinarily include specific performance and
damages (Section 538) as well.
16. N. Horn, H. Kdtz & H. Leser, supra note 8, at 129.
17. See K. Larenz, supra note 9, at 186.
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iii. Contracts for Services
In contracts for services (Werkvertrag)-like the rule in leases and
unlike the rule in sale-the obligations of conformity are considered
as ordinary contractual obligations.'8 The definition of defect in Section
633(1) of the BOB adopts the elements of the definition of defect in
sale (Section 459). Usually, the object in a contract for services does
not exist at the time of the formation of the contract, therefore the
proviso concerning defects of which the promisee knew or must have
known is usually irrelevant. Instead, special provisions refer to cases
in which the orderer does not cooperate with the contractor.19 As in
sale, the orderer's remedies are subject to short periods of limitation
(Section 638). However, no special burdens of examination or notice
(the kind that Section 377 of the HGB provides with regard to com-
mercial sales) are imposed on the orderer. The orderer, like the lessee
and unlike the buyer, is entitled to the full scope of remedies. However,
the provisions of the BOB regarding the orderer's relief-particularly
the rule according to which the orderer's remedies (rescission, reduction
and damages) are mutually exclusive and the short periods of limita-
tion-give rise to considerable difficulties. These are conspicuous mainly
where a defect, discovered after the short period of limitation, causes
personal and pecuniary damages beyond the mere decrease in the work's
value. These difficulties have been solved for the most part by the
"positive breach" doctrine and by a ruling that in a claim for damages
the aggrieved party may return the defective object and demand damages
for the complete failure of the contract. 20
c. French Law
As in German law, the point of departure of French law is that
the seller, the lessor and the contractor bear responsibility for the
conformity of the object. This responsibility is not conditioned upon
fault, and the aggrieved party is generally entitled to the full scope of
remedies for a breach. Yet, the French law, as laid down in the Code
Civil and as developed in doctrine and case law, includes even more
classifications and distinctions between different aspects of the con-
formity of the object in every kind of contract. We shall briefly refer
to some of the features of conformity rules in sales and leases.
Sales-The definition of latent defects in sale (Section 1641 of the
Code) adopts the definition of redhibitory defects in Roman law. The
18. Id. at 280, 284-85. See also T. Sfiss, Wesen und Rechtsgrund der Gewihrleistung
fiir Sachmingel § 18, 186-88 (1931).
19. See §§ 642-643 of the BGB; W. Lorenz, Contracts for Work on Goods and
Building Contracts, in VIII Int. Encyc. Comp. L., Ch. 8, § 121, at 118 (1980).
20. W. Lorenz, supra note 19, § 79, at 79-80.
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buyer is bound to inspect the property prior to purchase, and the seller
bears no responsibility for defects which were detectable by such in-
spection.2
Under French law, the seller's knowledge of a defect has three
important implications: first, a seller who knew of a defect and con-
cealed it cannot argue that the buyer could have discovered the defect
by herself prior to the conclusion of the contract; second, any agreement
designed to exclude the seller's liability for latent defects has no effect;
and, third, the buyer is entitled not only to protection of her negative
interests, but also to positive damages for a concealment of the defect.2
In light of these effects, one can appreciate the great significance of
French case law, according to which professional and commercial sellers
are considered as knowing the defects of the things they sell, and cannot
prove that they did not or could not know thereof. 23 This holding
creates a sharp distinction between the rules applicable to the occasional
seller and those that apply to commercial dealers. As to the latter, the
burden of previous inspection imposed on the buyer is not as significant,
the buyer is entitled to damages as a matter of course, and the seller's
liability cannot be contractually waived.
If the buyer sells the object to another, and even if it is resold
more than once, the seller continues to bear responsibility for hidden
defects towards the sub-purchasers. According to French case law, every
buyer is entitled to institute an action based on the guaranty for latent
vices against her direct seller as well as against all prior sellers, including
the manufacturer. 24
21. The courts distinguish between the severity of the burden imposed on a layman,
as opposed to a professional buyer. See Encyclopdie Dalloz, Droit Civil 2e ed, T. VIII,
Vente (Obligation du vendeur) arts. 473-481, at 26-27 [hereinafter Dalloz]; P. Le Tourneau,
Conformitis et garanties en droit franqais de ia vente, in Les ventes internationales de
marchandises 232, at 255 (1981). On the scope of the examination burden placed on the
buyer, see also Durnford, What is an Apparent Defect in the Contract of Sale?, 10 McGill
L.J. 60 (1964); Gow, A Comment on the Warranty in Sale Against Latent Defects, 10
McGill L.J. 243 (1964); Durnford, Apparent Defects in Sale Revisited, 10 McGill L.J.
341 (1964); Gow, A Further Comment on Warranty in Sale, 11 McGill L.J. 35 (1965).
22. On the first rule, see Dalloz, supra note 21, § 480, at 27. On the second rule,
see Planiol & Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law, Vol. 2, Part I, § 1468, at 822 (lth
ed. 1939, La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959); Morrow, supra note 2, at 534. On the third rule,
see infra.
23. Juris-Classeur, Civil, Vente, arts. 1641-1649, Fasc. X-3 § 197 et seq., at 37 (11,
1986) [hereinafter J.C.C.l; Malinvaud, Redhibitory Defects and their Importance in Con-
temporary Society, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 517, 519-23 (1976). On the distinction between
professional and non-professional sellers, see generally J. Ghestin, Conformit6 et garanties
dans la vente (produits mobiliers) 243 et seq. (1983).
24. See Dalloz, supra note 21, §§ 522-528, at 29; Malinvaud, supra note 23, at 523-
24; G. Berlioz, Remedies for Breach in Contractual Chains of Sales: A French Perspective,
in Survey of the International Sale of Goods 287, 294 (L. Lafili, F. Gevurtz & D.
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As is the case under German law, various aspects of the conformity
of the sale object are regulated in French law by rules external to those
of guaranty against hidden defects (garantie des vices cachks). These
external rules are connected primarily to the obligation of delivery and
to the rules concerning the object of the contract-the property sold.
The cases of delivery of a different (aliud) object, and the conformity
of the object in terms of its described quality" or quantity are dealt
with within this framework. The courts are not very particular about
the distinction between defective and different things, and they tend to
extend the incidence of the liability for redhibitory defects to cases that
prima facie fall under the delivery of a different thing.26 Contrarily,
the tendency is to preserve the distinction between defects and non-
conformity of quantity, in spite of its difficulties, and to apply the
rules of guaranty in border-line cases.2 7
Another category of rules, which are neither part of the rules of
guaranty nor of the rules relating to the object of the sale or its
delivery, includes instances of nonconformity resulting from deficient
user instructions, from damage caused to the object due to mishandling,
or from faulty packaging .2  Yet another set of rules applies to legal
defects in the sale object, according to Sections 1626 et seq. of the
Code (garantie d'eviction). The seller's responsibility is regulated as a
warranty derived from the seller's obligation to provide the buyer with
quiet possession and to prevent her dispossession, and not as a derivative
of a rule concerning the conformity of the title. The guaranty relates
both to disturbance by third parties (garantie du fait des tiers), and to
disturbance by the seller herself (garantie du fait personnel).9 The Code
provides detailed provisions regarding the circumstances in which the
seller bears responsibility and regarding the burdens imposed on the
buyer who wishes to rely on the breach.
Campbell, eds. 1986). On the different justifications suggested for this doctrine, see also
Barham, Redhibition: A Comparative Comment, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 376, 379-84 (1975).
25. Suppose that a bicycle of a different color than that agreed upon is supplied,
and this nonconformity is significant in the circumstances, e.g., the color reduces the
chances of marketing it to the public. This is not a defect diminishing the usefulness of
the object, thus the guaranty relating to hidden defects does not apply to it. It is considered
a breach of the seller's central obligation: delivery of the object. See J.C.C., supra note
23, arts. 1641-1649, Fasc. X-1, §§ 26-27, at 10; P. Le Tourneau, supra note 21, at 254.
26. R. ZUrah, La garantie des vices caches, Thkorie gtndralJ du vice rddhibitoire dans
les ventes de marchandises, in Hamel, La Vente Commerciale de Marchandises 339, 365
(1951); M. Amaudruz, La Garantie des Dtfauts de la Chose Vendue et la Non-conformit6
de la Chose Vendue 24-25 (1968); E. Rabel, supra note 13, at 126.
27. M. Amaudruz, supra note 26, at 38-39.
28. Malinvaud, supra note 23, at 524-26.
29. As will be explained in Part 1II.C.I infra, only the first type is relevant when
considering conformity obligations. The second type is a non-facere obligation imposed
on the seller, and not a case of defect or nonconformity in the object.
[Vol. 52
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
Additionally, the special difficulties concerning defects in buildings,
particularly in transactions relating to buildings under construction, have
led to specific legislation in this field. The Code was amended in 1967
and 1978, and a special set of rules was introduced regarding defects
in contracts for the construction of buildings, the sale of buildings
under construction, and the sale of erected buildings where the seller
is also the contractor or the promoter. 0
Moreover, there are difficulties concerning the relationship between
the rules of guaranty against hidden defects and the rules on mistake
in the formation of the contract, 3' the rules of tortious liability, 2 the
obligation to provide information regarding dangerous products," and
more.
Leases-Like the conformity rules in sale, the conformity rules in
leases are characterized by doubtful distinctions. The obligations of
"garantie" include various types of obligations, beginning with liability
for. hidden defects and ending with the obligation not to disturb the
lessee (by the lessor, as well as by third parties). The common denom-
inator of these obligations is not always clear.3 4 Alongside the obligations
of garantie, there are the obligations of maintenance (obligation den-
tretien), which also impose continuous responsibility on the lessor.3s
The distinction between the two sets of rules is not very clear, and in
many cases they may overlap. It is not very clear how those rules may
be reconciled with the rule prohibiting the lessor from effecting changes
30. C. civ. Loi n* 67-3, 3 janv. 1967; C. civ. Loi n* 67-547, 7 juill. 1967; C. civ.
Loi n 78-12, 4 janv. 1978. The main features of the new arrangement are: unification
of the nature and scope of responsibility regarding the construction (contracts for services)
and the sale of new houses; imposing full, no-fault contractual liability; negating the
possibility of exculpating statutory responsibility; extension of the liability towards sub-
sequent purchasers; introduction of distinctions among different kinds of defects in the
building, its installations and accessories, and providing different periods of responsibility
for each kind (from one month up to ten years); enumerating some of the purchaser's
remedies, while giving preference to the rectification of the flaws by the contractors.
Regarding the determination of no-fault liability, its compulsory character, and its ap-
plication towards subsequent purchasers, the legislative amendments follow the develop-
ments already established in the case law (since the responsibility under discussion is
imposed on professionals). For a critical survey of the legislative reform of 1978, see
Malinvaud & Jestaz, La loi n* 78-12 du Janvier 1978 Relative a ia Responsabilite et A
L'assurance dans le Domaine de la Construction, J.C.P. 1978, I, 2900.
31. See J.C.C., supra note 23, arts. 1641-1649, Fasc. X-1, §§ 21-25, at 9-10; J.
Ghestin, supra note 23, at 52-75; J. Huet, Responsabilit6 du venduer et garantie contre
les vices caches 38-39 (1987); E. Rabel, supra note 13, at 116-18.
32. J.C.C., supra note 23, arts. 1641-1649, Fasc. X-1, §§ 92-102, at 25-27; J. Huet,
supra note 31, at 87.
33. J.C.C., supra note 23, arts. 1641-1649, Fasc. X-1, §§ 46-59, at 16-19.
34. See generally Dalloz, supra note 21, T. I, Bail, §§ 217-311, at 16-22.
35. Section 1720. See generally Dalloz, supra note 21, arts. 169-216, at 12-16.
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in the leased property (Section 1723), or with the rule concerning the
termination of the lease in the event of the property's destruction
(Section 1722). Indeed, there are basic principles common to all of the
conformity rules, such as the imposition of full responsibility on the
lessor, unconditioned upon her knowledge of the nonconformity, and
the principle of good faith, which increases the liability imposed on a
lessor who knows about a defect and conceals it from the lessee. Yet,
there are substantial differences in the details of the rules.
In sum, the conformity rules in French law are still largely based
on legislation from the beginning of the nineteenth century (the Code
Civil), which has not been significantly altered (except for in the field
of construction and sale of buildings). The adaptation of the rules to
the changing reality has been achieved primarily by the courts and in
scholarly writings, which have developed new rules and doctrines . 6
These case law rules cope remarkably well with the variety and com-
plexity of modern commerce, the introduction of sophisticated and
dangerous products, and the difficulties of consumer protection. The
combination of these doctrines with the provisions of the Code, the
starting point for the imposition' of liability for latent defects, results
in a comprehensive system of liability for the conformity of the object.
d. Conclusion
Though there are differences between the French, German, and
other Civil Law systems in the field of conformity rules, the basic
features are very much alike in all of these systems. All systems rooted
in the Roman law tradition do impose conformity obligations on the
suppliers of goods, land, services or any other objects. As a rule, these
obligations apply wherever there is no contrary agreement between the
parties. They require no promise, expressed or implied in the circum-
stances, nor do they require fault. The rules contain requirements of
conformity to ordinary use and expected (medium) quality, absence of
hidden defects, clear title and so on. The rules take into account the
different characteristics of professional and non-professional suppliers,
as well as the difference between expert and lay customers, yet they
apply to all cases.
The main weakness of the conformity rules in most Civil Law.
countries lies in the fact that there is no concentrated body of rules
36. Among those rules one may mention the viewing of tradesmen -as being aware
of every defect in the things they sell; imposing successive contractual liability in cases
of re-sale of the object; extending remedies and developing new ones; and taking into
account the distress of landlords and the problems of the deterioration of old buildings.
On the last two issues, see generally Morrow, supra note 2, at 537-50 and Dalloz, supra
note 21, arts. 187-196, at 14.
[Vol. 52
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
which merits the title "conformity rules."" There are the "obligations
of guaranty," which include some of the main obligations of conformity,
but also obligations of other types, such as the lessor's and the seller's
obligation to refrain from disturbing the lessee or the buyer. On the
other hand, many conformity obligations are dealt with under other
headings as, for example, part of the obligations concerning delivery
of the object (matters of quantity, description), within the framework
of obligations concerning the object itself (as opposed to the guaranties
relating to it) and so on. These legal systems deal separately with cases
of latent defects, delivery of different object, incorrect quantity, defects
of title, maintenance obligations (in leases), faulty use-instructions, etc.
These distinctions result in many practical differences among the rules,
especially regarding the promisee's remedies and the burdens imposed
on her. These distinctions create both theoretical and practical diffi-
culties, and their advantages are usually questionable.
.2. Anglo-American Law
a. Sale of Goods
The English Sale of Goods Act of 1979 states (in Section 14(2))
that, subject to statutory exceptions, "[tihere is no implied condition
or warranty about the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of
goods supplied under a contract of sale." This statement reflects the
doctrinal starting point of English law in the last centuries: caveat
emptor. This concept, and the ideological-legal attitude behind it, evolved
from approximately the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century along
with the flourishing of individualistic philosophy."' Towards the end of
the nineteenth century, with the decline of individualism, a parallel
erosion of the caveat emptor attitude occurred, a process which has
continued to this day.3 9 The central concept that evolved during the
nineteenth century was merchantability, i.e., the requirement that even
in the absence of fraud, the seller would be responsible at least for
37. As a matter of fact, in the French law of sales, the rules relating to "noncon-
formity of the thing sold" (Non-coqformitk de la chose), do not refer to the guaranty
against hidden defects, but to other aspects of the object's conformity. See J.C.C., supra
note 23, arts. 1641-1649, Fasc. X-1, §§ 26-45, at 10-15.
38. Sale of Goods Act, 1979, ch. 54. Professor Atiyah argues that "the doctrine of
caveat emptor can be said to represent the apotheosis of nineteenth-century individualism."
P. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 464 (1979). For an analysis of the
development of the Common Law in this field during that era, see also Hamilton, supra
note 2, at 1136-41; Morrow, supra note 2, at 328-38; A. Rogerson, supra note 2.
39. See generally P. Atiyah, supra note 38, at 571 et seq., and especially at 774-75;
Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 439-44 (1964).
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the merchantable character of the goods. At present, the rules of
conformity in sales of goods are embodied in England in the Sale of
Goods Act of 1979, which replaced the prior Act of 1893, and incor-
porated its later amendments.4 In the United States, the central piece
of legislation is the Uniform Commercial Code, Chapter 2 of which
deals with the sale of goods.
The current English law derives its concepts and rules from the
Common Law, as was developed during the last centuries. The old
distinction between Conditions and Warranties still exists in the law,
as do many other distinctions and limitations. As for the conformity
to description (Section 13 of the Act), English law still struggles with
the distinctions among different representations: conditions, warranties
and terms.4' These distinctions are mainly relevant to the existence or
denial of the right to reject the goods. In the Supply of Goods (Implied
Terms) Act of 1973, as merged in the provisions of the 1979 Act, a
statutory definition of merchantability was introduced for the first time.
Section 14(6) states that goods are of merchantable quality, "if they
are as fit for the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind
are commonly bought as it is reasonable to expect having regard to
any description applied to them, the price (if relevant) and all the other
relevant circumstances. "4 Both with regard to conformity to description
and in the matter of merchantability, the Unfair Contract Terms Act
of 1977 (Section 6) limits the seller's power to contract out of her
responsibility. Section 14(3) of the 1979 Act deals with conformity to
particular purpose. Like the "implied condition" of merchantability,
this "condition" applies only to the sale of goods made in the seller's
course of business. The liability exists only if the buyer advised the
seller of the particular purpose for which the goods were bought. It
is also conditioned on the absence of circumstances indicating that the
buyer did not rely on the skill or judgment of the seller, or that such
a reliance would not be reasonable.4 3
40. The main amendments were introduced by the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms)
Act, 1973, ch. 13 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, ch. 50.
41. Benjamin's Sale of Goods, § 715 et seq., at 409 and § 755 et seq., at 435 (3d
ed. 1987); P. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods 61-63, 126-35 (8th ed. 1990).
42. On this definition and its relation to criteria provided for in previous judgments,
see Benjamin's Sale of Goods, supra note 41, § 779 et seq.; P. Atiyah, supra note 41,
at 142. On the proposals to reformulate this definition, or even to replace the concept
of "merchantability" with another term, not so historically loaded, see the Law Com-
mission's Working Paper No. 85 on Sale and Supply of Goods §§ 4.1-4.25, at 56-67
(1983); P. Atiyah, supra note 41, at 145-46, 167 et seq.; Benjamin's Sale of Goods, supra
note 41, § 800, at 461-62.
43. According to the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, ch. 71, § 14(1), the buyer had to
prove that he had made known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
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Sale by sample (Section 15) does not include every case in which
a sample or model has been presented to the buyer; rather, an express
or implied indication is required that the sample or model constituted
part of the contract. In such a case, three obligations are imposed on
the seller: the goods must correspond to the sample; the goods must
be free of any defect rendering them unmerchantable that would not
be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample; and the buyer
must be given a reasonable opportunity to compare the goods with the
sample.
The matter of quantity is not dealt with in the framework of
"Conditions and Warranties," but rather in the chapter dedicated to
the performance of the contract, in Section 30. Here, the law takes a
strict attitude towards the seller. The seller must deliver precisely the
agreed quantity, and if she delivers a smaller or a larger quantity, the
buyer is entitled to accept the delivered goods or to reject the whole.
Where conformity obligations are not implied by the law as afore-
said, but are based on the parties' agreement, the question arises whether
their breach entitles the buyer to rescind the contract, or allows her
only damages. In the absence of an answer in the agreement itself, it
is decided as a matter of the contract's construction and the severity
of the breach. Conversely, where the Act defines an obligation as a
"condition," any breach thereof entitles the buyer to treat the contract
as repudiated." This difference is hardly justifiable.
The American Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is also closely
linked to the Common Law tradition as to the conformity of the sale
object. Its main relevant provisions are found in Sections 2-312 to 2-
318. The obligations relating to the quality of the goods are divided
into Express Warranties and Implied Warranties. Express warranties are
those which derive from affirmation of facts by the seller, her promises
to the buyer, description of the sale object, or the use of samples or
models-all on the condition that the affirmations, promises, descrip-
tions, samples or models constitute "part of the basis of the bargain"
(Section 2-313). The implied warranties are those of merchantability
were required, so as to show that he had relied on the seller's skill or judgment. The
new rule shifts the burden of proof, and places on the seller who wishes to rebut the
assumption of possible reliance a heavy burden. In practice, even under the previous rule,
the courts were willing to infer the buyer's reliance from the mere fact that he went to
a shop of a retailer (Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd. [1936] A.C. 85, 99 (P.C.)).
This is a fine example of the interrelations between the legislature and the judiciary in
the gradual development of English law in this field (and in others). Another difference
between the new provision and the previous provision is the omission of the proviso
relating to sales under a patent or trade name.
44. See section 11(3) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1979, supra note 38; Benjamin's
Sale of Goods. supra note 41, §§ 738 et seq., at 424-34, §§ 872 et seq., at 500-02, and
especially § 876, at 503; P. Atiyah, supra note 41, at 125-26.
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and fitness for particular purpose (Sections 2-314 and 2-315, respec-
tively). The first applies only to a sale by a merchant. Section 2-314(2)
provides a detailed definition of merchantability. It refers inter alia to
the fitness of the goods for ordinary purposes, their quality, uniformity
of units, and adequacy of packaging and labels. The goods must also
"pass without objection in the trade under the contract description.'
A special development in the U.C.C., which does not exist in the
Common Law tradition, is a certain extension of the liability towards
people who have no contractual privity with the seller. 6
In many respects, the U.C.C. is an improvement on the previous
law. Yet, it preserves limitations and distinctions that can hardly be
justified. Even the very classification of warranties into express and
implied categories is justifiable almost solely on historical grounds.47
The same applies to the limited application of the requirement of
merchantability to sales by merchants.
An important development in both the English and American sys-
tems is the enactment of statutes regulating consumer transactions. This
legislation grants the consumer-buyer special privileges, though in many
cases it deals with other aspects of the matter, and not necessarily with
the content of the seller's contractual responsibility." One should also
note the development of the tort doctrine of strict liability in American
law, which in the sphere of consumer transactions constitutes a central
device for the protection of buyers.
b. Sale of Real Property
As in the sale of goods, the point of departure of Anglo-American
law regarding the object's conformity in the sale of real property is
45. For a general discussion of the warranties of quality under the U.C.C., see R.
Nordstrom, Law of Sales §§ 63-92, at 198-289 (1970); R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial
Code, Vol. 3, at 1-322 (3d ed. 1983); Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions:
An Update (Special Project), 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1159 (1987); Williston on Sales, Vol.
3, chs. 17-22, at I to 320 (1974, 4th ed. updated to 1991).
46. Section 2-318 of the U.C.C.; R. Nordstrom, supra note 45, §§ 90-92, at 278-89;
R. Anderson, supra note 45, at 398-418.
47. For a recent attack on this distinction, see Herbert, Toward a Unified Theory
of Warranty Creation under Articles 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1990
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 265. Compare also R. Nordstrom, supra note 45, § 74, at 228-30.
48. The central English statutes dealing with the issue in the contractual sphere are
the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, supra note 40, and the Unfair Contract
Terms Act of 1977, supra note 40. The American federal act in this respect is the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1978). On the latter, see C. Reitz,
Consumer Product Warranties under Federal and State Laws. (2d ed. 1987). On consumer
legislation generally in England, see R. Cranston, Consumers and the Law (2d ed. 1984);
Benjamin's Sale of Goods, supra note 41, §§ 1020-1093, at 609-56; P. Atiyah, supra note
41, at 205-71. On American law, see D. Pridgen, Consumer Protection and the Law




caveat emptor.49 There are also similarities between the exceptions to
this principle in the two fields. Yet, one of the striking features of
English and American sales laws is the sharp separation between the
treatment of sale of goods and the rules relating to "vendor and
purchaser. "
Within the sphere of real property, there is a strict distinction
between conformity of the object and conformity of the rights therein.
Unlike the caveat emptor doctrine governing in the first case, in the
latter the attitude is the opposite. In the absence of agreement to the
contrary, the vendor is obliged to convey full and complete title to the
property, free of any charge or other third party right.3 0 As for the
conformity of the object, the prominent distinction in England is be-
tween the sale of existing realty and the sale of future realty, especially
buildings which have not yet been erected or that are still in the process
of construction. With regard to the sale of existing real property, in
the absence of fraud or express undertaking, the seller bears no re-
sponsibility for patent or latent defects." As for buildings under con-
struction, the constructor-seller is responsible for carrying out the
construction with reasonable care and skill, and for the building's fitness
for use." However, this responsibility is of delictual nature, based on
negligence, rather than contractual liability."
In the United'States, the tendency is to extend the conformity
obligations in the sale of realty beyond what was reached in England . 4
49. R. Walton, The Law of Sales of Land 159 (1969); R. Annand & B. Cain, Modern
Conveyancing 194 (1984); Powell on Real Property, Vol. 6A, § 938.2[1l, at 84A-5 to
84A-6 (1949, updated to 1990).
50. J. Farrand, Contract and Conveyance 83-166 (4th ed. 1983); R. Annand & B.
Cain, supra note 49, at 199 et seq.; Williston on Contracts, Vol. 7, § 923, at 666-704
(3d ed. 1963, Updated to 1990).
51. See, e.g., Perry v. Sharon Development Co. Ltd., [19371 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.);
Turner v. Green, [1895] 2 Ch 205; A. Speaight & G. Stone, The Law of Defective
Premises 20-25 (1982).
52. The case that formed the basis for the development of case law in this regard
was Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113. See also Perry v. Sharon
Development Co. Ltd, (1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.); R. Walton,. supra note 49, at 161;
A. Speaight & G. Stone, supra note 51, at 1-19.
53. See also Lynch v. Thorne, [1956) 1 W.L.R. 303 (C.A.); V. Di Castri, Law of
Vendor and Purchaser, § 215, at 175-77 (2d ed. 1976). This tortious liability was extended
considerably by The Defective Premises Act, 1972, ch. 35. See E. George & A. George,
The Sale of Flats 196-99 (4th ed. 1978); A. Speaight & G. Stone, supra note 51, at 13-
19.
54. As for the sale of new houses, a development similar to the English one had
occurred already in the late fifties. See Bixby, Let the Seller Beware: Remedies for the
Purchase of a Defective Home, 49 J. Urban L. 533, 556 (1971). Moreover, in contrast
to the English rule, American case law does not distinguish between buildings that are
in the process of construction and those which have already been completed. This distinction
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Generally, with regard to the sale of new houses, the disparity between
goods and realty has been eliminated. However, the social, consumer
justifications given to that responsibility, alongside the reliance on de-
lictual bases of responsibility (negligence, fraud and strict liability)"
have affected the incidence of the implied warranty doctrine. The de-
velopment is confined to the sector of dwellings, and the liability is
imposed only on firms dealing with the construction or sale of new
buildings. The slow progress concerning the seller's responsibility in the
sale of real property other than dwellings and as to sale of second-
hand dwellings has been criticized more than once. The critiques' view
is that the seller's responsibility in the sale of realty in general should
be equated with that imposed on sellers of new dwellings or goods, or
lessors of realty for the purpose of habitation. 6 This view was accepted
by the American Law Institute, which in 1975 approved the Uniform
Land Transactions Act (ULTA). Generally, the Act's provisions impose
conformity obligations similar to those applied by the U.C.C. to the
sale of goods, subject to modifications resulting from the difference
between the objects. Regrettably, the proposed Act has not yet been
enacted by any of the states.
c. Lease of Movables
Since the litigation concerning the lease of movables is relatively
scarce, the conclusions one can draw from the cases are not very clear.
In general, the development of English and American case law as to
the lessor's liability for the object's conformity resembles the devel-
opment that occurred in the sale of goods.5 Inasmuch as there were
was penetratingly criticized by American scholars, Bearman, supra note I, at 543; Kessler
& Fine, supra note 39, at 443; Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of New Homes, 26
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 862, 864 (1965); Wells, Implied Warranties in the Sale of New Homes,
23 U. Fla. L. Rev. 626 (1971); Bixby, supra. Inspired by these (and other) articles,
American courts abandoned the English distinction. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154
Colo. 78, 83, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964).
55. On the various ways for imposing tortious liability on the builder-seller, see
Zipser, Builders' Liability for' Latent Defects in Used Homes, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 607, at
610-21 (1980); Powell on Real Property, supra note 49, § 938.3[21 et seq., at 84A-26 et
seq.
56. See. e.g., Bearman, supra note 1; Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty
of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 Geo. L.J. 633 (1965); Bixby, supra note 54. On
the development of American case law in dwelling leases, see Part ll.B.2.d infra.
57. In England, see Law Commission's Report No. 95 on Implied Terms in Contracts
for the Supply of Goods, §§ 79-92, at 25-29 (1979) (hereinafter The Reporti; Working
Paper No. 71 on Implied Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods, §§ 46-68, at 25-
42 (1977) (hereinafter Working Paper); Palmer, Conditions and Warranties in English
Contracts of Hire, 4 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 207 (1975). In the United States, see generally
Williston on Contracts, supra note 50, Vol. 9 (1967, updated to 1990), § 1041, at 919-
24. For a review of the case law on this issue, see Warranties in Connection with Leasing
or Hiring of Chattels, 68 A.L.R.2d 850 (1959).
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doubts about the exact scope of the lessor's liability, they largely
disappeared in England by 1982, with the enactment of the Supply of
Goods and Services Act. The Act applies the provisions of the Sale of
Goods Act concerning the quality of goods to contracts of barter, to
hire of movables, and to the component of the supply of goods in
contracts for services ("work and materials")."s Thus, in all respects
except for the title and rights to the property, the "implied terms" of
quality in hire have been assimilated to those applicable to sale of
goods. As for title, the 1982 Act follows the law of sale subject to
modifications resulting from the limited scope of rights the lessee obtains
and from the continuous nature of the lease (Section 7). Except for
the matter of title, the Act does not concern itself with the continuous
nature of the lease, and, as in sale, it imposes one-time obligations of
conformity."
In the United States, courts and scholars have dealt extensively with
the question of whether the U.C.C.'s warranties of sale are also ap-
plicable to the hire of goods. 60 Hopefully, in a few years these dis-
cussions will no longer be necessary. In 1987, a new chapter of the
U.C.C. was introduced: Chapter 2A, dealing with leases of goods. As
for the conformity of the leased object, the new chapter lays down
provisions similar to those of Chapter 2. When this chapter is adopted
by the states that previously adopted the other chapters of the Code,
a clarification and unification of the conformity rules in sales and leases
of goods will be achieved, similar to the progress made in England by
the 1982 Act. 6' Yet, neither in England nor in the United States can
58. The Supply of Goods and Services Act, 1982, ch. 29, §§ 3-5, 8-11.
59. See generally The Report, supra note 57, §§ 100 et seq., at 32; Benjamin's Sale
of Goods, supra note 41, § 810, at 467-69.
60. The prevailing view is that the warranty provisions are not directly applicable to
leases, though many attempts were made to apply them by way of analogy. The issue
was discussed in dozens of cases and articles. See, e.g., Boss, Panacea or Nightmare?
Leases in Article 2, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 39 (1984); Note, Disengaging Sales Law From the
Sale Construct: A Proposal to Extend The Scope of Article 2 of the UCC, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 470 (1982). For a review of the case law, see Application of Warranty Provisions
of Uniform Commercial Code to Bailments, 48 A.L.R.3d 668 (1973); Note, The Extension
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Leases of Goods, 12 Tulsa L.J. 556,
at 561 (1977). In fact, this issue is part of a wider problem, namely the scope of the
possible application of chapter two's warranties to non-sale transactions, whether directly
or by analogy. See official comment no. 2 to § 2-313 of the U.C.C.; Farnsworth, Implied
Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 653 (1957); Murray, Under
the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 Fordham L.
Rev. 447 (1971); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-2, at 389-93
(3d ed. 1988).
61. To the best of my knowledge, eight states (including California) have already
adopted the new chapter, and the legislative process has begun in others.
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this unification overcome the shortcomings of the conformity rules
applicable to the contract of sale itself.
d. Landlord-and-Tenant Law
The starting point of landlord and tenant law under Anglo-American
law is identical to that of the law of sales. In the absence of express
obligation or obligation based on specific legislation, the landlord bears
no responsibility towards the tenant regarding the condition of the
leased property at the commencement of the tenancy or during its
term.62 Even today, English law basically adheres to the principle of
"caveat tenant," though some exceptions to the principle have evolved.
The two general exceptions are express undertaking and fraud, though
their scope is quite limited.63 Other exceptions were developed by the
courts with regard to dwelling tenancies of furnished apartments, dwell-
ing tenancies in which the contract was made while the building was
still under construction, and the maintenance of the common areas of
apartment houses."
More significant exceptions were introduced by legislation, partic-
ularly in the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1985, which combines pro-
visions previously found in other Acts.65 Sections 8-10 of the Act provide
implied terms as to fitness for human habitation, and they apply mainly
62. This rule evolved against the background of a reality in which the typical tenancy
related to rural land. The typical tenant, staying on the property, had the tools and skills
needed for the evaluation of the property's condition and for keeping it in repair. On
the other hand, the landlord usually was not a resident, so it was not reasonable to
expect him to look after the property and see to its repair and conformity. Obviously,
the characteristics of modern tenancies are quite different. See Friedman on Leases, Vol.
1, § 10.101, at 556-75 (3d ed. 1990). See also D. Yates & A. Hawkins, Landlord and
Tenant Law 239 (2d ed. 1986); Woodfall's Law of Landlord and Tenant, Vol. I, § I-
1465, at 618/3-619 (28th ed. 1978, Updated to 1990); R. Schoshinski, American Law of
Landlord and Tenant, § 3:10, at 109 (1980).
63. Board of Governors of the London Hospital v. Jacobs, [1956 2 All E.R. 603,
609, 610 (C.A.). Even where the law is ready to infer an undertaking concerning the
condition of the property out of a landlord's representation, only a representation made
with the intention of becoming part of the basis of the transaction will suffice. See, e.g.,
De Lassalle v. Guildford, 119011 2 K.B. 215, 222. The attitude toward the other exception
("fraud") is also very restrictive. The mere non-disclosure of defects known to the landlord
is not necessarily considered to be fraud. See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 27 (4th
ed. 1981), Landlord and Tenant, § 270, at 210-11.
64. Smith v. Marrable, (1843), 152 Eng. Rep. 693, 11 M & W (5) (1843); Wilson
v. Finch Hatton, [18771 2 Ex. D. 336; Sarson v. Roberts, [18951 2 Q.B. 395 (C.A.) (first
exception); Perry v. Sharon Development Co. Ltd., [1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.) (second
exception); Liverpool City Council v. Irwin, [1977 A.C. 239 (third exception).
65. Particularly §§ 4 and 6 of The Housing Act, 1957, 5-6 Eliz. 2, ch. 56, §§ 32,
33 of The Housing Act, 1961, 9-10 Eliz. 2, ch. 65, and § 125 of The Housing Act 1974,
ch. 44.
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to the letting of dwellings at low rents. The Act lays down minimal
standards for compliance with this compulsory duty. Sections 11-17 are
located in the chapter headed Repairing Obligations, and apply to leases
of dwelling houses for a term of less than seven years. They detail the
maintenance and repair obligations imposed on the landlord, and their
scope and limits, taking into account the property's condition, age and
location. These provisions further reinforce the tenant's rights by lim-
iting the possibility of contracting around them and by extending her
right to specific performance.
As previously mentioned, there is no difference between English
and American laws regarding their starting point in this issue. As for
commercial leases, the attitude of caveat emptor largely prevails in the
United States even today. With regard to the relations between the
parties in dwelling leases, however, numerous changes have been made.
These changes are part of broad trends in American law, which have
evolved against the background of the socio-economic reality in many
urban poverty neighborhoods. This development, beginning in the late
sixties, occurred both in case law and in statutes, and is characterized
by consistent extension of the tenant's rights and parallel limitation of
the landlord's Tights and immunities in numerous contexts."6
The central concept that has evolved with regard to the landlord's
responsibility for the conformity of the property leased is the "Implied
Warranty of Habitability." The leading case is Javins v. First National
Realty Corp.,67 decided in 1970, which included two fundamental in-
novations. The first innovation concerned the duties imposed on the
landlord by the applicable Housing Code. The court allowed the tenants
to rely on the landlord's breaches of these duties as if they were
contractual relations, although no reference, express or implied, was
made to them in the contract. Secondly, the court overruled the former
rule which held that the tenant's obligation to pay the rent was in-
dependent of the fulfillment of the landlord's obligations. The court
based the reform on social and consumer considerations, and on the
66. See Friedman on Leases, supra note 62; Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes
and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 1 (1976); Rabin, The Revolution
in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 517
(1983/84). The last article is part of a symposium on the same subject: 69 Cornell L.
Rev. 517-683 (1983/84).
67. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For a partial list of the numerous notes and
articles written following this case, see Abbott, supra note 66, at 13 n.56; Friedman on
Leases, supra note 62, at 561-64 n.15. See especially Cunningham, The New Implied and
Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16
Wash. U. Urban L. Ann. 3 (1979). See also R. Schoshinski, supra note 62, §§ 3:16-3:29,
at 122-50.
1991]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
argument that the imposition of these obligations is but a natural
extension of the warranties implied in sales contracts." The new ruling
was shortly adopted in most of the states of the United States, and,
following the case law, legislative reforms were carried out in many
states, thereby crystallizing the new rule.69
The implementation of the new doctrine as a contractual doctrine
raised many problems. 70 As for its incidence, though sometimes the
courts were willing to apply it to non-residential leases, it seems that
at least for the time being the prevailing view limits its application to
residential leases." Certain solutions to the various problems were found
where the doctrine was regulated by statute. This legislation (including
the Restatement) established general and independent criteria for the
conformity of the leased property, without reliance on the Housing
Codes, and it also mitigated the compulsory character of the Codes'
duties.7 2 As for the application of the rules to commercial leases, there
is still reluctance to such an extension even in the legislation.
Along with the line of cases based on the Housing Codes, the
courts became increasingly willing to infer conformity obligations from
the circumstances of the contract, even without any express agreement
to that effect." In fact, the expression "implied warranty" is more
68. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075. See also Green v. Superior Court of San Francisco,
10 Cal. 3d 1616, 517 P.2d 1168, Ii Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
69. For a review of these enactments, see R. Schoshinski, supra note 62, §§ 3:30-
3:34, at 150-59. In 1976, the implied warranty of habitability was absorbed into the
Restatement. See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Property-Landlord and Tenant,
Ch. 5 [hereinafter Restatement-Property).
70. Thus, since the Housing Codes are compulsory by their very nature, there is no
way under the new doctrine to contract out of their obligations. These Housing Codes
are detailed and complicated, and since it would be unreasonable to view any non-
fulfillment thereof as a breach of the lease, one must determine the scope of non-fulfillment
that would also constitute a breach of the contract. Finally, since the standard applied
by the courts is not based on the parties' actual agreement, many problems also arise
with regard to the. appropriate remedies for breach, particularly the quantification of
damages. See Rabin, supra note 66, at 524; R. Schoshinski, supra note 62, §§ 3:19-3:23,
at 132-40.
71. See Friedman on Leases, supra note 62, at 561-66; R. Schoshinski, supra note
62, § 3:29, at 147. This approach was criticized. See, e.g., Levinson & Silver, Do
Commercial Property Tenants Possess Warranties of Habitability?, 14 Real Est. L.J. 59
(1985); Bopp, The Unwarranted Implication of a Warranty of Fitness in Commercial
Leases-An Alternative Approach, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 1057 (1988).
72. See, e.g., § 5.6 of the Restatement-Property, supra note 69, which, subject to
qualifications of unconscionability and public policy, recognizes the possibility of con-
tractually waiving the lessor's liability. See also the review of state legislation on the
subject at the beginning of the same chapter of the Restatement.
73. A leading case in this connection is Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d
470 (1969).
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appropriate for these cases, where the liability is not derived from
external statutory standards.7 4
From a comparative point of view, the "enthusiasm" accompanying
the development of the implied warranty of habitability in American
law is rather questionable. The limited incidence of the doctrine (at
least for the time being), and its close linkage to compulsory statutory
standards indicate that it is a consumer doctrine in nature and scope.
Further, the content of the conformity requirements under the new
doctrine does not seem to be so advanced or innovative. The warranty
of habitability provides the tenant with rights which in other (Civil
Law) systems she had obtained long ago. However, one might expect
that in the future the development described above will bring about a
broader reform in the law of landlord and tenant.
e. Contracts for Services
Until recently, there was no enactment in English law that regulated
contracts for services. As for the conformity obligations, the courts
distinguished between the component of work or service, existing in
any contract of services, and the component of supply of materials or
goods, which often accompanies it. Though the Sale of Goods Act did
not apply to contracts for services, the conformity obligations developed
by the courts with regard to the goods were very similar to those
provided by the Sale of Goods Act.7 Contrarily, as for the element
of service or work, only reasonable care and skill were usually required.
7 6
The Supply of Goods and Services Act of 1982 (Sections 1-5, 13) restates
these rules. The limited obligation to carry out work with reasonable
care and skill applies only to services rendered in the contractor's course
of business.
The scope of the contractor's liability for the conformity of work
or service under American law is unclear. The U.C.C. does not deal
with contracts for services, nor does any other general enactment. As
in England, the prevailing view in the case law requires proof of
negligence as a precondition to the imposition of liability on the con-
tractor, though there are other views as well.77 American courts exten-
74. On the importance of the distinction between these two types of doctrines, and
on the difficulties resulting from overlooking it, see Rabin, supra note 66, at 521-27.
75. For a review of the English cases, see the Working Paper, supra note 57. §§ 25-
32, at 15-18; N. Palmer, Bailment 531-37 (1979).
76. See, e.g., Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co., [1951] K.B. 805 (C.A.);
Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co., [1978] Q.B. 69 (C.A.). See also G. Treitel,
The Law of Contract, 644-45 (7th ed. 1987).
77. Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and
Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 661, 663-68; Comment; Guidelines for Extending
Implied Warranties to Service Markets, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 365, 393 (1976).
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sively dealt with the question of whether the U.C.C.'s warranties can
be applied to contracts for services, either directly or by way of analogy.
As for clear contracts for services, the general tendency is not to apply
the provisions of the U.C.C., either directly or by analogy. 78 The main
struggle in the case law relates to contracts in which there are both
elements of work or services and elements of supplying goods, such as
medical treatment that includes blood transfusion, repair contracts, and
the like. There are contradictory views regarding such combined trans-
actions. 79
f. Conclusion
Although the socio-economic views that gave birth to the caveat
emptor attitude in the previous centuries have lost much of their force,
the Anglo-American law still encounters difficulties when trying to free
itself from the chains of old precedents and doctrines. Indeed, in several
fields the exceptions to the promisor's non-liability rule are gradually
forcing out the rule itself. However, the pace of this development varies
greatly with different kinds of transactions. Even regarding the trans-
actions in which the greatest progress has been attained (sale of goods),
the non-liability rule has not yet been formally replaced by a liability
rule. In real property transactions in particular, the non-liability rule
is still predominant, and as far as there are exceptions to it, they are
usually limited to the sphere of consumer transactions. Thus, except
for the majority of dwelling leases, the conformity rules in the lease
of realty under English law are still about two hundred years behind
the progress reached in sale and hire of movables. As for obligations
to do, the prevailing view is that the promisor's liability is conditioned
upon the existence of negligence on her part. The distinction between
78. Singal, Extending Implied Warranties Beyond Goods: Equal Protection for Con-
sumers of Services, 12 New Eng. L. Rev. 859, 885-91 (1977); Greenfield, supra note 77,
at 668-677; Comment, supra note 77.
79. Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 660-65; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 60;
Singal, supra note 78. For an analysis of the cases on blood transfusions, see R. Nordstrom,
supra note 45, § 22, at 44-46, § 80, at 247-50; Dugas, Sales-Implied Warranty in Sale
of Blood, 17 Loy. L. Rev. 229 (1970). The prevailing view among the authors supports
the extension of the warranty provisions to non-sale transactions. See also A., Contracts
for Goods and Services and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 Rut.-Cam.
L.J. 303 (1977). Part of the confusion results from the fact that sometimes the courts
express themselves in terms of "implied warranty"-a phrase apparently indicating full
contractual responsibility-while in fact referring to a responsibility based only on rea-
sonable diligence (e.g., Garcia v. Color Tile Distributing Co., 408 P.2d 145, 148, 75 N.M.
570, 573 (N.M. 1965)). Of course, providing an "implied warranty" of reasonable care
and skill in the performance of the work is nothing but a liability rule based on negligence,
under a cover of "implied warranty." See Greenfield, supra note 77, at 663-68; Comment,
supra note 77, at 393.
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obligations of diligence or means (obligations de moyens) and obligations
of result (obligations de r~sultat) has not been utilized in the Anglo-
American legal system. Even with regard to obligations to do which
belong to the latter category, Anglo-American law usually does not
impose full contractual responsibility. 0
Indeed, at least for the last hundred years, the tendency in Common
Law countries has always been towards the expansion of responsibility.
However, this development is slow, partial, and in many cases involves
disharmony and artificiality. This is due to the fact that the development
is mainly judge-made, and the fact that even when made by the leg-
islature, the legislation reflects the concepts and iules developed by case
law. The drafters adhered to the judicial tradition, and preserved many
of the distinctions of the previous case law. In the sphere of private
law (apart from the field of consumer transactions), no legislative
reforms were made. The legislation contributes to clarification of the
rules and introduces some minor improvements into the existing law,
but does not substantially further the developments made by the courts.
C. The Exception-Coherent and Systematic Rules
1. Austrian Law
In sharp contrast to other codes, the Austrian Civil Code of 1811
(das Allgemeine Birgerliche Gesetzbuch-ABGB) is based on a general
principle of conformity." The main provisions in this matter are to be
found in Sections 922 et seq. of the Code, which are part of the chapter
including the general rules on reciprocal contracts. In these provisions,
the legislature concerned itself primarily with transactions for the supply
of property for consideration, such as sales and exchange. However,
subject to specific provisions, these provisions apply equally to any
other mutual contract.8 2 In the same breath, the ABGB regulates the
incidence of nonconformity in terms of quality, quantity, and defects
of title. It does not distinguish between cases in which the criterion
for the conformity is the parties' agreement, express or implied, and
cases in which the criteria are derived from supplementary statutory
provisions. The liability according to the law of warranty applies whether
the contract refers to an identified object or to an unidentified one.
In the context of remedies, Austrian law distinguishes between quali-
80. See Part Ill.C.2 infra.
81. The Austrian Code was not the first to adopt a unified system of liability for
nonconformity. it was preceded by the approaches of canon law and 'the natural law
school, and by the Prussian Code of 1794. See E. Rabel, supra note 13, at 107.
82. H. Koziol & R. Welser, Grundriss des buirgerlichen Rechts, Bd. 1: Algemeiner
Teil und Schuldrecht, 229 (7 Auf. 1985).
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tative and quantitative nonconformity, yet the two are treated within
the framework of the rules of warranty. A distinction preserved in
Austrian law is that between defects (qualitative, quantitative, or of
title) and the delivery of an object different from that agreed upon.83
The law of warranty does not apply to the latter case. Austrian law
entitles the promisee to choose between relying on the rules of warranty
and having recourse to the rules of mistake (where the two overlap).
As for the general rules of breach, they apply only where the non-
conformity is discovered prior to the delivery of the object, whereas
after the delivery only the rules of warranty apply."
Section 922 states that a person who delivers property to another
for consideration is responsible for ensuring that the property possesses
the qualities that were expressly specified or that are ordinarily supposed
to exist in it, and that it can be used according to the nature of the
contract or its express specifications. Where there are no express un-
dertakings regarding the object's qualities, they are deduced from the
circumstances of the transaction. Section 923 further specifies types of
conduct that lead to the imposition of damages. These acts are: expressly
or impliedly attributing qualities to property which it does not have;
concealing unusual defects or charges; alienating property which no
longer exists or which belongs to another, while pretending that it is
owned by the promisor; and pretending that the property is fit for a
certain purpose, or that it is free from usual defects or charges. In the
following provisions, the Code clarifies specific issues concerning the
effect of the promisee's cognizance of the defect, the special burdens
imposed on the aggrieved party who wishes to rely on nonconformity,
nonconformity in sale of animals, and more.
As for the promisee's remedies, the ABGB distinguishes between
negligible defects (those which bear no effect), secondary (non-sub-
stantial) defects, and essential (substantial) defects. This tripartite dis-
tinction is based on the scope and results of the defect. Another
distinction is between rectifiable and unrectifiable defects. A defect is
considered unrectifiable if its rectification involves unreasonable eco-
nomic or other efforts. Generally, the available remedies are rescission,
price reduction, rectification of the defect or completion of the missing
part thereof.
If the nonconformity is essential and unrectifiable, the promisee is
entitled to rescind the contract immediately. If the defect is essential
but rectifiable, the promisee is entitled to demand the rectification of
83. Id. at 228. It should be noted, however, that § 378 of the Austrian CommercialJ
Code (drafted after the German HGB) narrows the gap between the rules governing the
two cases (see supra Part II.B.I.b.i). Apart from that, the results of this distinction in
Austrian law are not very significant.
84. H. Koziol & R. Welser, supra note 82, at 241-42.
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the defect or the completion of the missing part, and she must grant
the promisor an appropriate extension for that purpose. If the non-
conformity is secondary and rectifiable, the promisee is entitled to grant
an extension for its removal, but to the' extent that it is not removed,
she is only entitled to reduction of the remuneration. If the defect is
secondary and cannot be removed, the promisee has to content herself
with reduction as well. In all of the above cases, if the supplier's
behavior involves fault, the promisee is entitled to damages in addition
to any of the other remedies. Where the defect is rectifiable but the
party in breach does not remove it during the extension given to her,
the promisee may do so herself. Her costs are then taken into account
in the calculation of her monetary relief. Where the contract refers to
unidentified objects, the assumption is that the nonconformity may be
cured by substituting the object or by completing the missing quantity. '
Therefore, in such cases the promisee is not entitled to immediate
rescission, but is required first to grant an extension to remedy the
breach.
Austrian law lays down specific provisions concerning the object's
conformity in leases (Section 1096), contracts for services (Section 1167),
assignment of rights (Section 1397) and commercial sales (Section 377
of the Commercial Code). Special rules also apply to consumer trans-
actions."' Particularly noteworthy are the provisions regarding leases
and contracts for services. As for leases, the need for a special ar-
rangement derives from the continuous nature of the agreement. The
Code imposes on the lessor three obligations: to deliver the property
in serviceable condition, to maintain the property in such condition
throughout the lease, and to refrain from disturbing the lessee's use
and enjoyment of the property. Though it is not expressly stated in
the provision, the lessor bears responsibility for disturbances caused by
third parties as well. 6 If the leased property is not usable at the time
of delivery, or becomes unusable afterwards without the fault of the
lessee, the lessee is exempt from paying the rent for the period in which
she cannot use the property as agreed. In a lease of real property, this
exemption may not be contractually waived. Additionally, under the
general rules the lessee is entitled to rescind the contract in appropriate
circumstances, to require the performance of the lessor's obligations,
and, in case of fault on the part of the lessor, to claim damages."7
85. The special rules on the supplier's guaranty in consumer transactions are provided
in §§ 8 et seq. of the Consumer Protection Law (Konsumentenschutzgesetz) of 1979.
These provisions deal with the time limits for the consumer's right to rely on defects,
the force of exemption clauses, etc.
86. Rummel-Wilrth, Kommentar zum ABGB, Bd. 2, Art. 1096, §§ 7-9, at 1574-75
(1984).87. Id. § 2, at 1572.
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The lessee may also carry out repairs that the lessor should have
executed, and her right of indemnification is regulated by reference to
the general rules on management of another's property.
As for contracts for services, the rule stated in Section 1167 differs
from the ordinary rules of remedies for nonconformity. The section
provides that in the case of essential defects which render the outcome
of the work useless or which constitute a breach of an express condition
(ausdriicklichen Bedingung), the orderer is entitled to rescind the con-
tract. In contrast to the general law, which requires the promisee to
grant an extension for the removal of the defects before having recourse
to other remedies, here there is apparently no such requirement. This
rule has been severely criticized." In fact, the disparity between the
general law and the rule provided by Section 1167 has been considerably
diminished by the courts. In this context, the courts strictly construed
the phrase "essential defects," and tended to recognize the orderer's
right to immediate rescission only when the defect was so severe that
it was actually unrectifiable. The practical outcome is, as under the
general rule, that the orderer should first require the removal of the
defect if this is possible. Neither is the additional provision of Section
1167, under which the right to demand correction of the defect does
not apply to cases that would involve disproportionate expenses, a
deviation from the general law. As has already been mentioned, ac-
cording to the general law, the criteria for the distinction between
rectifiable and unrectifiable defects are based on the reasonableness of
the expenses incurred by the supplier. It is indeed remarkable that
precisely in those cases where the Code deviated from the ordinary
rules the courts have found it necessary to assimilate the special law
into the general one.
2. The Conventions on the International Sale of Goods and
Israeli Law
a. The International Conventions
In 1964, following preparatory works that lasted for some decades,
a convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods (ULIS) was approved in The Hague.89 In spite of its modern
88. W. Lorenz, supra note 19, § 76, at 76-77.
89. On the preparatory work and on the Hague conference itself, see Rabel, A Draft
of an International Law of Sales, S U. Chi. L. Rev. 543 (1938); Rabel, The Hague
Conference on the Unification of Sales Law, I Am. J. Comp. L. 58 (1952); Nadelmann,
The United States and Plans for a Uniform (World) Law on International Sales of Goods,
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 697 (1964); Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law Governing
the International Sale of Goods, The Hague, 2-25 April 1964, 2 Vol's (1966); Honnold,
Documents, The 1964 Hague Convention and Uniform Laws on the International Sale of
Goods, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 451 (1964).
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provisions and fine drafting, the convention did not achieve much
practical success, mainly due to non-legal reasons. 90 With the initiation
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL), another conference was held in 1980 (the Vienna Conference),
in which the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods was accepted. 91 This convention is largely based
on the provisions of ULIS.
One of ULIS's great achievements is the removal of the distinctions
among different types of conformity obligations, which as seen above,
prevail in most legal systems throughout the world. In Section 33(1),
ULIS establishes a single, unified concept of nonconformity, which
encompasses any divergence between the agreed upon goods and the
goods actually delivered. Along with the general principle, the provision
specifies five categories of nonconformity: quantitative nonconformity
(including the delivery of a larger quantity than agreed upon) or delivery
of only part of the goods, goods different in identity or kind from
those to which the contract related, nonconformity in a sale by sample
or model, conformity to ordinary use, and conformity to particular
purpose. The Uniform Law provides that the seller is not responsible
for nonconformity of which the buyer knew, or could not have been
unaware (Section 36).
ULIS includes detailed provisions concerning the burdens of ex-
amination and notice imposed on the buyer as a precondition to her
reliance on nonconformity (Sections 38 and 39). 92 Section 40 precludes
the seller's reliance on the non-fulfillment of the buyer's burdens if
she knew of the defect (or could not have been unaware of it), and
did not disclose it to the buyer. Where nonconforming goods were
delivered, and the buyer complied with the burdens imposed on her,
a variety of remedies are available to her, including specific perform-
90. P. Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law-The UN-Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods 18 (1986).
91. On UNCITRAL's activity, on the Vienna conference and on the convention, see
generally Symposium on Unification of International Trade Law: UNCITRAL's First
Decade, in 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 201 (1979); J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International
Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention (1982); Edrsi, Comment, A Propos the
1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. 31 Am. J.
Comp. L. 333 (1983); International Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods ( N. Gaston & H. Smit eds. 1984); P. Schlechtriem,
supra note 90; Commentary on the International Sales Law-The 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention (C. Bianca & M. Bonell eds. 1987) [hereinafter C. Bianca & M. Bonell].
92. The buyer is required to examine the goods within as short a period as possible
after their arrival at their destination, and to give the seller a notice of the nonconformity
as soon as possible. Where the defects are not detectable in such examination, the buyer.
may still rely on them after their discovery, provided that he promptly gives notice thereof,
and that he does so within two years from the date of delivery.
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ance, rescission, damages and price reduction (Sections 41 et seq.).
ULIS also contains special provisions with regard to the seller's obli-
gation to supply goods which are free of third-party rights or claims
(Sections 52, 53).
Another noteworthy point regarding the conformity obligations in
ULIS relates to the definition of the delivery obligation. This obligation
is defined as an obligation to deliver "goods which conform with the
contract" (Section 19(l)). Therefore, at least prima facie, one of the
important results of a breach of the conformity obligations is that the
seller is viewed as if she had not delivered the goods at all.
Essentially, the 1980 UN Convention did not alter the rules provided
by ULIS. Most of the changes in the new convention are stylistic or
changes of details. The basic provision, parallel to Section 33 of ULIS,
is found in Section 35. 'It adds the conformity of package to the aspects
of conformity established in ULIS. The new law eases to some extent
the promptness required of the buyer in examining the goods and giving
notice of the nonconformity." Instead of separate regulation of the
remedies for each kind of breach, the new law contains a unified
regulation of the remedies for various types of breach.9 'Under the
influence of Anglo-American law, the availability of the remedy of
specific performance was qualified to some extent (Section 46), and the
relevant time for the calculation of the amount of reduction was changed
(Section 50). The difficulty which resulted from the definition of delivery
as a delivery of conforming goods was removed in the new law, and
the matter of conformity was severed from the fulfillment or breach
of the delivery obligation. 95
b. Israeli Law
The process of codifiying legislation of private law began in Israel
in the mid-60's. The method adopted was one of legislation by stages,
with the intention that eventually the separate laws would be integrated
93. According to Article 39 of the 1980 U.N. Convention, the buyer has to give
notice specifying the nonconformity "within a reasonable time after he has discovered it
or ought to have discovered it," whereas according to ULIS he is required to give notice
"within as short a period as possible in the circumstances" (arts. 39 and 11). For a
critical survey of these rules, see Reitz, A History of Cutoff Rules as a Form of Caveat
Emptor: Part I-The 1980 U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 36 Am.
J. Comp. L. 437 (1988).
94. Compare Articles 45-52 of the 1980 U.N. Convention to Articles 26-29, 30-32
and 41-49 of ULIS. The 1980 U.N. Convention retains the separation between the pro-
visions on the seller's remedies and those on the buyer's.
95. Compare Article 31 of the 1980 U.N. Convention to Article 19(l) of ULIS. See
also Part ilI.E infra.
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into a comprehensive civil code.96 This legislation has been influenced
by various legal systems, mainly continental but also Anglo-American.
One of the central sources of inspiration in the field of contract law
was ULIS, which was also adopted into Israeli law, and applies in the
sphere of international trade.
The Israeli Law of Sale of 1968 applies to the sale of goods and
mutatis mulandis to the sale of real property, obligatory rights and
intellectual property." It applies in the spheres of commercial, private
and consumer transactions. The Law's provisions on nonconformity are
based on the provisions of ULIS. It adopts the concept of noncon-
formity in its broad incidence (Section 11). Following ULIS, the Israeli
Law excludes the buyer's reliance on defects of which she actually knew
at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Yet, it does not impose
on the buyer any obligation or burden of examination prior to entering
into the contract or prior to taking delivery. The Law lays down detailed
provisions regarding the burdens imposed on a buyer who wishes to
rely on nonconformity (Sections 13-17). It also states the seller's ob-
ligation regarding the supply of an object free of third-party rights
(Section 18). As for the main remedies for nonconformity, they are to
be found in the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law of
1970." This Law contains general provisions which apply to every kind
of breach in any kind of contract, including nonconformity of the
object in sales contracts. In addition, the Law of Sale provides special
remedies for nonconformity, the most important of which is the pro-
portional reduction of price. The principal rules regarding the different
remedies (specific performance, rescission, reduction and damages) and
their interrelation are very similar to the rules of ULIS, save for the
abstraction and generalization of the remedies to all types of breaches
in all contracts.
Following the Law of Sale, the Hire and Loan Law was enacted
in 1971. The Hire and Loan Law governs lease transactions of real
property, movables and rights." The Law's provisions on the conformity
96.. G. Tedeschi & Y. Zemach, Codification and Case Law in Israel, in The Role
of Judicial Decisions and Doctrines in Civil Law and Mixed Jurisdictions 272, 287. (J.
Dainow ed. 1974); Friedmann, Independent Development of Israeli Law, 10 Is. L. Rev.
515, 536-62 (1975); Shalev & Herman, A Source Study of Israel's Contract Codification,
35 La. L. Rev. 1091 (1975).
97. 22 L.S.I. 107. For a general review of the law, see Aronovsky, Comments on
the New Law of Sales, 4 Is. L. Rev. 141 (1969) (to which the full text of the law is
annexed); U. Yadin, The Uniform Sales Law of the 1964 Hague Convention and the
Israeli Sales Law of 1968, in lus Privatum Gentium, Festschrift fdr Max Rheinstein, Bd.
1, 455 (1969).
98. 25 L.S.I. II. The full text of the law is appended to Professor Shalev's article:
Shalev, Remedies on Anticipatory Breach, 8 Is. L. Rev. 123, 135 (1973). See also Fried.
mann, Remedies for Breach of Contracts, I T.A. Stud. L. 170 (1975).
99. 25 L.S.I. 152.
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of the leased object are based to a large extent on the Law of Sale's
provisions. As for the conformity of the object at the time of its
delivery to the hirer, Section 6 provides a conformity rule resembling
the rule that applies to sales. Apparently, during the lease period the
lessor's obligation is confined to the repair of substantial defects within
a reasonable time after receiving a demand from the lessee (Section 7).
In addition to her ordinary relief under the general remedies Law, the
lessee is entitled to proportional reduction of the rent in case of breach
of the lessor's obligation of repair, and in certain circumstances she
may also repair the object herself and claim reimbursement (Section
9).
The Contract for Services Law, which was enacted in 1974, applies
to every contract for the performance of any work and the rendering
of any service for remuneration (provided that the contractor is not
the orderer's employee).'0 Sections 3 and 4 of the Law regulate the
matter of nonconformity in the object of the work by providing rules
resembling those of the Law of Sale. The main flaw of these provisions
is their extreme brevity, which leaves considerable gaps. However, in
light of the close linkage between this law and the Law of Sale, as is
indicated both by its history and by its content, it seems that these
gaps should be filled by analogy to the relatively detailed provisions
of the Law of Sale.
Additional provisions on the conformity of the object in general
are provided in the Contracts (General Part) Law of 1973,10 especially
in Section 45 therein. This section states the rule of medium performance
in cases in which the object's quality has not been agreed upon. Special
conformity provisions may also be found in the specific legislation
dealing with the sale of new flats by builders and contractors.1°2 These
are consumer-oriented, compulsory provisions. They broaden the def-
inition of nonconformity by incorporating every official standard ap-
plicable to building construction, and ease the burdens of examination
and notice imposed on the buyer.
D. Conclusion
From the above survey two central conclusions may be drawn. First,
there is great similarity among the 'problems that have arisen in the
various legal systems regarding conformity of the object in different
100. 28 L.S.I. 115. For a general review of the law, see Yadin, The Contract for
Services Law, .1974, 10 Is. L. Rev. 569, 580 (1975) (full text of the law is annexed).
101. 27 L.S.I. 117. The full text of the law is appended to Shalev, General Comments
on Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973, 9 Is. L. Rev. 274, 282 (1974), and to Shalev &
Herman, supra note 96.
102. The Sale (Housing) Law,'1973 (27 L.S.I. 213), sections 2-5.
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contracts. This parallel development is found not only in regard to the
challenges faced by the various systems, but also in the basic approaches
to the development of solutions to those problems. In all of the systems,
the importance of conformity obligations grew as the market economy
developed and as commerce became more important in society. In all
the systems, there was a gradual shift from liability based upon fraud
or upon express undertaking to a readiness to infer liability from the
circumstances of the contractual relationship, and later, to establish
liability as an obligation under law (in the absence of agreement to the
contrary). The problem of nonconformity has always come into primary
focus in regard to contracts of sale, and it was in that context that
the solutions, later applied to other transactions, developed. The course
of development is in the direction of full liability which is not con-
ditioned upon the fault or negligence of the promisor. However, the
pace of development among the various systems is not identical. Gen-
erally, the Civil Law systems preceded the Anglo-American developments
in this area, but the primary tendencies are similar. -
The second conclusion to be drawn from this comparative survey
is that nearly all of the systems remain rooted in a myriad of classi-
fications and distinctions involving situations that, on their face, are
not vastly different. In most of the legal systems, there are substantial
differences among the laws applicable to different contracts (sale, rental,
services, etc.), different obligations under the same contract (for ex-
ample, the obligation of delivery as opposed to the obligation to transfer
rights in the object of the sale), and even among different forms of
breach in regard to the same obligation (e.g., delivery of goods that
are of inferior quality, in partial quantity or different from the agreed
upon object). One even finds that similar flaws and obligations in
similar contracts may be subject to different rules where the object is
different (such as the difference between the Conformity requirements
in a sale of goods and a sale of real property in Anglo-American law).
At times, these fine distinctions may entail, far-reaching effects in terms
of the scope of liability, the relief available to the promisee, and the
burdens placed upon her. For the most part, these distinctions are
deeply rooted in history, and despite their progressive erosion, they can
be abolished only with great difficulty.
Austrian law is exceptional in this regard, establishing broad pro-
visions regarding conformity of object in synallagmatic contracts in
general. These provisions deal with nonconformity in all its aspects,
including those of quality, quantity, and legal defects, with the exception
of supplying an object different from that agreed upon. Together with
these general provisions, we find several specific provisions treating
unique aspects of nonconformity in special contracts. Insofar as the
sale of goods is concerned, the international treaties, also are based
upon a uniform concept of nonconformity, at least with regard to the
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physical aspects of conformity of the object (quality, quantity, fitness
for description, fitness for ordinary uses or particular purposes, etc.).
Following this line, in Israeli legislation the concept of nonconformity
was broadened to other contracts, such as leases and contracts for
services.
The examination of Austrian and Israeli law, international treaties,
and English and American legislation that extends the conformity ob-
ligations relating to the sale of goods to other contracts relating to
goods, shows that there is no inherent obstacle to the unification of
the laws; both unification in terms of the various aspects relating to
conformity in any particular contract and (as in Austria and Israel)
unification in regard to the performance of contracts in general. The
next chapter will introduce a concept that will serve as a framework
for such unification.
III. TOWARD A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF CONFORMITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
A. General
Unification of the treatment of conformity problems is both at-
tainable and desirable. The experience of the legal systems discussed
above shows that the application of many different rules to closely
related situations causes practical and theoretical confusion. This con-
fusion often results in both unfairness and inefficiency. It is unfair
that substantively similar situations are treated differently. 03 It is in-
efficient because it imposes on the parties and on the courts the costs
involved in uncertainty-uncertainty which is the result of delicate clas-
sification problems.
Admittedly, there is a trade-off between the generality of a rule or
a standard and its preciseness. The more general a rule or a standard
is, the more likely it is to be over and under-inclusive.1°  However, this
drawback of generality does not seem to impair the suggested concept
of conformity. The conformity principle suggested is neither a single
general rule, nor a general standard. Rather, it is a unified conceptual
framework within which different rules and standards may be elabo-
rated. The advantage of such a framework is that its formulation is
103. Compare Levin & McDowell, The Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice
in Voluntary Obligations, 29 McGill L. Rev. 24, 35-40 (1983). The authors discuss the
justifications for the introduction of general theories, emphasizing the "imperative to treat
like persons and like cases alike." Id. at 36.




based on substantive analysis, whereas the existing rules in most legal
systems are the outcome of peculiar historical developments. It is not
contended that rules and standards based on such a general concept
will forever meet the ever-changing needs of society. The belief is,
however, that this framework will serve in creating a more harmonic
and manageable system of rules in that sphere. Such a framework
would allow for future developments of the rules and standards of
conformity, while preserving a comprehensive grasp of the different
situations.
The recognition of a general concept of conformity does not mean
that different transactions, or different situations within each trans-
action, will be governed by exactly the same rules. For example, a
distinction may be drawn between obligations that call for instantaneous
performance and those that involve extended performance. Yet, this
does mean that the analysis will start from the same general idea, and
only inasmuch as there are substantive differences between the situations
will the rules differ. Once the concept of conformity is recognized, it
may be used to explain the rules in force in certain legal systems. It
may further be used as a yardstick for critical evaluation of existing
rules, and insofar as needed, as a basis for legislative reforms.
In what follows, the concept of conformity and the limits of its
incidence will be described. Then, its relation to the content of the
contract will be indicated, and the possible structures of conformity
obligations will be discussed. This part will conclude with a brief
reference to the content of the rules to be developed within the proposed
framework.
B. The Concept of Conformity
The concept of "conformity" or "nonconformity" has various
meanings in contract law, at different levels of abstraction. In the most
abstract sense, it can be viewed as synonymous with the term "breach."
Contracts are to be performed (pacta sunt servanda), and performance
must conform to the agreement. In this sense, it is possible to describe
every act or omission contrary to a contract in terms of conformity
or nonconformity. For example, where a promisor is obliged to act
with due care and skill, and she acts negligently, her conduct does not
conform to her obligation. Similarly, when the U.C.C. defines (in
Section 2-106(2)) goods or conduct as "conforming" to the contract
wherever they are "in accordance with the obligations under the con-
tract," it may have that same broad meaning. On the other hand, the
term "nonconformity" can be used in a more narrow sense to specify
one of the obligations imposed by certain contracts. Thus, in ULIS
and in the 1980 UN Convention, one of the obligations of the seller,
along with others, is the obligation of conformity (Sections 33 and 35,
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respectively). 05 The two conventions provide for many obligations, such
as delivery, payment, preservation of the goods, and so on. Inter alia,
they impose on the seller an obligation of conformity. French law also
indicates non-conformitk as one possible breach by the seller.1' 6
The first, abstract meaning of nonconformity does not concern us
in this paper, as we are not examining the rules of breach under the
heading of nonconformity. The second, narrow meaning does not reflect
the full scope of the concept. Nonconformity substantively differs from
the other obligations which have been mentioned in that it may relate
to different kinds of obligations. Whether we speak of an obligation
to supply an object, to transfer a right, or to perform some work, in
each case we may inquire whether or not the object, right, or work
conformed to the agreement. In other words, conformity is one aspect
of the performance of an obligation, along with such other aspects as
time and place of performance. For example, when A agrees to supply
an object to B, she undertakes to supply the object at an agreed time
and place, and to supply an object conforming with the agreement in
terms of size, quality, etc. The same would be true were the agreed
object the performance of work or the transfer of a right. Thus,
conformity may be classified in the same group as date and place of
performance, identity of the performer, etc. Conformity is an element
common to many different obligations and not in itself an obligation
of specific content. Although we may speak of the "conformity obli-
gation," as we may speak of the timely-performance obligation or the
obligation to perform a duty personally, we must not allow such lin-
guistic portrayals to cloud the true nature of conformity as a concept
that differs from any defined obligation. One should not speak of
conformity or nonconformity as an independent and disconnected thing,
but only with regard to the performance of another obligation: to
deliver goods, to convey ownership, and the like. Thus, it is like the
obligations of timely performance or performance in the right place,
which have meaning only in the context of the performance of another
defined obligation.
One may also describe conformity in a negative way: nonconformity
is a possible type of breach with regard to various obligations, along
with other types of breach. For instance, in the case of an obligation
to provide certain services, the following breaches, inter alia, may occur:
* complete non-performance of the obligation;
* rendering the services too late or too early;
* rendering the services in a place different than that agreed
upon;
105. See Part lH.C.2.a supra.
106. See J.C.C., supra note 23, arts. 1641-1649, Fasc. X.i, §§ 26-45.
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* performance of the obligation by a different person (in cases
where personal performance is required);
* rendering the services to the wrong person;
* rendering defective services, that do not conform to the
agreement though provided by the right person, to the correct
promisee, at the agreed time and place
From among these breaches, the concept of conformity relates only
to the last. Conformity is, therefore, one aspect of the performance
of obligations. Nonconformity is one of the typical breaches of various
obligations.
As with most distinctions, the division between conformity and
other aspects of performance has its penumbra of ambiguity. It is
difficult at times to decide whether, for example, one is presented with
performance that does not conform to the obligation or whether one
is confronted with something so different from the obligation as not
to constitute performance at all. Does delivering a motor scooter con-
stitute a nonconforming performance of an obligation to supply a truck,
or is it simply an instance of non-performance? Such examples should
neither be discounted, nor should they cause us to discard the proposed
distinction. Almost by definition, distinctions and classifications yield
borderline cases, but that does not necessarily testify to the weakness
of the distinction.
C. The Applicability of the Concept
The concept of conformity enjoys a wide scope of incidence in
terms of the types of contracts and obligations to which it may apply.
But this incidence is not general. As opposed to the abstract concept
of nonconformity (that is, breach of contract), the concept of con-
formity of performance is meaningless in relation to many obligations.
For instance, an agent must not use information obtained in the course
of her agency in a manner contrary to the principal's interest. It would
seem meaningless to speak of the performance of this obligation in
terms of its "conformity." Therefore, we must delineate and classify
those obligations to which the concept of conformity is relevant. Such
delineation must be made in regard to obligations and not in terms of
contracts, as in any contract there may be obligations to which con-
formity is relevant and others to which it is not. The necessary clas-
sification is that of the content of the obligations.
1. Obligations To Do and Not To Do
The ancient Roman distinction between obligations to give (dare)
and obligations to do (facere) is not useful for our purposes, as con-
formity may be relevant to both types of obligation. Thus, we find
conformity provisions both in laws regulating sales and in laws regu-
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lating contracts for services.'0 7 However, the preliminary distinction
between obligations to do (including giving) and obligations not to do-
of refraining from acting-may be helpful. 08 When A undertakes to
refrain from some action or conduct, the question of conformity' of
performance is not, as a rule, germane. While there may be varying
degrees of conformity in obligations to do, an obligation not to do is
either fulfilled or not, and, generally speaking, no question of con-
formity arises. Suppose that A undertakes not to sell a specific product
within a certain geographical area for a fixed period of time. A may
comply with the obligation or infringe it, but usually she cannot render
nonconforming performance. If she sells other products or sells the
same product in other places, she is not in breach. If she sells the
product within the prohibited area, then she breaches her obligation
whether she sells the product once or many times, whether she sells a
flawless product or a defective one, and so on. Indeed, there may be
disagreement as to whether the product sold is the one to which the
obligation referred, or whether the sale was made within the prohibited
area. But when these disagreements are settled, the conclusion must be
either that the obligation was complied with or that it was breached.
In any case, it would seem inappropriate to talk of defective perform-
ance in this respect. On the other hand, various modes of conduct may
be regarded as performance of an obligation to do, though some would
be considered to be defective performance thereof.
2. Result Obligations and Obligations of Means
Another distinction that is of great importance in delineating the
scope of the conformity requirement is that between obligations to
obtain some result (obligations de rksultat) and obligations to adopt
appropriate means for achieving the purpose (obligations de moyens).' o
107. See, e.g., §§ 459 and 633 of the BGB; arts. 1641 and 1792 et seq. of the French
Civil Code.
108. See generally 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations §§ 13 et seq. and 154 et seq., at 17
and 282, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, (1975); Planiol & Ripert, supra note 22, §
999. at 576-77.
109. This modern distinction was developed primarily in French law. It first appeared
in Demogue's treatise on the law of obligations (R. Demogue, Traiti des obligations en
gdn6ral, T. 5, § 1237, at 536 et seq., T. 6. § 599, at 644 (1925)). Result obligations are
the more common type in contracts. In result obligations, the promisor is liable for breach
absent circumstances of force majeure or frustration. As opposed to this, in obligations
of means the promisor is not obligated to achieve the result, but only to act with appropriate
diligence and care to achieve the result. The former group includes such obligations as
delivery by a seller or lessor and a common carrier's undertaking to deliver an object to
its destination. Examples of obligations of means are a physician's undertaking to heal
a patient and a lawyer's obligation regarding the desired outcome of a trial. This distinction
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The distinction between result obligations and obligations of means
yields several results, such as in the matter of the prerequisites for the
materialization of the debtor's responsibility for a breach, and with
regard to the burden of proof as to the existence of breach." 0 For our
purposes, the most important of these results is that the concept of
conformity is only applicable to result obligations, as it cannot have
effect in the context of obligations of means.
Where result obligations are concerned, nonconformity between the
result promised and that achieved constitutes breach. A difference be-
tween the agreed upon result and the actual result is, in such obligations,
a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a breach. As
opposed to this, where the obligation can be met by adopting appro-
priate steps for achieving the result, then a difference between the
hoped-for result and that actually attained is neither a sufficient con-
dition nor a necessary one for the purpose of liability. On one hand,
a patient's death after surgery does not make a conclusion of negligence
ineluctable, and on the other hand, a patient may recuperate, negligence
notwithstanding. At most, the difference (between the hoped-for result
and that attained) may serve as evidence of the promisor's negligence
where our experience tells us that, were there no negligence, the desired
result would have usually followed. Moreover, the measure of damages
in such cases is not the difference between the result achieved and that
desired, but the difference between the actual result and that which
would probably have followed in the absence of negligence. It is possible
that even if there had been no fault on the part of the promisor, the
desired result would not have been achieved. Although there is some
similarity in establishing the scope of damages, only in the case of
result obligations is nonconformity itself the breach remedied.
Support for this view can be found in the fact that the provisions
regarding nonconformity' are found in laws treating obligations of result
(such as sales and leases), but are not found in laws regulating obli-
gations of means, such as agency. Particularly instructive in this respect
is the Draft Civil Code, prepared by the Civil Code Revision Office
is one between obligations, not contracts, as most contracts contain obligations of both
types (and because it refers to non-contractual obligations as well). On this distinction,
see generally J. Frossard, La distinction des obligations de moyens et des obligations de
rksultat (1965); Mazeaud, Essai de classification des obligations: Obligations contractuelles
et extra-contractuelles, 35 Rev. Trim. Droit Civ. I (1936); Tunc, La distinction des
obligations de rtsultat et des obligations de diligence, 1945 J.C.P. I, 449; H. et L.
Mazeaud & A. Tunc, Trait6 thkorique et pratique de la responsabilitt civile, ddlictuelle
et contractuelle, T. 1, §§ 103-2 to 103-10, at 113-30 (6th ed. 1965). For a comparable
discussion in English law, see P. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contracts, 228-
34 (4th ed. 1989).
110. See generally I. Frossard, supra note 109, §§ 169-199, at 90-109.
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of Quebec."' The draft adopts the distinction between result obligations
and obligations of means as a basis for the classification of contracts.
Along with the traditional distinction between the contract of employ-
ment (contrat'de travait) and the contract for work and labor (contrat
d'entreprise), the draft subdivides the last category into contracts of
enterprise (contrat d'entreprise) and contracts for services (contrat de
services). The former sub-category refers to contracts in which the
contractor is required to produce some result, such as the construction
of a building or the repair of a property. The latter sub-category includes
contracts in which the contractor is required to act with skill, prudence
and diligence, but not necessarily to achieve any specified result. It
comprises contracts with experts, professional consultants, lawyers, and
others. The commissions that dealt with the preparation of the code
came to the conclusion that the factual and legal differences between
the two types of contract are significant enough to make their common
regulation clearly unsatisfactory.' 12 One of the significant effects of this
classification is that only in contracts of enterprise is there an obligation
of conformity, and detailed provisions are provided." 3 In contracts for
services, however, this obligation is missing. Instead, there are obli-
gations to provide the services personally, with due prudence and dil-
igence. ",4
The relationship between the conformity aspect of obligations and
the classification of obligations into result obligations and obligations
of means was dealt with in the French law from a special viewpoint.
According to an accepted view, Demogue's dual division does not
exhaust all obligations, and it should be supplemented by a third
category," 5 guaranty obligations (obligations de garantie), or absolute
obligations. This category includes obligations such as the insurer's
obligation to pay compensation when the risk insured against occurs,
or the obligation of a bank issuing a letter of credit to pay the agreed
amount against the tender of the stipulated documents. The common
feature of these obligations is that even if, for example, the event
insured against occurs in circumstances of force majeure, this does not
exempt the insurer from her obligation to pay the agreed sum. The
same applies to the bank's payment obligation in documentary credit,
Ill. Civil Code Revision Office, Report on The Quebec Civil Code (Quebec, 1977)
(hereinafter Draft Codel.
112. See Revision Commission, Committee Reports, Quebec Civil Code, Report on
the Contract for Services. Introduction 2-4 (1971).
113. §§ 686-694 of the Draft Code, supra note Il, Vol. I, at 444-46, and the
commentary relating to these provisions, id., Vol. 2, at 744-47.
114. See § 699 of the Draft Code, supra note Il l, Vol. I, at 447, and the commentary
relating to this provision, id., Vol: 2, at 749-50.
115. See H. et L. Mazeaud & A. Tunc, supra note 109, § 103-8, at 123-27.
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when the seller presents the required documents, although she has
breached her obligations towards the buyer and the latter has a good
defence against the payment of the price. According to the view under
discussion, the guaranty obligations imposed, for example, on the seller
and lessor, are included in this category of obligations de garantie, as
indicated by their name." 6
Obviously, this view is not reconcilable with the thesis proposed
above regarding the relationship between conformity obligations and
the dual division into- result obligations and obligations of means.
According to our view, the aspect- of conformity is a common aspect
of various obligations. The distinction between this and other aspects
of performance is of a different level than the distinction between result
obligations and obligations of means. According to our view, it is,
therefore, possible to "intersect" these two distinctions, and determine
to which types of obligations the aspect of conformity is germane. In
contrast, the view under discussion does not refer to the obligations
of conformity as such, but only to specific regulations of the seller's
and lessor's responsibility for latent defects under the Code Civil. The
obligations of conformity laid down in those provisions create a third
category of obligations (together with the insurer's obligations and other
similar obligations), alongside the result obligations and the obligations
of means. In other words, this view characterizes and delimits the
guaranty obligations on the same level as the distinction between result
obligations and obligations of means.
It seems that this view should not be accepted even within French
law, and in any case it is baseless outside French law. As for the
French law, in a treatise dedicated to the distinction between result
obligations and obligations of means, Frossard explains in detail why
this view should be rejected." ' Frossard distinguishes between the in-
surer's obligation to pay compensation, the bank's obligation under a
letter of credit etc., on the one hand, and the obligations of the seller
and lessor, on the other hand. As for the insurer, he points out that
the obligation under the contract of insurance (like that of the bank
in the case of documentary credit) is not different from any other result
obligation. The event insured against (like the tender of documents in
documentary credit) is a condition precedent to its effectiveness. From
the start, the insurer assumes no obligation regarding the occurrence
or non-occurrence of this condition, so that obviously one cannot inquire
whether the "obligation" concerning the condition is one of result or
of means. The only substance of her obligation is that if the agreed
condition is met, she will pay the sum she undertook to pay. The same
116. Id. at 124-27.
117. J. Frossard, supra note 109, §§ 157-168, at 83-89.
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applies mutatis mutandis to other instances of contracts of this kind.
As for the garantie obligations of the seller and the lessor, they
are indeed unconditioned upon the promisor's cognizance of the defect.
However,' this does not make them more "absolute" than any other
result obligation, since the liability for the breach of such obligations
is in any case unconditioned upon fault or negligence. Indeed, there
are differences between the contents and remedies laid down by the
special provisions regarding obligations de garantie and those applicable
to ordinary contractual obligations under the general law, but they
cannot be taken to justify the conclusion that we are presented with
a different category of obligations in terms of the nature of respon-
sibility."' At present, Frossard's view is also supported by the new
statutory regulation concerning the liability of builders and sellers of
new buildings, introduced in 1978." 9 In these provisions the legislature
employs the expression "garantie" (see, e.g., Sections 1646-1 and 1792-
3 of the Code), and in the same breath expressly declares that the
builder's responsibility does not apply to cases of "cause &rangert"
(Section 1792). This qualification, which refers inter alia to cases of
force majeure, is irreconcilable with the allegation that this obligation
de garantie imposes an "absolute" responsibility, different from any
other result obligation.
Frossard's arguments, only part of which were mentioned, seem
quite convincing in relation to French law itself. Beyond that, in all
systems where no distinction is made between conformity obligations
and other obligations (such as the one of delivery) in terms of the
nature of liability, there is clearly no basis for the view under discussion.
In sum, the conformity aspect of obligations is relevant to result ob-
ligations, and is irrelevant to obligations of means.
3. Employment Contracts
In the French doctrine, doubts were raised as to the correct clas-
sification of the employee's obligations as result obligations or obli-
gations of means. A view was expressed that the contract of employment
does not fit into either of these categories. The alleged ground for this
proposition is that the object of this contract is the mere performance
of the employee's work, while there is no obligation, either definite or
relative, to achieve any result.12 However, the opposite view, according
to which the employee's obligations do fit into either category, seems
more convincing. Indeed, showing up for work and performing the job
118. Id. §§ 160-161, at 84-85.
119. See Loi n* 78-12 du 4 janv. 1978, supra note 30.
120. H. et L. Mazeaud & A. Tunc, supra note 109, at 123.
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.assigned are obligations of result. '2' But these obligations are intertwined
with obligations of means that require professional, skillful, dedicated,
and devoted performance.1'" It would seem, therefore, that obligations
under a labor contract would best be classified as obligations of means,
as was indeed held by the French cour de cassation.' 21 Be that as it
may, the contract of employment does not generally impose on the
employee an obligation to achieve any specific result. Flaws in the
outcome of the employee's work may be evidence of her negligence or
lack of skill. But inasmuch as it constitutes a breach on her part, the
breach is not in the nonconformity of the result, but in the negligence
or lack of skill. Therefore, the concept of nonconformity is not ap-
plicable to the worker's obligation, just as it is inapplicable to all other
obligations which are not result obligations.
4. Standards of Conduct
Another type of obligation that should not be measured in terms
of conformity is that involving standards of conduct, such as the duty
to act in good faith, reasonably or fairly. Here, too, we can find no
defined obligation, the performance of which can be measured in terms
of conformity to the agreed upon standard. Rather, these are flexible
standards, of conduct that change in accordance with the circumstances
in which they are applied.2 4 They are standards of conduct, not result.
This conclusion is consonant with our earlier finding regarding the
inapplicability of the conformity principle to the obligations of workers
(even according to the view that these obligations cannot be graded
under the classification of obligations of result or means). There are
indeed various links between conformity and the duties of reasonableness
and fairness. Inter alia, when examining the conformity of the per-
formance of a result obligation, the exact content of such obligation
may be determined or altered in accordance with these standards.' 2 5
121. J. Frossard, supra note 109, § 406, at 233-34.
122. See, e.g., Chitty on Contracts, Vol. II, Specific Contracts, §§ 3899-3913, at 751-
63 (26th ed. 1989); Codice Civile (The Italian Civil Code), Title II, ch. 1, Section 111,
§0 2104-2105.
123. See J. Frossard, supra note 109, at 234-35.
124. See, e.g., Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Reasonableness under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1963); Summers, The General Duty
of Good Fiith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810, 816
(1982).
125. Thus, in determining the quantity of goods that a seller has to supply under
"requirement" or "output" agreements, particular importance is paid to considerations
of good faith. See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform
in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 394-97 (1980); R. Nordstrom, supra note 45, §
40, at 110-14.
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However, in the present context it may be stated that the conformity
of performance is not relevant when referring to the compliance with
general standards of conduct.
5. Monetary Obligations
There is no inherent obstacle to applying the concept of conformity
to a delivery obligation whose object is a sum of money, that is, an
obligation of payment. One may say that the payment of a greater or
lesser sum than the agreed amount is an instance of nonconformity of
performance. However, the special characteristics of the monetary ob-
ligation make an analysis in terms of conformity somewhat superfluous.
In this regard, there can be no instances of nonconformity other than
those of quantity, as any other nonconformity would be considered
non-performance. Performance in forged money, foreign currency or
any other medium different from that agreed upon can be one of two
things: payment or non-payment. The basic rule is that payment of a
debt other than by the correct means is tantamount to non-performance
of the obligation. Unless otherwise agreed expressly or impliedly, or
established by usage of trade, a creditor may refuse any payment that
is not made in legal tender.2 6 As a rule, there are no intermediate
levels of conformity in this context. This consideration, together with
the other specific rules applying to payment, make an analysis in terms
of conformity devoid of much practical purpose. Yet, as was mentioned,
in principle it is possible to include monetary obligations within the
scope of the conformity concept.
6. Bailment Obligations
As was demonstrated earlier, the concept of conformity is not
relevant to obligations of means. Therefore, whenever the obligation
to preserve property is one of due care only, it would be inappropriate
to examine its performance in terms of conformity. However, it would
seem that even in those cases where the bailee's obligation is one of
result, the conformity perspective is of almost no significance. As we
shall see, the interest raised by the conformity obligation lies in its
reference to conformity between agreement and actual result. As op-
posed to this, in the case of bailments, there is no externally agreed
yardstick concerning the condition of the property at the termination
of the bailment. The property is supposed to be in the same condition
as it was when deposited with the bailee (subject to normal wear and
tear). Damage or defect caused to the property during the bailment
will ordinarily be regarded as a breach on the bailee's part, yet they
126. See F. Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money, 70 (4th ed. 1982).
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shall be examined by comparison to the actual state of the property
at the time of its delivery to the bailee, and not according to the
parties' agreement. True, in a contract of sale, for example, the parties
may express their agreement by means of sample or model, in which
case the conformity would be examined mainly by comparing the sale
object to the sample or model. However, the model or sample is but
a means for expressing the criterion for conformity, which is still the
parties' agreement. Thus, if the sample suffered from hidden defects,
of which the buyer could not know, their presence in the sale object
would be considered as a breach of the conformity obligation.'27 In
the case of bailment, the rule is the opposite. For certain purposes it
would be possible to draw an analogy between the rules and remedies
relating to the concept of conformity and those applying to the safe-
keeping of a deposited property, but the central characteristic of con-
formity, conformity between the agreement and the performance, is
missing. Therefore, with regard to the safekeeping obligations of the
carrier, the lessee, the repairer, the creditor who receives a pledge, and
any other bailee, the concept of conformity is inapplicable to the
property's condition when returned to its owner.
The aforesaid applies also to a contract of loan for use (commo-
datum). In contrast, it seems that in a loan of fungible goods for
consumption (mutuum) there is a conformity obligation regarding the
goods which the borrower delivers to the lender (and of course, re-
garding the goods given by the lender as well). Assume that A agrees
to lend B fifty sacks of cement, and B undertakes to return fifty (other)
sacks in the future. Each of the parties is entitled to receive cement
of the stipulated quality and quantity, suitable for its ordinary or agreed
uses, etc. Should the lender deliver defective cement, it would be a
breach of the contract and the borrower would be entitled to the
appropriate remedies. Yet, it does not seem that the borrower is au-
tomatically entitled to deliver defective cement in return. If the condition
of the goods delivered by the lender is the criterion for the quality of
the goods which the borrower has to supply in return, then she can
deliver goods of that same quality, but still the criterion is the agree-
ment.
7. Summary
In summary, we may conclude that the aspect of conformity of
performance is relevant in obligations to do or to give (as opposed to
obligations not to do or give), that are result obligations (as opposed
to obligations of means), with the exception of bailment obligations,
127. See supra note 38, Sale of Goods Act, 1979, § 15(2)(c).
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standards of conduct between the parties, and perhaps monetary ob-
ligations. Thus, we may consider conformity in regard to such obli-
gations as conveyance and delivery by a seller or exchanger, the
obligations of a lessor as regards the object of the lease, those of the
lender as regards the property lent, and those of builders, handymen,
carpenters, and other contractors who promise particular results. Con-
formity is also relevant to contracts granting easements, assignments
of rights, the bringing of property into a partnership by a partner,
dissolution of partnerships, division of property, etc.'2
D. The Principle's Center of Gravity: Content of the Agreement
Now that we have defined the concept of conformity as an aspect
of the performance of obligations and have delineated the types of
obligations to which it is relevant, we can take another step in char-
acterizing the concept. In speaking of conformity, we refer to the
relationship between the results promised by a party to a contract and
the results she actually achieved. Schematically speaking, the two central
questions that may arise in this context are: what was the promise,
and what was actually performed? 29 Occasionally, a third question may
arise after the last two have been answered: Did the performance
conform to the promise? Let us say that A sues B for breach of a
contract of sale. A claims that the agreement called for delivery of 500
tons of wheat, but only 498 tons were delivered. B can adopt any of
several defenses, among them:
A. Although only 498 tons where delivered, there was no non-
conformity since the agreement stipulated delivery of "approx-
imately 500 tons of wheat."
B. Indeed, the agreement called for the delivery of 500 tons,
and exactly 500 tons were delivered.
C. Although the agreement was for 500 tons and only 498 tons
were delivered, the disparity is so small as to be insignificant
and should not, therefore, be viewed as nonconformity.
The first assertion focuses on the content of the agreement, the
second on the content of the performance, and the third on the degree
128. The concept of conformity of performance is relevant also to gratuitous contracts,
such as gifts or rendering of services without remuneration (in those legal systems that
recognize the enforceability of such contracts, which are mainly the continental systems).
However, special considerations apply to these contracts, and they are therefore subject
to special rules of conformity. The meaning and substance of conformity in gratuitous
contracts are beyond the scope of the present study.
129. Schematically, the examination of conformity is done in a quasi-syllogistic way:
* The promisor undertook to perform, give, or achieve a certain result;
* The promisor performed, gave, or achieved some result;
* Therefore the performance conforms/does not conform with the agreement.
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of similarity required between the agreement and the performance. In
examining the subject of conformity, the second type of claim is of
little interest and the third is of limited significance. Primary interest
-is in the first assertion. The question of what was performed is exclu-
sively factual. The question as to whether or not some particular per-
formance conforms to a given agreement does not generally present
any special difficulty. A problem may arise only when the promisor
seeks to rely on principles such as good faith or upon claims resembling
de minimis in order to mitigate the conformity requirement.3 0 In the
vast majority of cases, once the facts of what was agreed and what
was performed are decided, the question of conformity answers itself.
The center-of-gravity of the "conformity rules" is, thus, to be
found in the first assertion, which focuses upon the content of the
agreement. The parties to a contract frequently fail to express themselves
with regard to all of the matters related to the promised result. Must
the leased premises be suitable for dwelling or is it sufficient that they
be suitable for storage? Must the goods be of excellent quality, of
ordinary quality, or of any quality at all? These are but a few examples
of questions concerning the content of the agreement as it relates to
the promised result. In the absence of agreement, expressed or implied
by the contract, by the circumstances, or by usage, how shall we answer
such questions? Here we may be aided by a number of rules-some
suppletive and others compulsory-intended to supplement the parties'
agreement or even to supersede it. These are the primary and most
important rules of conformity. After addressing the question of the
preferred structure of conformity obligations, we shall discuss some of
the central rules of conformity.
E. Legal Structure of Conformity Obligations
Few legal systems initially considered or even now view conformity
obligations as regular contractual obligations like a seller's duty to
deliver the goods. When these obligations were gradually developed, it
was by means of special legal tools, beginning with requiring that the
seller retroactively guarantee that the goods were free of defects (in
Roman law), and ending with such concepts as collateral agreement
and implied conditions. Even the contractual nature of the liability was
not always clear, as some legal systems relied upon tortious liability in
this regard."'
130. See Zamir, The Extent of Similarity Required Between the Content of the Contract
and its Performance, (to be published in 25 Is. L. Rev. 187 (1991)).
131. The origin of this confusion in Anglo-American law is that in its early stages.
the Common Law did not recognize liability based on a promise. To the extent that
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There are three central approaches to the legal nature of conformity
obligations: the collateral agreement doctrine, nonconformity as non-
fulfillment of the obligation, and nonconformity as an aspect of the
fulfillment of the obligation.
The Collateral Agreement Doctrine-According to this approach,
the obligations of conformity derive from a separate contract, collateral
to the main contract in which the promisor undertakes to supply the
object. This approach exists both in continental and in Anglo-American
law.
German law distinguishes between regular contractual obligations
that require the promisor to perform, give, or achieve some result
(Erfillungspflicht), and between the giving of a warranty, or an ob-
ligation to warrant (Gewahrleistungspficht). In the first case, if the
promisor does not fulfil her obligation, its performance may be en-
forced. As opposed to this, a warranty does not include an obligation
by the warrantor to achieve any result, but only an obligation that if
the result is not achieved she stand liable and the promisee may rescind
the contract or reduce the consideration.'" This concept of warranty
sprung from the view that in a contract relating to an identified piece
of property, the object of the contract is that specific property, with
all its qualities and flaws. The promisor's obligation consists entirely
of delivering that object.'" Even where there is liability for its con-
formity, this liability is not construed as an obligation that the object
be free of defects or be of a certain quality. Its sole outcome is that
if the object is not free of defects or not of the agreed quality, the
warrantor bear the consequences, which do not include the possibility
of specific performance. 3 4 According to this view, the warranty for the
quality of the object is not integral to the obligations of the supplier,
but auxiliary or collateral to her normal contractual obligations.' 3
This theory is gradually losing ground. The attempt to base the
distinction between the cases on the unavailability of specific perform-
liability for the quality of goods was imposed on the seller, it was based on tortious
causes of action. See Williston on Sales, supra note 45, Vol. 2, § 15-1, at 322-28; T.
Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability, Vol. I, 389 (1906); Benjamin's Sale of Goods,
supra note 41, § 729, at 418-19. In any case, today there is no real doubt about the
contractual character of the liability in warranty. See T. Street, supra at 389-91; W.
Holdsworth, 8 A History of English Law, 70 (1925); Rabel, The Nature of Warranty of
Quality, 24 Tul. L. Rev. 273, 281 (1950).
132. T. Suss, supra note 18, at 12-20.
133. See E. Rabel, supra note 13, at 104-06; Rabel, supra note 131, at 277-80.
134. E. Rabel, supra note 13, at 105; Rabel, supra note 131, at 277. For a comparable
view in American law, see Corbin on Contracts Vol. 1, § 14, at 31 (1963, updated to
1990).
135. On the special rules applicable to this warranty under the German and French
systems, see Parts Il.B.l.b.i and II.B.l.c supra and the references cited therein.
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ance does not stand up to criticism from a comparative point of view,
nor does it fall into line with the modern trends in German law itself."6
Nevertheless, German and French law still preserve a separate, distinct
arrangement for nonconformity based upon the promisor's warranty,
alongside the normal contractual obligations.
In Anglo-American law as well, the view was that the basis for
the warranty lay in a collateral contract that was not part of the primary
contract. 3' However, regardless of perplexing statutory formulations,"'
the currently accepted view is that the collateral nature of the warranty
refers only to the transfer of title and delivery, and that it does not
require the requisites for establishing a separate contract. English and
American law view warranty as a contractual obligation integral to the
contract of sale. 39
Nonconformity as Non-Fulfillment of the Obligation-Some ap-
proaches have not been satisfied with abolishing the auxiliary, extra-
contractual character of conformity obligations, adopting instead the
view that the conformity obligation is integral to the obligation to
supply the object. The most extreme position in this direction defines
performance of an obligation as the conforming fulfillment of that
obligation. One widespread approach in German case law viewed the
nonconformity of the object of sale as totally precluding fulfillment of
136. As to the comparative point of view, there are legal systems (such as the Common
Law) in which even a breach of ordinary obligations does not usually give rise to specific
performance, while some systems grant this remedy in the case of quality defects as well.
As for Israeli law, see § 3 of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law,
1970, supra note 98. As for the use of the remedy asireinte by French courts, see Morrow,
supra note 2, at 537. Therefore, one cannot say that there is an inherent difference
between the cases. See also Rabel, supra note 131, at 277. As for German law, the
modern trend is toward blurring the borders and narrowing the differences between the
rules governing warranty and those applying to ordinary contractual obligations. The
courts tend to expand the scope of relief available for breach of warranty to include
protection of positive interests, including specific performance. On these developments in
the French and German systems, see Parts II.B.I.b.i and II.B.l.c supra,
137. See Stoijar, Conditions, Warranties and Descriptions of Quality in Sale of Goods
I, 15 Mod. L. Rev. 425, 431-32 (1952). Even in Street's book of 1906 (T. Street, supra
note 131, at 389) it was argued: "Nowadays the warranty is looked upon almost exclusively
as a separate contract subsidiary to the contract of sale .... .
138. § 61 ,of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979, defines the term "warranty" as:
"lAin agreement with reference to goods which are the subject of a contract of sale, but
collateral to the main purpose of such contract ...." The term "agreement" alludes,
so to speak, to the existence of a separate and distinct contrict that accompanies the
primary contract. The term "collateral," as well, can lead to the same conclusion. See
Stoljar, supra note 137, at 430-32.
139. Benjamin's Sale of Goods, supra note 41, § 736, at 423-24; P. Atiyah, supra
note 41, at 68-69; Rabel, supra note 131, at 279; S. Williston, The Law Governing Sales
of Goods, Vol. 3, § 608, at 343 ( rev'd ed. 1948).
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the seller's obligation.1t 0 According to this view, the seller's liability
for the quality of the object is but a specific incidence of impossibility
(Unmoglichkeit) of delivery (which is one of two types of breach rec-
ognized under the BGB)."'
A similar view was adopted in ULIS. Section 19(1) of the Uniform
Law establishes: "Delivery consists in the handing over of goods which
conform with the contract." Section 33(1), which enumerates the con-
formity obligations of the seller, begins: "The seller shall not have
fulfilled his obligations to deliver the goods where he has handed
over: . . . ." This absorption of conformity requirements into the de-
livery obligation raised substantial practical difficulties and was widely
criticized." 2 Since, by definition, delivery is contingent upon the handing
over of goods that conform with the contract, it would appear that
even if the buyer chooses to accept flawed goods (with the intention
of sufficing with monetary relief), and even if she uses them for her
purposes, still no delivery of the goods occurs. This definition of delivery
was deleted from the 1980 Vienna Convention, and conformity is no
longer established as a condition for delivery.
Nonconformity as an Aspect of the Fulfillment of the Obligation-
Just as the former perception that a promisor could perform her ob-
ligations despite delivery of a nonconforming object is unsatisfactory,
so too, one cannot accept the opposite view that a promisor can in
no way fulfill her obligation by delivery of an object flawed by non-
conformity. The conformity requirement is not something external to
the contract, but neither is it the obligation itself. As defined above,
conformity is one aspect of performance. This approach was adopted,
for example, in the Israeli legislation and in the 1980 Vienna Con-
vention. 14 3 This is the proper understanding of the principle of con-
formity in the performance of contracts.
Understanding the concept of conformity as one aspect of per-
formance and not as identical with performance does not imply a
140. T. Silss, supra note 18, at 186-96; E. Rabel, supra note 13, at 106.
141. This view was severely criticized on the ground thatthe seller's liability for the
conformity of the object under the BOB is different than ordinary contractual obligation.
See T. SOss, supra note 18, at 158-62 and at 186-88. To the extent that there. was any
basis for that view under German law, it was with regard to the rules of liability in
contracts other than sale.
142. In particular, the problems arose from the desire of the drafters to employ
conformity as a means for solving a wide spectrum of legal questions related to contracts
of sale, including such problems as transfer of risk and date of payment. See arts. 96-
101, 59 and 71 of ULIS; "Delivery" in the Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods (ULIS): Report of the Secretary-General, 3 UNCITRAL Y.B. 31, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/Wg.2/WP.8 (1972); Honnold, supra note 91, § 210, at 238-39.
143. It is to the credit of the Israeli legislature that the Israeli Sale Law and other




distinction between the conditions for. imputing liability for noncon-
formity and those applying to liability for non-performance (for ex-
ample, concerning the requirement of fault). Just as there is equality
in principle between the conditions and scope of liability in cases of
non-performance, performance by the wrong person, and performance
in a place other than that agreed upon, so should there be equivalence
in principle in regard to the conditions and scope of liability in the
case of nonconformity.
F. Fromthe Principle of Conformity to Conformity Rules
After demonstrating the need for a unified treatment of the various
aspects of conformity in Part II above, the foregoing sections of this
part were dedicated to portraying the analytical framework within which
such a treatment could and should be effected. Before dealing with the
justifications for imposing conformity obligations on promisors (in Part
IV below), we first have to indicate the main conformity obligations
to be developed under the general principle. In fact, this is the central
task facing any legal system.
The formulation of a coherent set of conformity rules (inasmuch
as possible) requires not only a broad perception of the concept of
conformity, but also a comprehensive understanding of other rules,
principles, and doctrines in any given system. One cannot formulate
conformity rules without paying attention to the existing arrangement
of contractual remedies, to the role of such principles as good faith,
and so forth. Therefore, we shall content ourselves with a brief review
of some basic matters that must be addressed in any system. The
comparative survey presented in Part II above illustrates these matters
in greater detail.
First, it should be established that the contract's object must con-
form with the actual agreement in all respects: description, quantity,
agreed purposes, etc. More importantly, default rules must be intro-
duced, to provide criteria for the object's conformity in the absence
of contrary agreement. As was mentioned above, this is the central role
of conformity rules.' 44 The default rules should apply to the performance
of all obligations to which the concept of conformity applies. 45 Re-
gardless of any fault or express undertaking,'" the object tendered must
144. See supra Part II1.D.
145. See supra Part IlI.C.
146. As Was shown in supra Part I11.C.2, the concept of conformity is applicable
only to result obligations. Full implementation of the conformity principle requires that
the requirement of conforming performance of these obligations will be considered as a
full contractual obligation, unconditional upon 'fault. That, in fact, has been the trend
of development both in Roman law and in the Common Law. In the Civil Law systems,
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conform to its ordinary use,'4 be of medium quality,tu and, in case
of property, be free of third party rights.49 Additional default rules
may refer to the object's accessories, package, labels, and more." 0
There is no clear line between these default rules and the previously
mentioned requirements of conformity with the "actual" agreement
(e.g., the stipulated use of the object or its described characteristics).
Hence, there is also a need for rules concerning the circumstances in
which an undertaking is to be implied from the promisor's acts or
omissions. Typical examples are the rules regarding the effect of using
a model or a sample,'5 ' and conformity to unusual purposes that the
promisee mentioned to the promisor prior to contracting."12
Regardless of their origin (expressed or implied intentions, usages
of trade, statutory default rules), the conformity requirements should
be understood as an aspect of the performance of the obligation.'"
The conformity rules must also state the pertinent time for the
conformity of the object. This issue is connected with the issue of the
conformity obligations do in fact impose no-fault liability (see supra Parts II.B.I.ii and
iii). The promisor's fault may have some relevance to the promisee's remedy of damages,
but this is a general characteristic of those systems, and not a special feature of the
conformity rules (see K. Zweigert & H. Kdtz, supra note 12, at 189-91; N. Horn, H.
Kdtz & H. Leser, supra note 8, at 97-98, 112-15) In English law, this trend is plainly
demonstrated in the expansion of conformity obligations from sale of goods to leases of
goods and to services contracts. The seller's liability is clearly a full, contractual one.
The no-fault nature of the lessor's liability was clarified only in The Supply of Goods
and Services Act of 1982, and, as for services, the liability is still conditioned upon fault,
even in result obligations (see supra Parts II.B.2.a, c and e). Parallel development has
occurred in the American law.
147. This requirement is the heart of both the Anglo-American "merchantability" and
the Civil Law "redhibitory defects." See supra Parts lI.B.2.a, lt.B.L.b and lt.B.l.c.
148. Compare § 243 of the German BGB; § 360 of the German HGB; art. 1246 of
the French Civil Code; art. 1178 of the Italian Civil Code; § 45 of the Israeli Contracts
(General Part) Law.
149. See, e.g., §§ 434 and 541 of the German BGB; § 1626 et seq. of the French
Civil Code; art. 923 of the Austrian ABGB; § 12 of the English Sale of Goods Act,
1979, and § 7 of The Supply of Goods and Services Act, 1982.
150. See § 2-314(2)(e) of the U.C.C. and § 35(2)(d) of the 1980 UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18 (1980). Problems
of nonconforming packages or labels are relatively modern phenomena, so that one should
not expect to find a treatment of them in older legislation.
151. See, e.g., §§ 2-313(l)(c) and 2A-210(l)(c) of the U.C.C.; § 494 of the German
BGB; art. 222 of the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations; art. 1522 of the Italian Civil
Code; § 15 of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 and § S of The Supply of Goods
and Services Act 1982; art. 33(l)(c) of ULIS and § 35(2)(c) of the 1980 UN Convention
on International Sale of Goods; § 11(4) of the Israeli Law of Sale, 1968 (supra note 97).
152. See, e.g., §§ 2-315 and 2A-213 of the U.C.C.; § 14(3) of the English Sale of
Goods Act 1979; §§ 4(4)-4(6) of The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982; art. 33(l)(e)
of ULIS and § 35(2)(b) of the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods.
153. See supra Part III.E.
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passing of risk regarding injuries or loss of the object. Special attention
should be given to the scope of conformity obligations in continuous
contracts, such as leases-both at the commencement of the continuous
relations and during its running.'54
A universal characteristic of conformity rules is the exclusion of
the promisee's reliance on defects of which she actually knew at the
time of contracting." In this regard, a decision of paramount impor-
tance must be made regarding defects of which the promisee could
reasonably have known: should the law impose on the promisee an
obligation or a burden of inspection prior to the conclusion of the
contract (if the object exists and is already identified at that time)?
Evidently, the broader the burden of inspection before contracting is,
the narrower the scope of the conformity obligations imposed on the
supplier will be. The heavier the burden of examination before con-
tracting is, the more the system is one of caveat emptor.
Once the prerequisites for, and the scope of, the promisor's liability
are established, then the issue of the promisee's remedies arises. Yet,
a preliminary question refers to the existence and the extent of burdens
imposed on a promisee who wishes to rely on nonconformity. Unlike
breaches such as complete non-performance, delayed performance or
performance by the wrong person, in the case of nonconformity the
promisor may be completely unaware of the nonconformity in the object
that she supplied. This, and numerous other considerations, may lead
to the requirement that the aggrieved party examine the object and give
the other party notice of any nonconformity within a prescribed period
of time as a prerequisite to her reliance on the nonconformity.5 6 Such
rules prevail in the Civil Law systems, following the Roman law tra-
dition.'"7 In prescribing such rules, one must determine the extent of
examination required (if any), the period in which the notice should
be given (which may be a fixed or flexible period), and the results of
failing to comply with these requirements. In this regard, the law may
take into consideration the patent or latent character of the noncon-
formity, the parties' expertise, and so on.
154. See also supra Parts ll.B.l.b.ii, II.B.I.c and I.B.2.c and d.
155. See, e.g., arts. 1491 and 1578 of the Italian Civil Code; §§ 460 and 539 of the
German BGB (but see § 544 thereof); art. 200 of the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations;
§ 14(2)(a) of the English Sale of Goods Act, 1979; art. 928 of.the Austrian ABGB; art.
36 of ULIS; § 35(3) of the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods. See also supra Parts il.B.l.a, b and c, II.B.2 and II.C. See infra Part IV.A.2.
156. See generally, Reitz, supra note 93; Reitz, A History of Cutoff Rules as a Form
of Caveat Emplor: Part Il-From Roman Law to Modem Civil and Common Law, 37
Am. J. Comp. L. 247 (1989).
157. See, e.g., 4§ 477 and 638 of the German BGB and §§ 377 and 378 of the German
HGB; art. 1648 of the French Civil Code; art. 933 of the Austrian ABGB. See also supra
Parts II.B.l and II.C.
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As to the aggrieved party's remedies, these would presumably be
derived from the general conceptions of the law of remedies in any
given system. The significant implication of the concept of conformity
in this regard is that the same remedies available in any other breach
should basically apply to nonconformity of the performance as well."'
Special issues that must be addressed include: the promisee's right to
demand the replacement of the object or its repair; the right of the
aggrieved party to suspend her performance until the nonconformity is
cured (dependency of obligations); protection of the restitution interest
by providing a remedy of proportional reduction of the price, etc.
Finally, a central issue in the formulation of any set of conformity
rules is whether and to what extent some of the rules should be regarded
as compulsory. This issue is part of a much broader dilemma concerning
the regulation of contractual relations by the state. It involves problems
of market failures, consumer protection, paternalism and distributive
justice in the law of contract, and generally the appropriate role of
the state in economy and society. As a matter of fact, all modern legal
systems include such compulsory regulation, especially with regard to
housing (construction, sales and leases) and other consumer products." 9
An attempt to suggest an "ideal model" for a set of conformity
rules is far beyond the scope of this article. However, it is hoped that
the analytical framework of the conformity concept proposed above
may assist in any reform aimed at improving and harmonizing existing
conformity rules. The dissatisfaction with the existing situation in most
legal systems that do not contain a general principle of conformity (as
demonstrated in the comparative survey above) indicates that such re-
forms are indeed necessary.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPOSING CONFORMITY OBLIGATIONS
The main significance of the conformity principle lies in the pro-
vision of rules that establish the criteria for the conformity of per-
formance.160 When the parties clearly stipulate the qualities that must
be found in the object, the basic norm of pacta sunt servanda suffices
158. Unlike the present situation in many legal systems whose rules are not based on
a general concept of conformity. See supra Part lI.B. The 1980 UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Israeli legislation represent such
uniformity of remedy rules. See supra Part 11.C.2.
159. See, e.g., the French statutory reform concerning construction and sale of new
buildings (supra note 30); the Israeli Sale (Housing) Law, 1973 (supra note 102); The
English Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (supra note 40); the American Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, IS U.S.C. § 45 (1978), and the doctrine of "implied warranty of habit-
ability" (supra Parts l.B.2.a and d); and the Austrian Consumer Protection Law (supra
note 85).
160. See supra Part III.D.
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to explain why the promisor should supply an object that conforms
with the agreement. The question which then arises is this: what ad-
vantage is there in introducing rules to establish criteria for the con-
formity of performance? Why not be content with the principle that
contractual obligations must be fulfilled? These questions will be dealt
with in light of various theories about contracts and the role of contract
law.
Some preliminary comments are necessary. First, we shall focus on
justifications for conformity default rules, leaving aside compulsory
standards of conformity. The reason for this is not that compulsory
conformity rules are few or unimportant, but rather that they arouse
too many questions concerning mandatory regulation of contractual
obligations. A meaningful analysis of these general, extensively debated
issues cannot be undertaken here. Second, it is not the purpose of the
following discussion to give any general account of the various theories
about contract law. The very attempt to implement the theories in
regard to the present issue will, however, shed light on the theories
themselves. This article addresses only those theories that seem most
fruitful in the present context, and arranges them according to consid-
erations of exposition. It will soon be realized that almost no satisfactory
justification for the conformity obligations may be grounded on just
one theory, and that, in fact, they are all interrelated .'6
A. Individualistic Justifications- The Will Theory
1. General
This section focuses on attempts to explain default rules that impose
conformity obligations as closely related to the will of the parties.
Classical contract theory, inspired by the ideas of nineteenth century's
liberalism and individualism, tended to ground all the consequences of
contracts on the parties' will. 62 Inter alia, it was proposed that the
default rules of conformity are based on that will. However, the dif-
ficulty of reconciling these default rules with the will theory of contracts
161. Part of the discussion will be based on German law. Although the German
scholars did not refer to the principle of conformity as such, but rather to the special
provisions of the German BGB on quality defects in sales, it seems possible to deduce
broader conclusions from their ideas. The same applies to the English and American
scholars who dealt with the concept of warranty.
162. See K. Ryan, An Introduction to the Civil Law 38-42 (1962); A. von Mehren &
J. Gordley, supra note 12, at 788-90; P. Atiyah, supra note 38, at 405; Pound, The Role
of the Will in Law, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1954); M. Horowitz, The Transformation of
American Law, 1780-1860, 180-85 (1977); B. Nicholas, French Law of Contract 31-35
(1982).
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is plain: the heed for obligations implied in law arises precisely in those
cases where it is impossible to found them on the parties intentions,
expressed or implied in fact. We shall examine three methods (or
categories of methods) of dealing with this difficulty.
2. The Promisee's Ignorance or Mistake
Several factors prompted scholars to try to justify liability for the
conformity of the object by analogy to the rules of defects in the
formation of contract, and of mistake in particular. The central reason
stemmed from the universal rule according to which a promisee, who
knows of a defect in the object at the time of the conclusion of the
contract, cannot rely on it under the rules of conformity. 63 Another
reason was the notion that transactions in which the object is existing
and identified at the time of contracting are the paradigm to which
"warranties" (in England and the United States) or "Gewahrleistung
fir Sachmiingel" (in Germany) apply.' 64 Other causes were the existing
rule in some systems, under which reliance on the rules of defect in
the object excludes recourse to the rules of mistake, and the general
trend, based on the will theory, to emphasize the subjective aspects of
the parties' relations.
According to one view, the imposition of statutory liability for
conformity is justified on grounds of the buyer's ignorance of the
defect. 6 The mere existence of a flaw in the object, from an objective
point of view, does not constitute a breach of the contract, as the
parties may agree on a sale of flawed property. The alleged source of
liability is, therefore, the gap between the buyer's knowledge and the
actual facts. According to another view expressed in Germany, the
provisions relating to the seller's liability for the quality of the thing
sold are but a special regulation of mistake, which excludes the ap-
plicability of the general rules on mistake. 166 The buyer may be mistaken
regarding various matters, and ordinarily her rights are determined by
the general rules. But whenever her mistake relates to the characteristics
of the thing sold, specific considerations of balancing between the
interests of the seller and the buyer and between the fairness of com-
163. See the provisions referred to in supra note 155.
164. Rabel, supra note 131, at 276; K. Larenz, supra note 9, at 60-68. In Anglo-
American law, the term "warranty" is occasionally used to indicate commitments regarding
existing facts, that is commitments that refer to the condition of existing objects. See,
e.g., P. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law 161-64 (1981). Compare also Bayles, Legally
Enforceable Commitments, 4 Law and Phil. 311, 311-12 (1985).
165. Haymann, Fehler und Zusicherung beim Kauf, in Die Reichsgerichtspraxis im
deutschen Rechtsleben, IIl, 317, 328 (discussed in T. Sfiss, supra note 18, at 162-68).
166. See T. Suiss, supra note 18, at 201-09.
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merce and its security apply, which justify certain deviations from the
general law.
Though capturing an important element of conformity rules, these
views are open to severe criticism. The mere fact that the applicability
of the special warranty rules excludes the buyer's reliance on the rules
of mistake does not lead to the conclusion that the former constitute
a particular instance of the latter. 67 Moreover, this argument is irrel-
evant in those systems (such as the American and the English) that do
not recognize such a rule. Furthermore, in numerous cases the con-
formity obligation is breached while there is almost no basis for a claim
of mistake. A typical case is that of the nonconformity in future goods
or services. The mistake approach is relevant only (or almost only) to
contracts referring to existing and identified objects. One cannot speak
of mistake in the formation of contract with regard to future objects
since at that time there is no object to which a mistake may refer.'6
The assumption that conformity rules ("warranties" or others) primarily
apply to existing objects is anachronistic. Currently, conformity rules
similarly (or even primarily) apply to executory contracts, in which the
object is to' be rendered, manufactured, purchased or identified by the
promisor only in the future.
Other objections to the views under discussion may be based on
the rules concerning the burden of proof and the remedies applicable
to each of the cases. A promisor who wishes to exclude her liability
for nonconformity on the ground of the promisee's knowledge thereof
at the time of contracting has to prove that the promisee did in fact
have that knowledge at that time. Contrarily, where a party claims that
she has entered into a contract in consequence of a mistake, she is the
one who has to prove this claim. This apparently technical difference
points to the substantive difference between the rules. 6 9 A considerable
disparity between the cases exists regarding remedies as well. In the
case of nonconformity the aggrieved party is entitled, at least in some
situations and in some systems, to positive damages and to specific
performance as well, whereas the ordinary relief in cases of mistake
167. Thus, in some legal systems (such as French law), the existence of a contractual
cause of action excludes recourse to a delictual cause in the same matter. It would be
far-reaching to deduce from this alone that contract law is but a special regulation of
tort law, and that there are necessarily like justifications for the rules in the two fields.
168. As a rule, one cannot speak of mistake in the legal sense with regard to future
events. A mistake may refer either to the past or to the present. See Tedeschi, Frustration
of Purpose, 10Is. L. Rev. 1, 36-37 (1975); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts
385 (3d ed. 1987); G. Treitel, supra note 76, at 237-38.
169. In Rabel's opinion, this is decisive evidence for the rebuttal of the view that the
buyer's mistake is the basis for the seller's liability. See Rabel, supra note 131, at 282.
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or fraud is annulment of the contract and restitution.7 0 Lack of in-
formation or a gap between the promisee's assumptions and the actual
facts are not considered in themselves as justifying the grant of remedies.
designed to bring her to the position in which she expected to be. Only
a party who can rely on additional causes besides mere mistake, and
particularly on a breach of promise, may seek such remedies.
On a more abstract level, the present views resemble the philo-
sophical theories that try to base the binding force of promises on the
moral obligation to tell the truth. These theories interpret promises as
representations about the promisor's future conduct."' A central weak-
ness of these theories is that an obligation to tell the truth usually
limits what one is allowed to say-she must not lie-while promises
limit what one is allowed to do-she must not do anything that con-
tradicts her prior statements. "Rather than requiring people to conform
their statements to reality, the misrepresentation theory of promising
requires people to act in such a way that reality will conform to their
prior statements.""11 2 The promisee's claim is not that the promisor did
not tell the truth, but that she did not carry out her promise. Similarly,
in the case of conformity obligations, the thrust of the promisee's claim
is not that she was mistaken about the object's condition, but that the
object's condition does not conform to the promisor's obligation. Hence,
the justification for statutory obligations of conformity cannot be found
in the promisee's mistake. One cannot draw upon the negative role of
the promisee's knowledge under the rules of conformity to conclude
that the promisee's ignorance of the nonconformity is the basis for
liability. The positive basis is to be found in the very existence of
nonconformity, while the matter of knowledge plays only a secondary,
negative role."73
3. The Parties' Presumed, Virtual or Hypothetical Intentions
As was mentioned, the German scholars focused on transactions
relating to existing and identified objects, in which the defect was
discovered after the conclusion of the contract. The discovery of the
defect was conceived as a sort of frustrating event that affects the basic
assumptions of the parties, and especially those of the promisee. Con-
170. On the buyer's remedies according to German law, see supra Pan II.B.I.b.i. On
the Israeli law, which entitles the buyer to the full scope of remedies for the breach of
contract (including enforcement and damages), see supra Part ll.C.2.b.
171. See generally, Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 501-03 (1989).
172. Id. at 502. For Craswell's general critique of attempts to derive default rules
from the theory that connects the keeping of promises to the prevention of misrepresen-
tation, see id., at 511-14, 523-28.
173. See T. Suiss, supra note 18, at 204-09.
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sequently, the rules relating to the object's quality were frequently
perceived as connected to the issue of frustration. Against the back-
ground of the will theory, the German scholars tried to base the rules
of frustration on the parties' will.7 4 In this context, well known theories
were Windscheid's Voraussetzung ("Supposition"),'7 and the theories
that followed it at the beginning of this century, such as the views of
Oertmann ("basis of the transaction"), Locher ("the transaction's pur-
pose") and KrUckmann.' 76 In the absence of an actual declaration of
will concerning the frustrating event, the different theories tried to base
the rules of frustration on a contractual reservation, which exists po-
tentially and hypothetically, or virtually on the psychological level, or
which is capable of being detected from the objective basis of the
transaction (according to the different views). Some theories focused
on the promisee's reservation, while others looked for the parties'
common purpose.
In the special context of the seller's liability for the quality of the
thing sold, the German scholars focused on the equivalence between
the considerations in the synallagmatic transaction. In such a trans-
action, each party's wish to receive the counter-consideration, which
she views as equivalent to the consideration given by her, is the causa
of the reciprocal contract. Each of the parties assumes that there is an
equivalence between the considerations given by the parties. The vio-
lation of this equivalence, as a result of the defect, undermines the
basis of the transaction and leads to its collapse.'" The equivalence is
measured by subjective criteria.' 8 However, the decision as to when
the potential or psychological reservation of will is to be recognized is
made according to an objective test of good faith. 79
174. The development of Common Law doctrines of impossibility and frustration was
inspired by similar ideas. See Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 3 B. & S. 826
(K.B. 1863); Tedeschi, supra note 168, at 16-21.
175. B. Windscheid, Die Lehre des r6mischen Rechts von der Voraussetzung (DOs-
seldorf, 1850); Windscheid, Die Voraussetzung, 78 Arch. f. die civ. Praxis 161 (1892)
(discussed in t. Silss, supra note 18, at 124-34); K. Larenz, Geschaftsgrundlage und
Vertragserfuillung 5-11 (3 Auf. 1963); Tedeschi, supra note 168, at 18.
176. For an analysis of these different theories and particularly their application to
the issue of quality defects in sales, see T. Siss, supra note 18, at 127-58. It should be
noted that some of these theories (particularly Locher's theory) tend to be more objective
than others. Yet, they are all based on the idea that the parties should not be subject
to rules that cannot be connected to their will and consent (actual or hypothetical).
177. See also H. Capitant, De ia cause des obligations § 14, at 30-32 (1923).
178. On the subjective equivalence (subjekliven Aquivalenz), see also K. Larenz, supra
note 9, at 62-63; and in the Austrian law, H. Koziol & R. Welser, supra note 82, at
229-30.
.179. The principle of good faith is a dominant principle in the German law. See
generally N. Horn, H. K6tz & H. Leser, supra note 8, at 135-45. In the present context,
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The concentration on the synallagmatic equivalence, and the jus-
tification of liability on grounds of its failure, are also common to
views expressed in the French law regarding the seller's liability for
hidden defects.8 0 These views were subject to severe criticism,", which
is equally applicable to the German theories. The criticism focuses on
the results which the law attributes to the breach of conformity obli-
gations. The aggrieved party may be entitled to rescission of the con-
tract, price reduction, restitution of the expenses incurred by her, and,
in certain cases, even positive damages. These results are irreconcilable
with the explanation that the defect leads to the nullification of the
basis of the contract.
A basic weakness of the various German views that tie conformity
with frustration lies in their concentration on contracts in which the
object is already identified at the time of contracting." 2 Since that
specific thing was considered the object of the contract, a later detection
of a defect therein was conceived as retroactively annulling the parties'
suppositions or the purpose of the transaction. However, as indicated
above, this contemplation does not suit the modern rules, which apply
equally to the sale of existing things and to contracts for the sale of
future property. In either case, the seller's liability for the quality of
the object is an integral part of her obligations. This liability is part
of the content of the contractual obligations. It is not a case in which
the performance of contractual obligations ceases to meet the promisee's
needs-a case of frustration of the contract's purpose.8 3
Finally, in accordance with the will theory of contract, all of the
above mentioned views strive to find the basis for the liability mainly
in the parties' will (either unilateral or bilateral). As was already men-
tioned, the problem with this conception is that the need for default
rules of conformity arises precisely in those cases where the inference
of the promisor's liability from the contract is not possible.," In other
words, the assumption is that the desired liability cannot be inferred
having recourse to this principle, the law allows the buyer to alter, qualify or even to
release herself from her original obligation, although initially her obligation was unqualified
and unconditional.
180. See J. Frossard, supra note 109, § 164, at 87. See also Esmein, Le fondement
de la responsabilit6 contractuelle rapprochde de la responsabilit6 d6lictuelle, 32 Rev. Trim.
Droit Civ. 627, 661-62 (1933); H. Capitant, supra note 177.
181. See J. Frossard, supra note 109, §§ 164-168, at 87-89.
182. See Rabel, supra note 131, at 276; K. Larenz, supra note 9, at 60-67.
183. See Tedeschi, supra note 168, at 15. Tedeschi also criticizes those theories (like
Locher's purpose of the transaction) that refer to the parties' common purposes or
assumptions. It is questionable whether in contracts such as sale or hire, where each of
the parties is motivated by purposes that are in a sense contradictory, a common purpose
is at all deducible (id., at 19-21).
184. Compare Craswell, supra note 171, at 514-16.
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from the parties' intention. "' Yet, it should be noted that some of the
theories also combine additional elements, such as the objective criterion
of good faith. The combination of subjective and objective elements,
and the emphasis put on the (subjective) equivalence of considerations,
are important contributions of these theories. One can embrace these
ideas while rejecting the problematic identification of nonconformity
with frustration.
4. Giving Up
The attempts to justify the default rules of conformity on the basis
of the parties' will have turned out to be rather unsatisfactory. In fact,
these and numerous other difficulties of the will theory led to its decline
in the past hundred years or so. However, a new version of this theory
was introduced about ten years ago by Professor Fried.'8 6 Fried tries
to overcome the prevalent postclassical criticism of the will theory by
making substantial concessions to the opposing theories. He limits the
incidence of the promise principle as an explanatory-and justifying basis
of contract law, and acknowledges the force of other principles beyond
this limited incidence.
As for the content of contractual obligations, Fried readily admits
that whenever the parties do not actually agree on something (whether
expressly or impliedly), the court should sort out the difficulty on bases
other than the agreement.'"' In such cases, one cannot rely on the
parties' will. Furthermore, even if the parties "in all probability" would
have agreed to a certain term had they thought of the issue, the court
is not bound to that term. The presumed intention of the parties is
185. A reference to the parties' hypothetical will does not solve the problem either.
In the absence of indications as to the parties' actual will, one may try to determine the
content of the hypothetical will according to such reasoning as "the rule to which 'utility
maximizing' parties would have agreed", or "the rule to which mutually considerate (or
altruistic) parties would have agreed." However, enforcing an obligation to which the
parties would have agreed is not based on their actual ex ante will. Therefore, the reliance
on the parties' hypothetical will does not add much to a direct implementation of the
principles or policies underlying these arguments (wealth maximization or altruism). For
further discussion of the relationship between hypothetical consent and default rules, see
Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions
and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, .12 Harv. J.L..& Pub. Pol'y 639, 640-50 (1989).
186. C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981). For
general comments and critique on his thesis, see Atiyah, Book Review, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
509 (1981) (reviewing C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation
(1981)); Kronman, A New Champion for the Will Theory, 91 Yale L.J. 404 (1981);
Johnson, The Idea of Autonomy and the Foundations of Contractual Liability, 2 Law
and Phil. 271 (1983); Bayles, supra note 164, at 319-42; Craswell, supra note 171, at
514-23.
187. See C. Fried, supra note 186. at 60-61.
1991]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
but one factor, alongside other considerations such as substantive stan-
dards of fairness, reliance and restitution (all of which Fried charac-
terizes as non-contractual).
Hence, the role left to the parties' will in this context (as in others)
is quite limited, and the difference between Fried's conception of the
will theory and opposing theories is dramatically reduced.
B. Realization of the Parties' Reasonable Expectations
According to a view clearly articulated by Corbin, the-central pur-
pose of contract law is to realize the parties' reasonable expectations,
expectations that are based on their promises.' 8 This theory shifts the
emphasis from each party's will to each party's responsibility for the
reliance and expectations of the other party. A party is responsible for
the reasonable expectations created by her declarations, actions or in-
actions. In this regard, one is not restricted to expectations actually
expressed by the parties or that actually came to their minds; it suffices
that the expectations are characteristic and reasonable. This theory
requires a complex process of uncovering the typical expectations of
each party and weighing them one against the other in order to determine
which are reasonable and worthy of full or partial recognition. In this
process, one has to consider the interests of the parties, characterize
the risks inherent to the transaction and determine their reasonable
allocation between the parties, examine the parties' expectations, and
select those that should be protected.
According to this theory, conformity default rules are justified
whenever the circumstances reasonably give rise to the promisee's ex-
pectations that the object be suitable for its ordinary use, be of medium
quality, etc. In contracts such as sale or hire, realization of the prom-
isee's reasonable expectations justifies the imposition of conformity
obligations even where not contemplated by the parties. 89
This theory avoids the central difficulty of the will theory by not
purporting to base the legal rules on the parties' inner will-a will that
is either nonexistent or undetectable. It takes into account subjective
factors-the parties' expectations, inasmuch as they are detectible-but
it selects those expectations that merit the law's protection according
to an objective criterion of reasonableness.' 90
188. Corbin on Contracts Vol. 1, 1-2 (1963). See also Pollock's Principles of Contract
I (12th ed. 1946). and the references cited therein; B. Reiter & J. Swan, Contracts and
the Protection of Reasonable Expectations, in B. Reiter & J. Swan, Studies in Contract
Law 1 (1980); Bayles, supra note 164, at 323-24.
189. See, e.g., Williston on Sales, supra note 45, Vol. 2, § 16-1, at 414 (regarding
the warranties in sale of goods).
190. Compare to the German views that rely on the general, objective principle of




The virtue of this theory lies in its flexibility, but there lies also
its weakness. How does one identify reasonable expectations? A ref-
erence to social practices (such as usage of trade) is not a satisfactory
answer for several reasons. Such practices do not always exist, and
default rules are necessary precisely in those cases. There may also be
a diversity of different and even conflicting practices, so that it becomes
very difficult to decide which to apply to a specific case.' 9' Furthermore,
the people's expectations and social practices are largely determined by
the legal rules, so the reasoning becomes circular. 92 And, most im-
portantly, social investigation may provide information about prevalent
expectations, but not about their desirability and reasonableness. 93 Thus,
the inescapable question is not what the characteristic expectations are,
but which expectations are justified. In that sense, Williston is very
precise when asserting that, "what is bought extends beyond the actual
physical object and includes what any purchaser might ordinarily have
a righi to expect when making a purchase."' Iw The question is not one
of expectations, but rather one of having a right to expect. Arguably,
the "reasonable expectations" theory does not provide much assistance
in resolving this issue. A possible, skeptical response would be to look
for guidance from alternative theories (such as economic analysis or
substantive ethical standards). A more positive reaction is to accept the
indeterminacy of the present theory as an unavoidable characteristic of
a fruitful analytical tool. Adopting this theory implies a rejection of
some other theories (e.g., the will theory), and at the same time calls
for the employment of various considerations, including efficiency, fair-
ness and others. The complexity of pertinent values may well require
such flexibility.
C. Consequentialist Justifications-Economic Analysis of Law
1. Efficiency and Will
Application of economic analysis to law, its normative basis and
its critique all require little in the way of introduction.' 9 Generally
191. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829, 836-39
(1983). Craswell, supra note 171. at 505.01.
192. See P. Atiyah, supra note 164, at 67-68; Bayles, supra note 164, at 323-24.
193. J. Feinman, supra note 191; Craswell, supra note 171, at 505-08.
194. Williston on Sales, supra note 45, Vol. 2, § 16-1, at 414 (emphasis added).
195. See generally, R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
R. Posner, Economic Analysisi; R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (1981) [hereinafter
R. Posner, Economics); Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value, 9 J. Legal Stud. 191 (1980); Kronman,
Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. Legal Stud. 227 (1980); Kennedy.
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1981).
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speaking, the economic approach evaluates legal rules according to the
criterion of efficiency. A rule is efficient if the sum of the benefits it
generates is greater than the sum of its costs.' 96 This cost-benefit (or
wealth maximization) analysis requires interpersonal comparisons of
utility. The economic analysis measures one's utility against her will-
ingness to pay for an entitlement (or against the sum for which she
would be willing to part with the entitlement). 197
This sketch of economic analysis reveals its basic relationship to
the will theory previously mentioned. Since the value of any entitlement
is measured against the individual's willingness to pay, there is usually
close similarity between the results reached by the two theories. As
with the will theory, the economic analysis focuses on individuals (their
total utilities), and not on any communitarian values. Yet, there are
fundamental differences between these two views. While the will theory
is a right-based theory, the economic analysis is distinctively conse-
quentialist. Whereas the will theory concentrates on the individual, the
economic analysis is interested in maximizing the aggregate sum of
utilities. Occasionally, these differences induce conflicting answers to
specific questions.'"
The relations between economic analysis and the "reasonable ex-
pectations" theory will be illuminated by considering the economic
account of contractual default rules.
2. Efficiency, Default Rules and the Parties' Expectations
The standard efficiency justification for contractual default rules is
as follows. Voluntary exchanges of resources facilitate the allocation
of resources to their most valuable use, thereby enhancing economic
efficiency.'" However, exchange of resources by means of voluntary
transactions involves considerable costs, including those of negotiating
196. This criterion, known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, is the common tool for policy
analysis. Another criterion, known as Pareto efficiency, requires a situation in which the
welfare of one individual cannot be improved without reducing the welfare of others
(Pareto optimal).. In that sense, a rule is efficient (Pareto superior) only if it improves
the welfare of at least one member of society while reducing the welfare of none. Of
course, this is a very restrictive requirement. See generally R. Posner, Economic Analysis,
supra note 195, at 11-15; C. Veljanovski, The New Law-and-Economics 34-41 (1982).
197. This is a basic difference between the economic approach and utilitarianism. See
R. Posner, Economics, supra note 195, ch. 3; Kronman, supra note 195; Dworkin, supra
note 195. On the possible significance of the "asking/offer" distinction in evaluating
people's utilities, see infra text accompanying note 251.
198. On the instrumental significance of the individual's will in economic analysis, see
R. Posner, Economics. supra note 195, at 92-99; Bayles, supra note 164, at 321-23.
199. See generally, A. Kronman & R. Posner, The Economics of Contract Law. (1979);
R. Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 195, at 11.15; F. Stephen, The Economics of
the Law 11-63 (1988).
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and drafting the contract.200 Maximization of the wealth of society
requires the minimization of these costs so as to enable the execution
of transactions that otherwise would not have been executed, or that
would have involved high costs. One method of reducing contracting
costs is to introduce default rules regarding the content of the contract.
When such rules reflect the typical expectations of the parties, they
save the need for negotiating and drafting them in the specific contract.
In contrast, absence of rules, or the existence of rules that do not give
effect to the parties' expectations, necessitate negotiations for the draft-
ing of terms that realize these expectations. Such negotiations make
the transaction more costly.20' Given the heterogeneity of people's needs,
preferences and skills, and the diversity of circumstances in which they
bargain, it is clear that default rules cannot reflect the parties' expec-
tations in each and every contract. Yet, a rule is efficient inasmuch as
it reflects the parties' expectations in most cases, while allowing them
to contract around the rule whenever they choose to do So.202
This description of the role of contractual default rules reveals the
relationship between economic analysis and the "realization of expec-
tations" theory in this context. In principle, both theories strive to
introduce default rules that imitate the terms that the parties would
have expected to find in their contract. In that sense, realization of
the parties' expectations is in itself an economic goal, and economic
analysis is a useful tool in determining the typical expectations of
rational parties.20  Yet, unlike the economic perspective, in realizing the
parties' reasonable expectations, one is not limited to efficiency con-
siderations.
200. Other costs are those of gathering information, choosing the partner to the
transaction, and the costs relating to the uncertainty involved in the performance of the
transaction, particularly in executory transactions. See generally. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. I, 15-19 (1960).
201. A. Kronman & R. Posner, supra note 199, at 4; R. Posner, Economic Analysis.
supra note 195, at 82.
202. Thus, even efficient default rules are only Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and not Pareto
efficient.
203. Economic analysis assumes that people are usually "rational maximizers," which
means that they are self-interested egotists who maximize their utilities. A disparity between
the outcomes of economic analysis and the conclusions based on the parties' will or
expectations may result inter alla from refutation of this assumption in certain situations.
In spite of the basic differences between the will theory and the "realization of reasonable
expectations" theory, the relations between each of these right-based theories and the
consequentialist theory of wealth maximization are quite similar in the present context.
For a broader examination of the relationship between efficiency analysis and consent-
oriented theories of default rules, see Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, supra note 185, at
640-50. A linkage between reasonable expectations and economic analysis is also indicated
by B. Rciter & J. Swan, supra note 188, at 6-7.
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It should be noted that the above mentioned consideration is not
the only efficiency consideration pertinent to default rules. 2 Other
factors have to do with information problems and with risk aversion.
These factors will be discussed as well.
3. The Efficiency of Conformity Rules
a. Preliminary Comments
Beyond the basic insight that efficient default rules should "imitate"
the terms that most parties would have expressly agreed to had there
been no transaction costs, economic analysis also indicates the content
of these terms. In the present context, the proposition is that rational
parties would have agreed to the rules of conformity.
Since conformity is examined at the time of performance (which
is usually the moment of supplying the object), the relevant default
rule should affect the parties' behavior until that time. This is not to
say that later actions of the parties may not influence matters connected
with conformity. For example, careless use of a nonconforming object
by a buyer or a lessor may increase the injuries it causes. Prevention
of such additional damages requires a liability rule that will influence
this late conduct.201 However, since we focus on the object's conformity
at the time of its supply, we shall consider later behavior only inasmuch
as it may influence the appropriate rule applicable to that time.
The conclusion of an efficient transaction requires that each party
has correct information about the value of the resources she parts with
and the resources she is about to receive. If, as a result of noncon-
formity, the value of the object to the receiver has decreased, then the
calculation on which basis she entered the transaction is no longer
204. For economic studies of the role of default rules that go beyond the standard
justification, see Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989); Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms,
73 Calif. L. Rev. 261 (1985); Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, supra note 185.
205. These are the kind of considerations that are relevant, for example, when dealing
with the operation of remedies for nonconformity (e.g., the choice between rectification
of the defect, replacement of the object and rescission of the contract). In this context,
one must consider the later conduct of the parties and try to influence it. For an analysis
of such considerations, see Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming
Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 Harv. L. Rev.
960 (1978); Chapman & Meurer, Efficient Remedies for Breach of Warranty, 52 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 107 (1989). See also Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty,
90 Yale L.J. 1297 (1981) (hereinafter Priest, 19811 and references infra to Priest's analysis
in notes 207. 213. and 233.
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accurate. "06 In this regard, it makes no difference whether the noncon-
formity diminishes the market value of the object, or only its subjective
value to the receiver. In other words, where the maximal welfare (of
the individual and society) is to be achieved by a voluntary transaction
relating to an object that possesses certain qualities, then if the object
does not possess these qualities, that maximization of welfare will not
be achieved.
Certainly, the optimal efficiency of a transaction does not require
maximal conformity of the object to the promisee's needs. Usually, the
greater the quality, quantity, safety, soundness of title, suitability for
idiosyncratic needs, or any other feature of an object are, the greater
the costs involved in its supply. Presumably, the net surplus of any
transaction will be maximized by stipulating the optimal features of its
object. These features will be determined according to the marginal
costs and utilities of both parties. Thus, many times the promisee will
prefer to contract for an object that involves some risks, for its costs
appear to be lower than the difference between the price of that object
and an object free of those risks.207 In this regard, costs of several
kinds must be taken into account. One is the cost of the risk itself,
which depends on the scope of losses the nonconformity may cause
and the probability of its occurrence. Another includes the cost of
preventing the nonconformity. This cost may vary depending upon who
is to prevent the risk, the supplier or the promisee. Presumably, if the
costs of preventing the risk are higher than the expected cost of the
risk itself, the parties will prefer not to prevent it, and to execute the
transaction though it involves that risk.m In such a case, the risk would
not be considered as nonconformity.
206. The costs of any transaction include all the other opportunities for the use of
resources that the receiver forewent when entering into the transaction. See R. Bowles,
Law and the Economy 21 (1982); F. Stephen, supra note 199, at 46-49. Had the promisee
known that she would get an object that did not conform to her expectations (based on
the agreement), she would not have entered into the contract, or at least would not have
done so under the same terms.
207. This may be illustrated by two of Professor Priest's examples (see Priest, 1981,
supra note 205). Most consumers probably prefer to reinstall shelves that fall in their
refrigerators than to pay the additional price for refrigerators whose shelves never fall.
Likewise, most consumers are not interested in washing machines that would not break
even if used many hours every day. Rather, they would prefer machines that function
satisfactorily in normal frequency. See also infra notes 213 and 233.
208. See Schwartz, The Private Law Treatment of Defective Products in Sales Situa-
tions, 49 Ind. L.J. 8 (1973), especially at 23-28. See also infra note 234; Priest, 1981,
supra note 205. An additional assumption made at that stage is that the parties are risk
neutral. See supra Part IV.C.3.e, where this assumption is relaxed.
At times, the assessment of those different costs is difficult, especially from the
promisee's point of view (see the considerations detailed below). Thus, where the law's
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Apparently, there may be three major causes for a transaction to
be sub-optimal (in the present context). First, it is possible that the
promisor is unaware of the promisee's needs and preferences. Second,
the promisee may be mistaken about the qualities of the promised
object." Third, there may be nonconformity between the promised
object and the object actually supplied. An efficient set of conformity
rules should create appropriate incentives to prevent these possible causes
of sub-optimality. We shall examine how the conformity rules deal with
these problems, while paying attention to other relevant considerations,
including risk aversion. 10
b. Informing the Promisor About the Promisee's Needs
A possible cause for the object's unsuitability to the promisee's
needs is the promisor's unawareness of those needs. Clearly, the prom-
isee has more information about her designated uses for the object,
the frequency and conditions in which she will use it, as well as her
taste and preferences. However, one should not infer from this obser-
vation that the promisor should never be liable for the object's non-
conformity unless the promisee actually advised her of her needs. On
the contrary, efficient default rules may save the need for such a
communication.
First, most objects have an ordinary use or uses. By definition,
"ordinary use" is the use for which the majority of purchasers acquire
the object. An owner who orders building plans from an architect is
very rarely interested in them as a piece of art to be hung in her living
room. Usually, she needs them for executing a building project. Cars
are usually bought or rented for driving, and so forth. In most cases,
a default rule that requires the promisor to provide an object suitable
for its ordinary use will save the need for express agreement in this
regard. In fact, as was observed in the comparative survey (Part II
supra), the central requirement of conformity in all legal systems is
conformity to ordinary use. This is the essence of "redhibitory defects"
point of departure is that liability for nonconformity is placed on the promisor, it may
encourage him to expressly delimit the scope of this liability, thereby revealing that
information to the other party (see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 204 and infra text
accompanying notes 215 and 232).
209. In a sense, these two causes are the two sides of the same coin; it is the existence
of a gap between the information each of the parties has that results in a nonconforming
performance. Yet, it seems that the different objects of knowledge, the promisee's needs
on the one hand and the thing to be provided by the promisor on the other hand, justify
separate analysis thereof.
210. As has already been indicated, we shall not address the questions involved in the




in the Civil Law and "merchantability" in the Anglo-American sys-
tems. 1 Similar reasoning applies to other conformity requirements, such
as the requirement that the object be free of third party rights, or that
in the absence of contradictory indications, it be of-a medium quality.
Another situation in which an efficient default rule can save the
communication of the promisee's needs to the promisor occurs when
the promisor knows of those needs from another source. The promisor
may know about those needs from previous transactions, from the
circumstances of contracting,212 or otherwise.
There is no justification, however, for establishing a default rule
requiring the object to be suitable for every purpose for which it may
be acquired. Since most promisees are satisfied with an object suitable
for ordinary uses, there is no reason to "force" them to accept an
object fit for unusual purposes as well. Such a requirement would
probably make the object more costly, while not increasing its value
for the ordinary promisee."' A default rule that realizes the expectations
of "unusual" parties and upsets the expectations of ordinary parties
is inefficient.2t 4
The question which then arises is what rule will induce the "un-
usual" promisee to communicate her special needs to the promisor.
First, it should be clear that the appropriate rule should induce such
communication only when its utility is greater than its cost. However,
since communication costs are normally not very high in contractual
settings, this will usually be the case. Essentially, the appropriate in-
centive to inform the promisor of the promisee's special needs may be
established by a "penalty default rule." As was recently pointed out,
default rules may enhance efficiency even if they do not reflect the
parties' presumed expectations. "Penalty default rules" are strategically
211. See supra Parts ll.B.l and II.B.2.
212. For example, when an evidently disabled man personally orders a room in a
resort place, he should be provided with a room that is accessible to disabled people.
213. The "ordinary use" of any object depends on the circumstances. A power drill
sold for household use may break down when intensively used for commercial purposes,
and still conform to its ordinary use. Professor Priest expresses his skepticism regarding
the existence of such thing as a "normal use" of a product, particularly with respect to
the frequency and extent of the use (see Priest, 1981, supra note 205, at 1312-13). This
skepticism is part of his "investment theory," which explains standard consumer product
warranties as an instrument for efficient allocation of risks. Our reply to this skepticism
is twofold. First, we are not as skeptical about the courts' ability to determine the*
"normality" of uses. Second, there is no contradiction between the need for express
warranties providing specific allocation of risks in specific contracts and between the
justification for subsidiary default rules that apply in the absence of any express agreement.
Presumably, Priest would not suggest the repeal of the statutory warranty of merchant.
ability.
214. But see infra the discussion on "penalty default rules" at note 232.
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designed to encourage at least one of the parties expressly to contract
around the default rule, thereby revealing information to the other
party or to third parties.2 15 In the present context, a rule providing
that the promisor is not responsible for the object's conformity to
special purpose unless she is informed thereof will encourage the prom-
isee to provide her with this information. In fact, under most legal
systems the risk of nonconformity to special purposes is borne by the
promisee unless she has notified the promisor of her needs.1 16
Of course, a promisee cannot unilaterally compel a promisor to
provide her with any certain object merely by indicating her needs.
Yet, in many situations the promisor's knowledge of the promisee's
purpose gives rise to the assumption that the promisor undertakes to
supply an object suitable for that purpose. 217 In such circumstances, an
efficient rule should induce the promisor to contract around that as-
sumption whenever she is not ready to undertake that obligation.
c. Informing the Promisee About the Object's Qualities
Having discussed the rules designed to deal with nonconformities
that result from the promisor's unawareness of the promisee's needs,
we shall hereafter assume that this problem does not exist. In examining
the influence each of the parties has on the conformity of the object
to the promisee's expectations, one should distinguish between two
situations. In the first situation, the promisor knows (or foresees) at
the time of contracting that the object does not (or will not) conform
to the promisee's needs, but conceals this knowledge from her. In the
other situation, none of the parties knows (at least not on a high level
of probability) that the object will not (or may not) conform. t 8 We
shall now discuss the first situation.2 19
215. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 204.
216. For a comparable analysis in the context of contract damages, see Bebchuk &
Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, Discussion Paper Note 78, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard
Law School (1990). We shall address (and reject) the claim that conformity obligations
are generally "penalty default rules," infra note 232.
217. See, e.g., § 14(3) of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979, supra note 38, and §
35(2)(b) of the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
supra note 150.
218. The third possibility, in which only the promisee knows of the object's noncon-
formity, or that he too knows about it, is improbable. Acquiring the object while knowing
about its "nonconformity" implies that this does not reduce the object's value from the
receiver's point of view (in other words, that the defect or lack of quality does not
amount to a nonconformity). Of course, if a promisee fraudulently conceals the fact that
he is aware of the object's "nonconformity," in order to subsequently claim a breach
by the promisor, this should not be allowed. See also infra text accompanying notes 224.
226.
219. The second situation will be discussed infra in Part IV.C.3.d.
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Usually, the promisor has greater information about the qualities
and characteristics of the object, its potential uses, its common defects
and dangers, etc. In this regard, there is no difference between a
professional promisor and a casual, private one. Professional contrac-
tors, lessors and sellers obtain that information as part of their pro-
fession. Private sellers and lessors may have the information as a by-
product of their previous use or handling of the object.
Whenever the promisor knows that the object does not or will not
conform to the promisee's needs, efficiency will be maximized if she
informs the promisee of it, because this disclosure involves almost no
cost. Sometimes the promisee has no means of revealing the noncon-
formity in advance, and often she may discover it only at some cost. °
In either case, a more efficient solution would be to require the promisor
to disclose this information to the promisee. When any of the parties
has information that she knows may negate or frustrate the other party's
benefit from the transaction, the cheapest way to prevent the execution
of the inefficient transaction is by compelling her to inform the other
party.22' An efficient way to create the necessary incentive is to hold
the promisor liable for any nonconformity that could have been elim-
inated by appropriate disclosure.m2 Since a mutually informed agreement
to contract around this rule is hardly imaginable (because the promisor
conceals the relevant facts from the promisee), this rule must be com-
pulsory.
This conclusion may change when special efforts are necessary to
obtain information, and there is an interest to encourage its procurement
and dissemination.2n However, when referring to the data concerning
the object of a certain transaction, such considerations are usually
irrelevant, as the obtaining of this information is merely a by-product
of the handling of the object by the promisor.
220. A typical example of a transaction in which the promisee can hardly get accurate
information about the object's quality at a low cost is the sale of a used automobile.
See Akerlof. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970). Another example involves transactions (construction, sales and
rentals) relating to real estate.
221. See Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
Legal Stud. 1, 25 (1978).
222. Another way is to impose compulsory disclosure duties, as most legal systems in
fact do. Those duties are beyond the scope of this discussion, yet they must be taken
into account in every comprehensive analysis of any system.
223. In such a case, compelling the person who obtained the information to reveal it
prior to the conclusion of the contract may prevent him from deriving benefit from the
information, and will thus be a negative incentive to its very obtainment. For an analysis
of the various situations, see Kronman, supra note 221; Kronman, Contract Law and
Distributive Justice, 89 Yale L.J. 472, 489-91 (1980); R. Posner, Economic Analysis. supra
note 195, at 96-97. For a critique of Kronman's analysis, see Coleman, Heckathorn &
Maser, supra note 185, at 691-707.
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Thus far, it has been assumed that the promisee was unaware of
the object's nonconformity at the time of contracting. If the promisee
was in fact aware of it, then there is no point in requiring the promisor
to give any notice, nor is there a justification for holding her liable
for the nonconformity (which the promisee could have easily prevented).
The universal rule is in fact that a promisee who knew of the non-
conformity at the time of contracting cannot rely on it.22
A more delicate question arises when the promisee is unaware of
the nonconformity at the time of contracting, but could have detected
it had she reasonably inspected the object beforehand (the assumption
being that the object was already existing and identified prior to the
making pf the contract). It is not very clear whether the promisee's
cost of so inspecting the object is greater than the promisor's cost of
informing the promisee of the object's condition.2 1 This question is
complicated where the promisor is unaware of the promisee's prefer-
ences, in which case a disclosure duty may become less practical and
less effective. Conceivably, the answer to this question varies with the
circumstances (the nature of the object, the parties' relative expertise,
the nature of the nonconformity, etc.). This variance gives rise to
another efficiency consideration, namely the costs and benefits involved
in the administration of a highly elaborate system of specific rules as
opposed to a system of a few general rules.
In this specific issue, efficiency analysis is not very insightful, as
is perhaps indicated by the considerable variety of answers given to
this dilemma in different systems. 226 The changing answers to this ques-
tion-which lies at the heart of the struggle between caveat emptor and
the conformity principle-were largely determined by changes in the
prevailing views about how markets should operate and what social
values should be enhanced by contract law.
d. Risk Allocation
When none of the parties knows (or suspects) at the time the
contract is concluded that the object will not conform to the promisee's
224. See supra the references in note 155.
225. The present question is frequently dealt with in light of a distinction between
latent and patent nonconformities. See Kronman, supra note 221, at 22-26; Coleman,
Heckathorn & Maser, supra note 185, at 705-07.
226. See, e.g., §§ 460 and 539 of the German BGB; art. 1642 of the French Civil
Code; arts. 1491 and 1578 of the Italian Code; § 14(2) of the English Sale of Goods
Act, 1979, supra note 38, and § 4(3) of The Supply of Goods and Services Act, 1982,
supra note 58; art. 36 of ULIS and § 35(3) of the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, supra note 150. On the controversy regarding the
burden of preliminary examination imposed on the buyer under French and Quebec law,
see the articles of Gow, supra note 21 and Durnford, supra note 21.
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needs, then nonconformity is a risk involved in the transaction, and
not a certainty as in the previous situation. The present case includes
both situations where the object does not yet exist at the time of
contracting, and situations where the object already exists, but suffers
a defect unknown to the parties. An inefficient transaction may be
avoided either by assuring the conformity of the object to the promisee's
needs, or by revealing the fact that it does not (or will probably not)
conform to these needs, and avoiding that transaction. As was clarified
at the outset, it is assumed that the expected costs of the risk of
nonconformity are greater than the costs of its prevention, so that it
would be inefficient to carry out the transaction with that risk."' Thus,
the central question is what rule will ensure the prevention of the risk.
In principle, the risk of nonconformity should be placed on the
party who may prevent its occurrence at a lower cost. The reason for
this is that in a mutual transaction each party derives maximal utility
from the transaction by taking on the risks which she is able to bear
at a lower cost than her counterpart. As long as the remuneration she
gets for taking on the risk is lower than the cost the other party would
incur, they both benefit."' For example, one may assume that a car-
penter, making a table for a client, can ensure at a relatively low cost
that the wood she uses for this purpose is of a suitable quality. The
remuneration the carpenter will demand for ensuring the suitability of
the wood will be considerably lower than the cost the orderer would
incur were she to see to it herself. It pays for both parties to place
this responsibility on the carpenter. Since contracting involves costs,
the way to reduce these costs js by introducing a default rule that
places the risk on the party who is usually able to bear it at a lower
cost.
The great variety of situations to which conformity rules are ap-
plicable makes it difficult to make a general statement as to who may
ordinarily prevent the risk of nonconformity at a lower cost. The answer
to this question may vary according to such factors as: the particular
expertise of the parties in regard to a given transaction; the promisee's
opportunity to influence the process of production or acquisition of
the object, and its handling by the promisor; and the scope of the
promisor's information about the conditions of the designated use of
the property and the extent of her influence upon it. In order to
determine the efficient ways to. prevent nonconformity, one should
characterize the possible causes of nonconformity.
227. See supra Part IV.C.3.a.
228. See R. Bowles, supra note 206, at 135. Compare Posner & Rosenfield. Impossibility
and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Stud. 83
(1977) (analyzing the allocation of risks to the "superior risk bearer").
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One important cause of nonconformity has already been discussed,
namely, information gaps between the parties at the contracting stage.
It was observed that in general the promisee has more information of
her designated needs and uses for the object, while the promisor has
greater information regarding the qualities and characteristics of the
object. Thus, the conclusion was reached that each party should be
encouraged to provide the other party with this information.
Other conspicuous causes for nonconformity are defects in the raw
materials used for manufacturing the object,. carelessness in its pro-
duction by the promisor, or the promisor's inattention when purchasing
the object from another person. The required rule should prompt the
promisor to use suitable materials and to act carefully in the process
of production, or to purchase the object from a reliable seller. As was
already stressed, the required rule is not one that will bring the promisor
to produce or supply the best possible object, or even to improve its
ordinary quality. The yardstick for conformity is the expectation of
the parties, based on the contract, and not an external criterion of
utmost quality.2 9
Sometimes, nonconformity may be avoided by the promisee's in-
tervention in the course of production or purchase of the object by
the promisor. Where, after the conclusion of the contract but prior to
the acceptance of the object, the promisee knows that the object is
affected by nonconformity, and particularly where prevention at that
stage is cheaper and easier than at a later stage, the promisee should
be encouraged to give notice to the promisor.. In certain cases, it is
also worthwhile to encourage early examination of the object by the
promisee during its manufacture. Often the cost of making the ex-
amination and preventing nonconformity at such an early stage will be
considerably lower than the cost of its correction after the completion
of production (despite the fact that in many instances the examination
may reveal no defect).
Nonconformity may also result from harm caused to the object
after its production or acquisition, while it is in the possession of the
promisor or persons acting on her behalf (carriers, storekeepers, etc.).
The promisor, who is in direct or indirect control of the object, should
be urged to take precautions against injuries and damage that can be
economically prevented.2 0 In this regard, there is no essential difference
between a professional and non-professional promisor.
229. Since we strive toward the furnishing of an object of the quality that the promisee
may reasonably expect it to be according to the contract, and not to the maximal possible
improvement thereof, Schwartz's critique on other formulations of this goal does not
apply here. See Schwartz, supra note 208, at 21-39.
230. Compare Posner's example, R. Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 195, at
82-83.
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On the basis of this characterization of causes for nonconformity,
and in light of common experience, it may be determined that the party
who undertakes to supply the object (the seller, the lessor, the con-
tractor) is usually the one who can more economically prevent or reduce
the risk of nonconformity.23' Usually, that party has more information
and expertise concerning the object. Where she is also the manufacturer
of the product or the executor of the work, she can take the necessary
precautions to lessen the danger of defect in the final product. If she
employs other people to do the work for her, she may choose more
reliable workers, and perhaps also supervise their work. When she
purchases the object or parts thereof from other suppliers, she is in a
better position to inquire as to their reliability and the quality of their
products. She has control over the object until its delivery to the
promisee, she can protect it from harm during that period, and she
may even influence its use following its transfer to the promisee (i.e.,
by suitable use instructions).'
Indeed, the promisee's conduct may also serve to reduce the risk
of nonconformity. As mentioned above, she may specify. her particular
needs, and at times she may intervene in the process of production in
order to prevent defects. Therefore, the promisee should be encouraged
to prevent nonconformity in those cases where prevention by her is
cheaper than by the promisor.3. However, these considerations cannot
231. See also H. et L. Mazeaud & A. Tunc. supra note 109, § 103-8. at 126.
232. Ayres and Gertner, supra note 204, at 107 n.92, allege that the warranties provided
by §§ 2-314 and 2-315 of the U.C.C. "cannot easily be justified as 'what the parties
would have contracted for."' Rather, they are designed to "force sellers to reveal in-
formation to consumers about the extent of their coverage," by expressly contracting
around these provisions. This argument, which stresses the information gap between the
parties (that we described above), seems to be self-contradictory. If indeed sellers are
better informed about the risks of nonconformity dealt with by these provisions (a
conclusion that we share), it is due to the typical circumstances of the transactions under
discussion. Sellers are usually better informed with respect to the risks and dangers of
the goods, due to the fact that they manufactured them, used them (e.g., in the sale of
used cars), or otherwise possessed or dealt with them. These same factors usually enable
sellers to prevent the risk of nonconformity at lower costs, thus justifying default rules
that impose liability for conformity on them.
233. Priest stresses these aspects in his analysis of standard consumer product warranties
(Priest, 1981, supra note 205, at 1307-13). According to Priest, the two major ways in
which a consumer influences the conformity of the object are the consumer's selection
of the product and the consumer's decision about the extent to which he will use the
product. Although Priest discusses the terms of consumer contracts for the sale of goods,
his penetrating analysis is clearly relevant to all transactions to which the conformity
principle applies, and to default rules as well. However, it should be clear by now that
efficient conformity rules can take those considerations into account. The qualification
of the promisor's responsibility to the ordinary uses of the object, unless the promisee
has informed her of his exceptional needs (including the frequency of the object's use)
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turn the scale towards placing the risk on the promisee. Regard for
these considerations leads only to qualifying the promisor's liability in
certain circumstances. Thus, the risk of nonconformity to particular
purposes-purposes of which the promisor was not informed-should
be placed on the promisee. It is also possible to exclude the promisee's
reliance on nonconformity of which she was aware at the time of
manufacture, unless she gave the promisor immediate notice thereof
(insofar as such notice would have enabled the latter to overcome or
reduce the nonconformity, or to mitigate its costs). 23'
e. Risk Spreading
Thus far, it has been assumed that the cost of nonconformity (or,
as is usually the case, the cost of the risk of nonconformity) may be
placed on one of the parties. One should also consider the possibility
of distributing the risk among other people. According to the economic
principle of diminishing marginal utility, distribution of risk is in itself
a worthwhile goal.3" This leads to the consideration that the risk of
may serve that purpose. Inasmuch as special restrictions on the promisor's responsibility
are efficient, the parties may contract around the default rule (as mentioned above, we
do not deal with the special considerations applicable to market failures, consumer trans-
actions, and the like).
234. Professor Schwartz opposes the claim that the liability should be placed on the
party who may prevent the nonconformity at a lower cost, on the grounds that the market
mechanism enables sellers to shift the cost of the nonconformity risk to the buyers
(Schwartz, supra note 208, at 21-39). In his view, the question of whether a conforming
object or a nonconforming one will be supplied, and the measure of the cost that will
be shifted to buyers, depend on a comparison of the following costs: the cost of the
nonconformity risk, the cost of the avoidance of that risk by the purchaser, and the cost
of avoiding the risk by the promisor. As a result of the market mechanism, the transaction
will be made at the lowest of the mentioned costs, and that cost will ultimately be placed
on, or shifted to, the purchaser (but see infra note 238).
Schwartz's model is problematic from the point of view of its implementation in reality.
The central obstacle which Schwartz discusses in the article relates to the information
problem of the purchasers. In any case, there is no contradiction between our conclusion
and Professor Schwartz's analysis. A default rule imposing the liability for conformity
on the promisor is not designed to change the market's behavior but to assist it in
realizing the ends to which it naturally "aspires." From the start, we have excluded those
cases in which the cost of the nonconformity risk is lower than the cost of its avoidance
by any of the parties. As for the comparison between the cost of preventing the non-
conformity by the purchaser and the cost of its prevention by the promisor, we accept
the idea that liability will be borne by the party capable of coping with it at a lower
cost. We propose that the promisor is usually the one who can more cheaply bear that
risk (even if this cost is ultimately shifted, in whole or in part, to the purchasers). Since
default rules play an important role in reducing the transaction costs of contracting,
imposing the liability on the promisor by a default rule is economically worthwhile.
235. On this principle, see generally, G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents-A Legal




nonconformity be placed on the party who is able to spread it more
efficiently. 36 In many cases, this consideration strengthens the conclu-
sion that the nonconformity risk should be placed on the promisor
rather than on the promisee.2" A commercial promisor may easily
distribute the cost of the risk among all the people who purchase the
object, by raising the price.28 It could be argued that placing the risk
on the promisee would (presumably) result in a decrease of the object's
price. With this difference, the promisee could insure herself against
the risk. However, distributing the cost of the risk by means of insurance
is an expensive way compared to the price mechanism.. In this regard,
one should distinguish a promisee who is the last link in the chain of
marketing from a promisee who uses the object as an input to the
production or marketing in which she is engaged. In the latter case,
the promisee can spread the risk by including its expected cost in the
price of the product or service she supplies to her customers. In Such
a case, the weight of the present consideration is substantially dimin-
ished.
It may be argued that the availability of means to spread the risk
of nonconformity derogates from the above analysis, based on the
relative cost of preventing the nonconformity by each of the parties.
This claim should be rejected. Each party's ability to insure her risk,
or to distribute it among her clients does not render superfluous the
need for a liability rule regarding the risk under discussion. The premium
charged by the insurer reflects the risk the insured person bears. There-
fore, a rule that allocates the risk between the parties in a way that
is likely to reduce the probability of risk realization will reduce the
cost of insurance, and hence the total cost of the transaction will also
be reduced.239
When the promisor bears the risk, and she insures herself against
it, her motivation to prevent that risk will indeed be smaller (the "moral
hazard"). However, since in the long run the cost of insurance (the
premium she pays) reflects the magnitude of the risk, the promisor has
a perceptible incentive to reduce it, i.e., to prevent defects in the object.
In contrast, the promisee's potential influence on the realization of the
nonconformity risk is much smaller. If the risk is placed on her, then
despite her clear interest in diminishing it in order to lower the cost
236. Compare Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 228, at 90-92.
237. Compare H. et L. Mazeaud & A. Tunc, supra note 109, § 103-8, at 126-27.
238. Though it should be noted that the seller's ability to shift the costs involved in
that risk to the customers depends on the relative elasticity of supply and demand in that
market. At times, when the demand for a certain product is very elastic, or when the
supply curve is very inelastic (or when the two coexist), the seller would be almost unable
to shift the costs to the buyers, and will have to bear them by himself.
239. See also R. Bowles, supra note 206, at 136.
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of insurance, it would be very difficult for her to cause such diminution.
At the same time, the promisor's motivation to reduce the risk will
lessen, although she has the means to achieve that task. 40 Moreover,
insurance must accurately reflect the probability of the realization of
risk. Promisors hold more comprehensive and precise information in
this regard (because of considerations similar to those mentioned above),
and it is therefore preferable that the insurance-if obtained-be ob-
tained by them.
Thus, in many situations the introduction of risk aversion strength-
ens the desirability of default rules placing the responsibility for con-
formity on the promisor.
4. Summary
The above discussion illustrates some of the advantages and draw-
backs of economic analysis. It shows that at least in market situations
this analysis is very fruitful. It enables one to evaluate even the details
of many rules, and to draw practical conclusions regarding many di-
lemmas. However, it does not give much guidance where empirical data
is hard to get and where different perceptions of the reality exist.
Usually, these are precisely the cases in which different legal systems
diverge in their solutions, and guidance is particularly needed. Economic
analysis is one-dimensional. Sometimes, its disregard for other consid-
erations weakens the force of its conclusions.
For our purposes, the most important conclusion is that conformity
default rules are indeed efficient, and are therefore justified from an
economic point of view.
D. Non-Promissory Theories
1. General
Postclassical theories of contract law tend to depreciate the elements
of will and promise in contracts and contract law.2 4' Some scholars
stress the importance of reliance and benefit (restitution) as the basic
principles of contract law, thus blurring the distinction between contracts
240. See also Priest, 1981, supra note 205, at 1313-14.
241. The clearest example of these tendencies is probably the association of contract
law and paternalism. See, e.g.. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract
and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563 (1982); Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts,
92 Yale L.J. 763 (1983); Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis
at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U.L. Rev. 349, 384-94 (1988). Since this study
concentrates on default rules, this issue shall not be discussed.
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and the involuntary liability in torts. 2 Others point out that the role
of the law (and particularly the role of the courts) in enforcing contracts
is not a neutral one, but rather involves an imposition of collective
value choices. Whenever a court rules in favor of one of the parties,
it "puts the sovereign power of the state at the disposal of one party
to be exercised over the other party." From that perspective, the law
of contract regulates the exercise of the state power in regard to "more
or less voluntary transactions."24 This view blurs the basic distinction
between private and public law.2
Modern contract law is characterized by an increasing recourse to
general standards and principles, such as good faith, unconscionability
and others.24  Along with these developments, and as part of the the-
oretical trends mentioned above, there is a growing willingness to in-
troduce non-individualistic values and considerations to the law of
contract. Different theories argue that the role of contract law (or at
least part of it) is to implement distributive policies,2" fairness 7 and
even altruism.?" We shall briefly examine the extent to which each of
these views sheds light on the present issue.
2. Consequentialist Justifications-Redistribution of Power and
Wealth
It is claimed that a legitimate role of contract law is to advance
a more equal division of wealth among members of society. This claim
242. See generally Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
Yale L.J. 52, 373 (1936); G. Gilmore, The Death of Contracts (1974); P. Atiyah, supra
note 164.
243. Cohen, The Basis of Contracts, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 586 (1933).
244. See also Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale
L.J. 997 (1985); Feinman, supra note 191; Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical
Approaches to Law, 15 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 195, 201-20 (1987); Singer, Legal Realism
Now (Book Review), 76 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 482.87 (1983).
245. The principle of good faith is gaining force not only in the Civil-Law systems,
which recognized it long ago, but also in Common Law systems and in the international
trade. See §§ 1-201(19), 1-203 and 2-103(l)(b) of the U.C.C.; § 205 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. See also Farnsworth, supra note 124; Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
Va. L. Rev. 195 (1968); Summers, supra note 124. As for international trade, see § 7(l)
of the 1980 Vienna Convention; C. Bianca & M. Bonell, supra note 91, at 65-94, and
the references mentioned therein. On the tendency to introduce substantive fairness concepts
into the law of contract, see 0. E6rsi, Comparative Civil (Private) Law § 135-138, at
250-58 (1979); Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in Commercial
Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1198 (1988).
246. Kronman, supra note 223; Kronman, supra note 241, at 766-74; Kronman, supra
note 186, at 416-23; Kennedy, supra note 241; H. Collins, The Law of Contract (1986),
especially chs. 1, 2 and 9. See also infra Part IV.D.2.
247. See, e.g., Levin & McDowell, supra note 103; H. Collins, supra note 246; Feinman,
Contract After the Fall (Book Review), 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1537 (1987). See also infra Part
IV.D.3.
248. Kennedy, supra note 104. See also infra Part IV.D.4.
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rejects both the view that it is not the role of the state to redistribute.
wealth, and the (more prevailing) view that contract law is not an
appropriate vehicle for such redistribution.24 9 Other views emphasize the
role of contract law as a means for the redistribution of power in
society. 250
Conformity rules may have distributive effects, both in terms of
power and in terms of wealth. Compulsory rules of conformity change
the balance of power between the contracting parties. They strengthen
the position of the promisee vis-d-vis the promisor. Conformity default
rules may have similar effects to the extent that formal, interpretative
and substantive doctrines (such as Section 2-316 of the U.C.C., contra
proferentum interpretation or unconscionability) create obstacles to the
exclusion of liability. Even in the absence of such obstacles, in small-
scale transactions the costs of contracting around the conformity ob-
ligations may be too high. Conformity default rules may also have
indirect distributive effects inasmuch as there is a difference between
utility measured in terms of willingness to pay for having an entitlement,
and utility measured in terms of one's readiness to part with an en-
titlement."' To the extent that the asking price of an entitlement is
higher than its offer price, initial allocation of the entitlement to con-
forming objects to promisees improves their position.
Nevertheless, the proposal to ground conformity rules on consid-
erations of redistribution, and particularly redistribution of wealth,
seems rather problematic. In comparison to other means (such as taxes
and transfer payments), conformity rules (like contract rules in general)
are very limited means of redistribution. " They are also very imprecise
means to that end, because there is no necessary correlation between
the promisor-promisee dichotomy and the rich-poor dichotomy.253 Fur-
thermore, the wealth-distributive effects of even compulsory conformity
249. See supra the references in note 246. On the central shortcomings of this theory,
see Kennedy, supra note 241, at 604-24; C. Fried, supra note 186, especially at 103-09;
Braucher, supra note 241, at 381-84. It should be noted that an egalitarian view is not
entirely incompatible with efficiency considerations. A central development in economic
thought at the beginning of the twentieth century was the concept of diminishing marginal
utility. This concept may justify the taking of steps designed to bring about a more
equitable allocation of resources; to a welfare economy. See P. Atiyah, supra note 38,
at 607-11, and the references mentioned there.
250. See Dalton, supra note 244; H. Collins, supra note 246, chs. 1, 2 and 9; Beermann,
Contract Law as a System of Values, 67 B.U.L. Rev. 553 (1987); Feinman, supra note
247 (the last two are reviews of Collins's Book).
251. See generally, Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology
in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 669, 678-95 (1979); Kennedy, supra note 195,
at 401; F. Stephen, supra note 199, at 32-35.
252. See Braucher, supra note 241, at 384.
253. Id. at 383. But see Kronman, supra note 241, at 772.
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rules depend on the specific structure of every market (the relative
elasticity of supply and demand). Many times, the inability to contract
around a conformity obligation results in a price raise, that shifts the
additional costs to the promisees, and forces some of them out of the
market. 2  Hence, even within the sphere of contractual relations, other
techniques-particularly regulation of prices-are clearly superior means
for redistribution. In light of these considerations, it is hardly possible
to view redistribution as the basis for conformity rules, especially when
dealing with default rules and with the redistribution of wealth.
This is not to say that conformity rules are inconsistent with re-
distributive considerations. On the contrary, to the extent that these
rules have any such effects, they will usually be desirable. Very roughly
speaking, conformity obligations tend to favor the sectors that in fact
deserve assistance. This rough estimation is based on the fact that many
times, the promisors whose obligations are subject to the conformity
concept (sellers, contractors, lessors)2" are wealthier than the promisees.
This is particularly so in those areas where the conformity rules are
compulsory (such as residential leases).256 Many times, the promisee in
such contracts is a private consumer who earns her living as an em-
ployee. As was demonstrated earlier, in employment contracts no re-
quirement of conformity is imposed on the employee. 2"
Historical perspective provides support for this correlation between
conformity rules and the distribution of power in society. During the
second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth
century, the working class, and later the "consumer class," gradually
gained social, economic, and political power. The rise of these classes
challenged the concepts of liberal economy, and brought about signif-
icant changes in the legal sphere. The decline of the caveat emptor
ideology and the development of conformity rules are but one illus-
tration of those trends.
3. Fairness Justifications
There are different versions of the theory that contract law is at
least partly designed to enhance fairness in contractual relations. Fairness
is a fairly vague concept. We shall not try to define fairness, nor to
254. Kennedy, supra note 241, at 604-24; Braucher, supra note 241, at 383-84. For a
general discussion on the indeterminacy of the distributive effects of product warranties,
see Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-
Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361 (1991).
255. On the applicability of the concept of conformity, see supra Part III.C.
256. See Kronman, supra note 241, at 766-74.
257. See supra Part 111.C.3.
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delineate its relations to other collective goals and social values.1 8 For
our limited purpose, it will suffice to indicate two ways in which
conformity obligations may be grounded on considerations of fairness.
The first way follows Atiyah's thesis of promises as mere (yet
conclusive) admissions of obligations, obligations that are in fact based
on benefits received by the promisor (restitution) or harm caused by
her conduct (reliance). 29 Reliance and benefit are alternatives to promise
as the basis for the binding force of contracts. They are founded on
the community's shared sense of fairness, rather than on respect to the
individual's autonomy and will.
On several occasions, Atiyah uses the law of warranty to illustrate
his arguments.260 Discussing the imposition of warranties by the courts,
he mentions the parties' intentions, but emphasizes that it is only one
relevant factor. Another factor is "the Court's view of what is just. If
the buyer has paid a price which would be a fair price for a sound horse
(which suggests that he believed and acted upon the statement), most
modern judges would say without hesitation that it ought to be treated
as a warranty." 26' This is a substantive fairness argument, intertwined
with the argument of reliance. The promisee is justified in relying on the
assumption that she will get a good object for her good money.
A very similar argument has already been presented. The present
argument is a modem, English version of the older German and French
justifications for conformity obligations, based on the equivalence of
considerations in a reciprocal transaction.26 The main difference between
the two versions is that the German scholars attempted to connect the
equivalence of considerations to the parties' will, while Atiyah links it to
the promisee's reliance. Yet, the closeness between the theories in this
.context is obvious. This closeness reveals that in spite of their emphasis
on subjective elements, the German theories also relied on objective criteria
of fairness. This is particularly conspicuous in the theory shaped by
258. On fairness and other collective concerns in contract law, see generally Braucher,
supra note 241; Johnson, supra note 186; Feinman, supra note 191; Levin & McDowell,
supra note 103; H. Collins, supra note 246; Feinman, supra note 247; Beermann, supra
note 250; P. Atiyah, supra note 109, at 300-31.
259. P. Atiyah, supra note 164; Atiyah. Contracts. Promises and the Law of Obli-
gations, 94 L.Q.R. 193 (1978); Atiyah, supra note 186. See also Raz, Promises in Morality
and Law (Book Review), 95 Harv. L. Rev. 916 (1982) (book review of Atiyah's Promises,
Morals, and Law); Fried, Book Review, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1858 (1980) (reviewing P.
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979)).
260. For example, in his critique of promise as the basis of contractual obligations
(P. Atiyah, supra note 164, at 148), Atiyah stresses that the "implied warranty" of
merchantability can neither be attributed to the promisor's subjective intention, nor to
an objective construction of his words or behavior.
261. P. Atiyah, supra note 164, at 171 (emphasis added).
262. See supra Part IV.A.3, and the references therein.
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Krickmann and Sfiss, a theory that expressly refers to the principle of
good faith.23
Another method of grounding conformity rules on fairness involves
the considerations discussed in relation to the economic analysis.26 Like
other efficiency considerations in various contexts, these considerations
may equally serve as fairness arguments.2 The factors that tend to make
the promisor a "superior risk bearer" (her greater knowledge of the
object's characteristics, her greater ability to monitor the production of
the object or its procurement from third party, her control of the object
prior to its delivery, her greater capability of spreading the risk of non-
conformity, etc.), are equally relevant to fairness analysis. In light of all
these factors, and regardless of any consequentialist viewpoint, it is only
fair that the promisor, rather than the promisee, be responsible for the
nonconformity. Usually, she is the one who could more easily prevent
the nonconformity, hence she is the one to blame. Just as one weighs
the relative fault of the parties in tort law, so does one here. Fairness
considerations similarly apply to more specific aspects of conformity rules.
For example, it would be unfair to hold the promisor liable for defects
of which the promisee knew at the time of contracting, or for the object's
conformity to a specific purpose, unknown to the promisor.
Thus, conformity rules are compatible with criteria of fairness. They
are fair both because they support fair equivalence of considerations in
reciprocal contracts, and because the moral responsibility of the promisor
in instances of nonconformity is usually greater than that of the promisee.
4. Altruistic Justification
Perhaps the simplest way to explain the introduction of conformity
rules is on the basis of altruism. A seller acting under the imperative of
"Love thy neighbor as thyself" is required to supply a property suitable
for its ordinary uses, of at least a medium quality, and so on. Since the
promisor is usually in a better position to assure the conformity of the
object,m she must assure it in order. to protect the interests of the
promisee. Since everyone wh9 acts as a promisor in one transaction is
the promisee in other transactions, it should not be difficult for her to
put herself in the promisee's place. Since as a promisee she (like everybody
else) would have disliked and resented the idea of being provided with
a nonconforming object, she must recognize that it is morally wrong to
263. See T. Suss, supra note 18, at 127.34, and supra Part IV.A.3.
264. See supra Part IV.C.
265. For a general discussion on the relations between consequentialist and moral
analyses, see Barnett, Forward: Of Chickens and Eggs-The Compatibility of Moral Rights
and Consequentialist Analyses. 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 611 (1989).
266. See the explanation in supra Part IV.C.3.
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do that to others. This recognition is based not only on a long-term
egotism (the belief that her consideration for the counter-party's interests
will enhance a similar consideration for her own interests in future in-
stances), but also on a true comprehension of the moral virtue of such
altruism. "67
Some support for the hypothesis of altruism as the basis for con-
formity obligations may be found in the history of the conflict between
conformity and caveat emptor in the Anglo-American law. The doctrine
of caveat emptor, the antithesis of conformity, emerged alongside the rise
of individualism and the decline of moral and religious altruism, since
the seventeenth century.28 Contrarily, since the middle of the nineteenth
century, conformity rules evolved and expanded along with the decline
of individualism and the rise of more communitarian and collective views
in social, political and legal thinking.26 These processes may indicate that
moral ideas of mutual consideration and altruism are an appropriate
background for the implication of conformity obligations, while individ-
ualistic views are more compatible with an ideology of caveat emptor.270
Fitting the rules of conformity into the altruist mold is not free of
difficulties. Basically, conformity obligations are default rules that can be
contractually waived by the parties. Only under certain circumstances does
the law impose them as compulsory duties. Whereas it is not so difficult
to explain compulsory regulation of contractual relations (the contracting
process, the performance, and even the content of contractual obligations)
on the basis of altruism, it is harder to so justify default rules. The
possibility to contract around these rules indicates the importance of the
parties' will in this regard.
Indeed, even in the sphere of conformity obligations, and surely in
other aspects, modem contract law is quite far away from adopting a
truly altruistic approach. But this does not prevent one from recognizing
267. On altruism, see T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism 79 (1970). On altruism
in private law, see Kennedy, supra note 104. See also Dowd, Critical Legal Studies:
Beyond Skeptical Jurisprudence, I! J. Contemp. L. 345, 353-58 (1984); Feinman, supra
note 191.
268. See supra note 38.
269. See P. Atiyah, supra note 38, at 571-778, and especially at 771-78. During the
past few years, there have been signs of return to more individualistic attitudes in the
political, economic and legal thinking, at least in some countries (such as the United
States and England). The emergence of the economic analysis of law is but one mani-
festation of this trend (see P. Atiyah, supra note 109, at 30-39). However, it is too early
to evaluate the long-run significance of those changes.
270. In light of the correlation between individualism and caveat emptor, it is not
surprising to find that scholars in the law and economics school seem to be rather hostile
toward conformity obligations, even when imposed as contractual default rules: see supra
notes 232-234. This tendency is striking because such rules are perfectly compatible with
efficiency analysis. See supra Part IV.C.
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the altruistic characteristics of conformity rules. There is an unmistakable
correlation between an inclination towards altruism along the individu-
alism-altruism continuum, and a tendency towards a broad concept of
conformity, along the caveat emptor-conformity continuum.
E. Conclusion
The conclusion is reached that conformity rules are justified in light
of all the pertinent considerations and are compatible with all the relevant
theories about contract law. Rules based on the general concept of con-
formity are compatible with the parties' presumed will, they realize the
reasonable expectations of the parties, and they enhance both efficiency
and fairness. Not all theories may equally be regarded as a basis for the
introduction of conformity default rules. Yet, even those theories that do
not significantly support the principle of conformity (such as the goal of
redistribution, or the theory relying on the promisee's ignorance),"7' def-
initely do not support the opposite view of caveat emptor.
This unanimity is significant for two reasons. First, it emphasizes the
soundness of the principle of conformity in the performanceof contracts.272
Second, it illustrates the interrelations between the different theories.
Theories that are very different in their points of departure refer to like
factors and lead to very similar conclusions when implemented on specific
issues. Thus, in supplementing the parties' will, even individualistic theories
refer to external, objective criteria of good faith. 73 Likewise, fairness and
efficiency are sometimes different labels for exactly the same considera-
tions.27' The above discussion reveals the merits and limits of the various
theories in analyzing the issue of conformity, the broader subject of
contractual default rules, and to some extent even contract law in general.
V. CONCLUSION
This study employed several methodologies in reexamining the ancient,
yet ever recurring problem of nonconformities in the performance of
contracts. The study examined how different legal systems deal with
various instances of nonconformity, and observed the historical devel-
opments of the relevant legal concepts. The comparative survey illustrated
the imperative need for reforms in most legal systems. The great complexity
and disharmony of existing rules, which lead to confusion in the admin-
istration of the rules and to discrimination between substantively similar
271. See supra Parts IV.D.2 and IV.A.2.
272. See Barnett, supra note 265, at 615-17.
273. We refer to the theory shaped by Krilckmann and Silss, on the basis of Windsch-
eid's "Voraussetzung." See T. Siss, supra note 18, at 127-34 and supra Part IV.A.3.
274. See supra Parts IV.C and IV.D.3.
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situations, call for such reforms in both Common Law and Civil Law
systems. It was suggested that such reforms should be founded on a
unified analytical framework, on a general concept of conformity in the
performance of contracts. This study characterized this concept as a
common aspect of the performance of numerous obligations, and delin-
eated the obligations to which it should apply. The study then described
the role of the rules to be formulated within the suggested framework,
and depicted the task of the legislature in providing a satisfactory set of
conformity rules. Following this analytical discussion, the third part of
the study examined the justification for introducing default rules of con-
formity, This examination was based on the various theories about contract
law, and about the role of contractual default rules in particular. The
theoretical analysis showed that conformity default rules are unequivocally
justified.
The background to this study is the apparent discontent with the
existing concepts, rules and doctrines associated with the quality, quantity,
description, title, safety and similar aspects of objects provided under
such contracts as sales, leases and services. This study tried to point the
way towards a better arrangement of this subject, and it is hoped that
legislatures will accept the challenge.
(Vol. 52
